From an article claiming that Western analysts are underestimating “Arab liberalism”:
“Is there such a thing as Arab liberalism? Judging by U.S. mainstream media coverage, the answer is no. Out of ten stories on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), chances are that nine cover terrorism and sectarian violence—and the tenth, government abuse. What is true for media is even truer for other circles of knowledge production. Washington’s MENA-oriented think tanks are transfixed by ISIS-like fanatic groups and focus what is left of their attention on Muslim Brother-type Islamists (though these lost much currency after the popular uprising and military removal of them in Egypt in 2013) as well as on the varieties of despotic regimes ruling the Arab world. Very little space, if any, is devoted to whatever is in between authoritarian establishments and their religious opponents—namely democratic, secular, liberal civil society actors. It is as if they don’t exist—or don’t count.
Yet three years ago, these same characters were making front-page news worldwide. Remember the “Facebook activists” and “Twitter revolutionaries?” Back in 2011, they were the darlings of global media. Reform-minded, free-spirited, and Internet-savvy Arab youths were taking over public squares by the tens of thousands, chanting their contempt of despotism and love of freedom—all without a hint of religious militancy—and ousting reviled dictators. How did that demographic fade to irrelevance after only a few years? What happened?
Realpolitik happened. Soon after the revolutionary dust settled, Arab liberal activists were outmaneuvered by more established, more organized, and more prepared actors. Today the army rules supreme in Egypt; Syria and Iraq are split between terrorist groups and despotic leaders; royal families enjoy an even stronger grip in Gulf countries, Jordan, and Morocco; and Libya is stuck in a bizarre stalemate based on tribal interests and armed militias.”
Well, the problem was and still is that this is a very small minority fighting a very uphill battle and that the majority instead either explicitly or implicitly support the Islamonazi radicals. The latter, not the former, dominate and shape the culture and have all the momentum at the moment. Much because arabs have identified Radical Islam as the successor to Baath socialism (which was an, failed, attempt at secularization) as their current best bet to Arab “greatness” (which is what populations in nations such as China and Russia are driven by to a surprisingly high degree and where a “strong horse” and “caudillo” political culture prevails).
To dismiss the kidnapping of the “Arab spring” (which turned it into the “Arab winter” we are currently witnessing) by Radical Islam as a mere function of “realpolitik” seriously misjudges how widespread the acceptance is of the fundamental values Islamists share with the silent majority on issues such as Sharia law, religion, authority, politics, et cetera. It was a bottom-up kidnapping of the “Arab spring”. Not a top-down kidnapping of the same, as the authors seem to imply. People seem to forget that for example the revolution and theocratic rule in Iran has a popular backing to this day still. The “liberal counter-revolution” there is a very small minority and can do little to overthrow the Iranian regime. Even the “green movement” uprising that was crushed recently merely wanted “a different kind of Islamism”.
If Arab liberalism is “trending” in Arab society, it is from a very low base, and a significant transformation of arab culture is still far away. I hope I am wrong. In my view though, looking at the facts, the author of the article referred to above have made himself guilty of one of the most common mistakes when it comes to analyzing developments in the arab world: projecting Western concepts and patterns of behaviour onto actors in arab society. I am not saying that all development is necessarily linear, it often isn´t. But, I do say that liberal values have a lot of forces against them in arab culture and that these are on a much more fundamental, cultural, level than simply politics is. “Arab liberalism” is a long-term project, to say the least. We are probably talking about 30-100 years rather than 5-10 years. In that time frame a lot of events such as ISIS can and, most probably, will take place. The question is thus not necessarily *whether* “Arab liberalism” will take root in the arab world, but rather how much fallout will there be in that or any other process going forward. We should stop to try to project our wishes for the arab world on the same, how we would like it to function, and instead acknowledge the way it does function at the moment and probably will continue to function. Because for the foreseeable future, at least, “Arab liberalism” is not a force to be reckoned with in any broad sense or manner. Unfortunately so.
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