ATHENS — Greece and Turkey’s competing bids to win U.S. attention, money and weapons are roiling the region, with war already raging next door.

The longtime Mediterranean rivals have suddenly found themselves in a prominent position as the U.S. and its Western allies reorient their military forces to constrain Russia’s march into Ukraine, which sits just across the Black Sea from Turkey and northeast of Greece. And both countries are playing different cards to argue that it — and not the other — is the most important nearby ally for the U.S. and NATO. 

Greece wants to be known as the “reliable and predictable ally,” while Turkey is offering a ready military and connections beyond the West.

Already an EU and NATO ally, Greece has granted the U.S. military open-ended access to pivotal military bases and is now taking in U.S. liquefied natural gas. Notably, Greece also isn’t run by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has irked U.S. officials with Russian weapons purchases and anti-democratic behavior.

“Greece is projecting its usefulness in contrast to Turkey, and the role it could play for the U.S., together with a group of other allies, as an alternative, since they cannot trust Erdoğan,” said Constantinos Filis, director of the Institute of Global Affairs and a professor of international relations at the American College of Greece.

But Athens can’t change some facts, Filis noted: “The West sees Turkey as a very important ally for them, a political hinge in the region, a very large market and an army willing to go on various missions.” 

Indeed, Turkey is portraying itself as uniquely suited to facilitate between Russia and Ukraine. The country has tried to broker talks to restart Ukrainian grain exports, welcomed both Russian exiles and Ukrainian refugees, and supplied Kyiv with drones, even as it dodges joining Western sanctions against Moscow.

“Turkey is trying to position itself diplomatically to leverage the influence it has achieved during the war in Ukraine,” said Sinan Ülgen, a former Turkish diplomat who is now a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels.

The dueling pitches are driving local instability.

Erdoğan cut off all bilateral talks with Greece after Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis urged U.S. lawmakers in person to block Turkish arms sales. Military provocations soon soared, creating the most volatile situation since the two sides almost came to blows in 2020.

With elections on the horizon in both Greece and Turkey — and powerful U.S. supplies at stake — deescalation is not expected any time soon.

“The posturing has more to do with broader geopolitical positioning amid shifting balances than domestic politics,” said Emre Peker, a Turkey and EU expert at risk analysis firm Eurasia Group. “So, the structural tensions are here to stay.”

The simmer begins to boil

Greece and Turkey’s shifting relationships with the U.S. had already created low-simmering tensions between the two countries even before Russia launched its war in Ukraine.

In recent years, Greece has grown tighter than ever with the U.S. as historic skepticism toward the global superpower thawed and Turkey became a regular irritant to the Western alliance. American corporate money started flowing into Greece. Athens welcomed the U.S. military into new bases throughout Greece.

Inevitably, however, the developments spilled into the Greece-Turkey relationship.

“The Greek government portrays the U.S. bases as a deterrent to Turkey, but in reality, their presence has nothing to do with Turkey,” said Ülgen, the former Turkish diplomat. 

“This political communication strategy has been adopted by the nationalists in Turkey, who repeat the same argument,” he added. “They say, ‘Look what the U.S. and Greece are doing against us,’ and this further escalates the situation between the two countries.”

After the Ukraine war broke out in February, Greece and Turkey both took steps that bolstered their standing in Washington’s eyes.

Greece swiftly began shipping weapons to Ukraine despite considerable dissension at home, eventually earning a shoutout from the U.S. Defense Department. Turkey passed along the drones that gave Ukraine precision air-strike capabilities, which proved critical to its defense.

Later, Greece even seized an Iranian oil tanker off the Greek coast at Washington’s request, suffering consequences for helping its ally when Iran grabbed two Greek oil tankers in response.

Initially, it also seemed Greece and Turkey may set aside some of their differences in favor of wartime unity — Mitsotakis and Erdoğan met in March, furthering those hopes. 

Yet the two countries were quickly back at odds, with the U.S. occasionally at the center.

In May, Mitsotakis flew to Washington and made headlines in Greek and Turkish media when he warned Congress in a high-profile address that arms sales to Turkey would exacerbate instability in the region.

Turkey has been seeking a reprieve on weapons purchases from the U.S. since being cut out of the American F-35 fighter jet program over its purchase of a Russian air defense system. It’s now seeking F-16 jets instead.

Yet during his trip, not only did Mitsotakis try to tank Ankara’s F-16 purchase, but he also confirmed Greece now wanted to buy the F-35s Turkey can no longer access. 

“There is no one named Mitsotakis for me anymore,” Erdoğan fumed in response.

“Mitsotakis taking his gripes with Turkey to Congress really did not go down well in Ankara,” said Peker, the EU expert with Eurasia Group. “It’s not only a personal affront to Erdoğan, who puts a lot of stock into bilateral relations, but also undermines broader Turkish trust in a working mechanism between Ankara and Athens.”

Turkey may now be indirectly taking its case to the U.S. via NATO, where Ankara has halted Sweden and Finland’s attempts to join the military alliance.

While Turkish officials argue the countries can’t be admitted until they end support for Kurdish groups that Ankara deems to be terrorist organizations, observers say Turkey also sees an opportunity to arm-twist Washington into approving its request to buy dozens of U.S. F-16 warplanes. 

“NATO and the U.S. are a point of reference for both countries,” said Filis, the Institute of Global Affairs director. 

From words to actions

In the meantime, Greece and Turkey’s rhetorical barbs are translating into the physical realm — and further reeling in the U.S. 

Each country has accused the other of airspace violations, while high-ranking Turkish officials are also challenging the sovereignty of Greek islands in the Aegean Sea. Turkey’s national oil company, meanwhile, is vowing to start drilling for gas in disputed waters. 

At the land borders, Greek officials said they have deployed more personnel and sent water cannons, tear gas and flash grenades to deter any possible mass entry of migrants. The goal is to avoid a repeat of March 2020, when Erdoğan declared the borders open amid a spat with Athens, letting thousands of people try to cross into Greece.

Inevitably, these bilateral disputes spill over into international arenas — the United Nations, the European Union and, of course, the U.S., even if it has historically tried to stay neutral during the two countries’ disagreements. 

“Greece’s sovereignty over these islands is unquestionable,” said a U.S. State Department spokesperson, reiterating the usual line from Washington that Greece and Turkey are both important U.S. and NATO allies and should work to resolve their differences diplomatically.

But years of failed diplomacy don’t inspire much hope that bilateral reconciliation is on the horizon. The two countries can’t even agree on what “bilateral” means, said Filis. 

“For Greece, it means we should talk to each other,” he said. “For Turkey, it means don’t go to any third parties” like the U.S.

“But,” he added, “is there any chance that a Greek PM could seriously go to discuss whether the Greek islands belong to Greece or whether Turkey could fly over Greek territory?”