By J Malik
“Goodbye to the West”, wrote Joschka Fischer, ex-foreign minister of Germany, for Project Syndicate in December. The Washington Post’s Charles Krauthammer similarly declared: “after a mere 25 years, the triumph of the West is over.” With the cataclysmic electoral revolts that were Brexit and Donald Trump in 2016 and with more such events promising to brace the world this year, the alliance commonly referred to as “the West” may be nearing its end.
With the rise of this profound turbulence, talk of the term “world order” has once again entered the mainstream. The ruling arrangements that have prevailed in the world since 1945, and certainly since 1990, may be challenged like never before. To some, this is deeply worrying. Eastern Europeans worry about weakening unity and deterrence in the face of an aggressive Russian neighbour. East Asian allies wonder if the US presence underpinning stability and strategic “balance” in the South China Sea is about to become a thing of the past. Middle Easterners worry US withdrawal from the region, and Syria in particular, could leave Iranian and Russian proxy advances unchecked.
For Muslims, this broad development is marked by truly conflicting sentiments. The rise of populism in the West has disproportionately drawn from anti-migrant and specifically anti-Muslim sentiment, potentially affecting the fortunes of millions of Muslims living there. Post-Brexit Britain is already beefing up domestic surveillance and making counter-terrorism legislation even more discriminatory. It also threatens to have knock-on effects on foreign policy. One can hardly imagine a President Trump exercising the restraint of President Obama in distinguishing between Islam and its extremist adherents or showing remorse for collateral damage amidst the pursuit of militant leaders with drone strikes, for example.
Internationally, the picture is more ambiguous. The Middle East is engulfed in two nefarious battles today. Iran and Saudi Arabia, the two titans on either side of the Persian Gulf, are jockeying for influence in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and Bahrain, arming opposing sides in three separate civil wars. For the most part, the once-inspirational Arab Spring has petered out into a collection of dismal counter-revolutions, with the resurrection of dictatorship in Egypt and descent into chaos in Libya, Yemen and Syria.
“The recession of Western activism may amplify already-burgeoning dictatorial resurgence in the region”
On the Arab-Persian rivalry, Western retreat bodes ill. Russia has firmly chosen the side of Iran in backing the brutal Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, forming an awkward new axis. As US and European support potentially dwindles in key countries like Iraq and Syria, this will push regional Muslim powers to step up further. Given Iran’s strategy of backing militias in conflicts across the Arabian Peninsula has worked so violently well, the nation is likely to be only encouraged as the more vacuums emerge to be filled. As Iran so successfully “captured” influence in Baghdad, it may again seek to do so more decisively in Aden, Aleppo and beyond. Backed on occasion by Russian hard-power and combined with genuine Shia grievances in Yemen, Bahrain and oil-rich provinces in the East of Saudi Arabia, this would be a truly menacing threat.
Assuming continued Iranian aggression should not be a given. After all, the Iranian electorate did opt for the most moderate Presidential candidate on offer in 2014, Hassan Rouhani. Whilst he has not yet indicated any flexibility over the Syrian conflict, which is close to the Revolutionary Guards’ core interests, he may not particularly desire to spread further instability in a region already teetering on the edge. Furthermore, expecting Sunni regional powers to step up would be unwise. Already, in the battle against ISIS since 2014 and in Yemen, countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE and Jordan have already been engaged in hot conflict. The Saudi-Emirati expedition to Yemen has made little progress, suffered substantial casualties and quickly proved the limits of hard power in urban conflicts. The ability of this Sunni axis of stable monarchies to resist further Iranian encroachment does not seem automatically viable; with low oil prices undermining massive Gulf military budgets and emerging war-weariness amongst comfortable domestic populations, appetite for any new theatre of civil conflict seems non-existent.
In addition, the recession of Western activism may amplify already-burgeoning dictatorial resurgence in the region. The West’s role in supporting democracy and human rights in the Middle East is undoubtedly dubious; the dictatorships toppled by the Arab Spring were enabled in large part by consistent US diplomatic cover and military funding. However, we should be under no illusion; the advancing alternative of an emboldened Iranian-Russian presence that is only too happy to work with brutal Arab dictators will only weaken struggling pro-democracy movements further. Already, Egypt’s President Sisi has declared the re-establishment of ties with fellow-brute Assad in Syria and shown support for Libya’s renegade General Haftar; the emergence of a broader dictatorial partnership seems far from unlikely.
Elsewhere, the picture may be more mixed. US retreat may force countries like Malaysia and Indonesia towards closer relations both with one another and their Asian neighbours, despite the plethora of territorial disputes and historical controversies between them. Western pressure on Myanmar to protect human rights as its economy opens up may wither further, as Chinese advances convince its generals (and tarnished Nobel Peace Laureate) that they can get away with outright ethnic cleansing. The Sino-Pakistani alliance may feel more confident if India feels less able to depend on American support. Sub-Saharan African nations may benefit from not being invaded by “peacekeepers” from France every other year.
More broadly however, the question of leadership is essential. When powers recede, regardless of their own merits, the vacuums a hasty retreat leaves can leave nasty messes in their wake. Witness the collapse of Iraqi society after the demise of Saddam, the genocide of Bosnia after the death of Tito, the descent of Europe into the chaos of World War I after the fall of the “Iron Chancellor” Bismarck. Western retreat may leave vacuums particularly in the Middle East, as well South Asia and South-East Asia simultaneously, even in best-case scenarios. In the context of near-perpetual instability in the world of Islam, who might fill the gap? After all, the opportunity for Muslim solutions to Muslim problems and the restoration of national sovereignties and collective pride, may be a welcome opportunity.
Here, there seems no obvious candidate. Until 2011, ascendant and newly-confident Turkey had captured the hearts and minds of the “Arab Street”; Erdogan’s was met in various Arab capitals by thronging crowds, as in Cairo shortly after the toppling of Mubarak. Turkey has the highest GDP of any Muslim country, the 14th largest military budget in the world and the closest relations with Europe. Yet after the Egyptian coup of 2013, the Sunni Arab world was bitterly divided, with Turkey losing out due to its perceived partisan support of Egypt’s outgoing Muslim Brotherhood government. A swift hit to relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates undermined Turkey’s ambitions of regional leadership, as did the floundering of Islamist parties in every country bar Tunisia and Morocco. A recent thaw in relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia under the latter’s new king Salman bin Abdul Aziz may ease this tension.
“Muslim solutions for Muslim problems should mean opportunity for cautious celebration…”
Yet Turkey is no longer an acceptable candidate to many. In popular Arab narratives, the supposed revival of neo-Ottomanism is unwelcome. Whilst Arab nationalism died long ago, in some quarters one of its remnants is firm opposition to any idea of Turkish supremacy. Beyond this are few contenders. In the Arab world, Egypt ceded its political primacy in the 1970s and its eccentric new dictator has won few friends. Saudi Arabia has jockeyed for Sunni leadership but its bitter row with Iran and an oncoming bout of the “Vietnam Syndrome” after its quagmire in Yemen have dimmed its already-dubious international standing. Iran is isolated and partisan, Indonesia distant and Pakistan too embroiled in domestic insecurity.
Precisely one of the obstacles to UN Security Council reform is that it would be folly to grant permanent membership to countries like India, Brazil, Germany and Japan without giving the Muslim world a single seat. That the Muslim world uniting on a single candidate is such a ridiculously unlikely scenario is a serious dilemma. Such is our condition. Western retreat and Muslim solutions for Muslim problems should mean opportunity for cautious celebration but in reality we may not be ready to fill such a vacuum anytime soon.
The West is in trouble: an opportunity or danger for the Muslim world? was originally published in Convivencia Magazine on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.
