My 2012 Book "Paramilitarism and the Assault on Democracy" provided a detailed documentation and investigation of paramilitarism in Haiti in the lead up to and following the 2004 Coup d'état It looked at the manner in which paramilitary groups (and those facilitating them) altered from the Duvlierist era up through the early twenty first century. Below I want to briefly address the reviews that the book has received.
The book has generally received positive reviews (Kaussen, 2015; Anglade, 2014; Podur, 2014; Smith, 2013; Pierre, 2013; Poinsette, 2013; Taylor, 2013; Barker, 2012; Fernandez, 2012; Wisskirchen, 2012, Tomes, 2012; Terral, 2012; Scherr, 2012). However some authors have also made criticisms of aspects of the book, such as, that (1) it did not theorize clearly the phenomenon of paramilitarism (Gutiérrez, 2015), that (2) it emphasizes too much the role of agency, but not enough the structural conditions (Gros, 2015), that (3) it failed to theorize and analyze the nature of the "failed" or weak state (Gros, 2015), that (4) the book at times exhibits "a certain kind of determinism in explaining the actions of the popular classes and elites" (Smith, 2014), that (5) it was too uncritical of FL (Fans Lavalas), as Gros (2015) claims the FL political project aggravated the "formal structure, such as the state, and the informal rules and norms embedded in culture", or that it was too apologist for the relatively moderate policies of the Aristide government (Gutiérrez, 2015), that the book included (6) a haphazard mention of the conflict in Colombia (Gutiérrez, 2015), and (7) that it failed to recognize that paramilitarism is actually rooted in a culture of banditry and the lack of a local culture of forgiveness, for example without the existence of the word "sorry" in Haitian kreyol. (Gros, 2015)
On points 1 and 2 I completely agree, and these are areas in which I have tried to improve upon in a forthcoming article with the scholarly journal Third World Quarterly (an altered version of this forthcoming article can be found here in french) and deal with in more length in my forthcoming book (Sprague-Silgado, 2018). On point 3 I agree partially: the analysis of paramilitarism does need a better theorization of the role of the state, however I do not agree with the "failed state" argument that Gros (2015) says I need. The “failed state” approach of political scientists tends to place most of the blame for "failed states" on the role of local state officials, rather than to historically contextualize the weaknesses of these states through underdevelopment, colonialism, imperialism, and for instance, the role of powerful interests in undermining progressive, leftist, and statist political projects, and how different social groups and social forces congeal and operate through state apparatuses.
On point 4, Smith is largely correct; the book does need a more nuanced explanation of class conflict and class relations, recognizing more clearly the many contradictions and various intermediary groups and complexities of social reproduction and contingent relations. For point 5, yes, it is true that the book could look more critically at the policies of FL and its officials, but as these criticisms have been repeated ad nauseum and often in ways that completely ignore the struggle and positive achievements of the Lavalas movement, I felt compelled to focus my narrative on the underreported and largely uninvestigated role of powerful groups in undermining and overthrowing the country’s reformist and constitutionally legitimate government. I felt compelled to draw attention to the unreported violence by rightist paramilitary groups that targeted so many from the country’s popular classes. Also, as elaborated upon in my book, I do agree with some of the criticisms of FL that Hallward (2008), for instance, has made, as in regards to its disorganization and many of its compromises and failures. On point 6 I completely agree here with Gutiérrez (2015), that my brief one sentence digression into discussing Colombia in the conclusion of my book should have been left out, as the sentence I included was based upon comments made to me by a former narco-trafficker that I interviewed and should have been further investigated. It seems odd though that Gutiérrezdismisses the entire book because of this one digression.
In regards to point 7, in my view Gros blames Haitian culture for what is so obviously foreign and domestic elite sponsored violence over these years. Could he really have missed that US troops and paramilitary forces - not his so called "bandits" - actually carried out the coup and pre-coup and post-coup paramilitary violence? At one point Gros (2015), in his review of my book, describes Emanuel Constant (the founder of the FRAPH death squads) as a popular figure. Where does he get that? Would he have been as popular as the founder of FLRN, Guy Philippe, who in the 2006 election was able to win a massive 2% of the vote? Shouldn't the defective culture have registered some impact at the polls? And was the "popular" Constant shielded in Haiti - by its defective culture - or through the activities of the U.S. embassy, the CIA, and their local allies? Gros' review stands out in that it feels as if it were written by two people: the first half careful and reasonable, the second part by someone that possibly skipped over much of the book. In regards to his claim that no word for “sorry” exists in Haitian Kreyol, he must be aware that phrases with similar meanings exist: “Mande Padon” to ask for forgiveness, or, depending on the situation, "dezole, ekskiz" for saying sorry for a simple mistake.
With such a detailed, and at times admittedly tedious text to read (as Kaussen (2015) rightly points out), many readers of my 2012 book likely did not get through the entire 400 pages, such as appears to be the case with Gutiérrez (2015) who never mentions the book’s most important insights in his brief review: such as, for the first time, showing: (1) that US/UN officials closely oversaw the integration of ex-paramiltiaries into Haiti’s police force, (2) its detailed documentation of the role of Dominican government officials, specific Haitian elites, and foreign intelligence officials in facilitating paramilitary violence-- going into much, much greater detail and investigative work than even Hallward’s (2008) excellent study, and (3) laying out a complex and difficult to piece together chronology of the paramilitary campaign.
The vast majority of my 2012 book was written while I was focused on investigative and historical research, and had not yet integrated this with a more nuanced global political economy approach. I have attempted in this french article (the english version forthcoming in Third World Quarterly) to provide a brief breakdown of the findings and argument in the book, alongside a more structurally grounded and theorized approach to understanding paramilitarism in the context of political tensions, social conflicts, and economic restructuring.
The vast majority of my 2012 book was written while I was focused on investigative and historical research, and had not yet integrated this with a more nuanced global political economy approach. I have attempted in this french article (the english version forthcoming in Third World Quarterly) to provide a brief breakdown of the findings and argument in the book, alongside a more structurally grounded and theorized approach to understanding paramilitarism in the context of political tensions, social conflicts, and economic restructuring.
References
Anglade, Boaz. (2014) Review of Paramilitarim and the Assault on Democracy in Haiti, Race & Class, Vol. 56, No. 1, pp. 104-106.
Barker, Michael. (2012) “Paramilitarism in the Age of Democracy,” The Bullet, E-Bulletin No. 718.
Fernandez, Belen (2012) Review of Paramilitarism and the Assault on Democracy in Haiti. Al Jazeera-English.
Gros, Jean-Germain (2015) review of "Paramilitarism and the Assault on Democracy in Haiti," Journal of World-Systems Research, Vol. 21, No. 1, Winter/Spring, pp. 232-235.
Gutierrez, Jose (2015) review of "Paramilitarism and the Assault on Democracy in Haiti," Social Movement Studies: Journal of Social, Cultural and Political Protest, Vol. 14, No. 4.
Hallward, Peter (2008) Damming the Flood: Haiti, Aristide, and the Politics of Containment. London, UK: Verso.
Pierre, Hyppolite (2013) “Democratic Struggle in Haiti: Jeb Sprague’s Account,” Eurasia Review.
Podur, Justin (2014) Review of Paramilitarism and the Assault on Democracy in Haiti, Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History, Vol. 15, No. 3.
Poinsette, Bruce (2013)“New Book Details History of Paramilitary Violence inHaiti,” The Skanner.
Kaussen, Valerie. (2015) review of "Paramilitarism and the Assault on Democracy in Haiti," New West Indian Guide, Vol. 89, No. 1-2, pp. 116-118.
Scherr, Judith (2012) “Book Exposes Violent Role of Paramilitaries in Haiti,” Inter Press Service.
Smith, Matthew J. (2013), "Review of Paramilitarism and the Assault on Democracy in Haiti," WorkingUSA: The Journal of Labor & Society, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 411-413.
Sprague-Silgado, Jeb (2018) The Caribbean and Global Capitalism. Forthcoming.
Taylor, Joe (2013) Review of Paramilitarism and the Assault on Democracy in Haiti, National Community Activist Network.
Terral, Ben (2012) Review of Paramilitarism and the Assault on Democracy in Haiti. Counterpunch.
Tomes, Adam (2012) Review of Paramilitarism and the Assault on Demolcracy in Haiti. Counterfire.
Wisskirchen, Christian (2012), “Paramilitarism in Haiti continues … and is the US (once more) lending a helping hand,” Haiti Support Group.
