In 2014 I began a series of posts on how Semantic Granularity is flexible, using (a linguistic analogue of) Kripke's puzzle about belief as the initial motivator.
I recently noted with interest that a new paper by Stewart Shapiro, which focuses on the debate about whether different logics confer different meanings on the logical particles, defends essentially the same idea.
Any notion of content, we suggest, must be either implausibly coarse-grained or implausibly fine-grained (or both)' (that's from the abstract).
It seems like the time has well and truly arrived for this idea. Whereas Bjerring and Schwarz frame the flexibility of ordinary Semantic notions as an unfortunate problem for the theorist, I think it's exciting news that we're beginning to realize better how they work!
Here is a draft of a paper: Semantic Granularity is Flexible (and I Feel Fine). Comments welcome - either comment on this post or email me ([email protected] without the 3).
I recently noted with interest that a new paper by Stewart Shapiro, which focuses on the debate about whether different logics confer different meanings on the logical particles, defends essentially the same idea.
Any notion of content, we suggest, must be either implausibly coarse-grained or implausibly fine-grained (or both)' (that's from the abstract).
It seems like the time has well and truly arrived for this idea. Whereas Bjerring and Schwarz frame the flexibility of ordinary Semantic notions as an unfortunate problem for the theorist, I think it's exciting news that we're beginning to realize better how they work!
Here is a draft of a paper: Semantic Granularity is Flexible (and I Feel Fine). Comments welcome - either comment on this post or email me ([email protected] without the 3).
