During the Christmas season of 2023, I posted a Neil Oliver GB News video explaining the various seasonal traditions, one of which was the Christmas tree.

In the video, a youngish German professor explained that, for centuries, Germans used fir boughs to remember their vanquishing of the invading Romans during the latter’s empire period.

I had never thought of Romans invading what is now Germany, but, on Monday, January 29, 2024, The Guardian had an article about their ancient tribes’ biggest defeat of a military superpower in AD 9, ‘”Their heads were nailed to the trees”: what was life — and death like for Roman legionnaires?’

The article is an appetite-whetter for a new exhibit at the British Museum, Legion: Life in the Roman Army, running from February 1 through June 23, 2024.

Returning to the Germanic tribes, what follows is the introduction to The Guardian‘s article. Keep in mind that Jesus Christ was a small child on earth at the time. Amazing.

The story begins in retrospect, with the discovery of the ruins from AD 9 (emphases mine):

It is one of the most chilling passages in Roman literature. Germanicus, the emperor Tiberius’s nephew, is leading reprisals in the deeply forested areas east of the Rhine, when he decides to visit the scene of the catastrophic defeat, six years before, of his fellow Roman, Quinctilius Varus. The historian Tacitus describes what Germanicus finds: the ghastly human wreckage of a supposedly unbeatable army, deep in the Teutoburg Forest. “On the open ground,” he writes, “were whitening bones of men, as they had fled, or stood their ground, strewn everywhere or piled in heaps. Near lay fragments of weapons and limbs of horses, and also human heads, prominently nailed to trunks of trees.”

Survivors pointed out the spot where Varus had killed himself, and the place where the military standards had been flaunted by the victors. “A living Roman army,” writes Tacitus of Germanicus’s visit, “had come to bury the dead men’s bones. No one knew if the remains he was burying belonged to a stranger or a comrade.” Three whole legions, perhaps 15,000 men, had been slaughtered – as well as the slaves, women and children who would probably have been with them.

Varus’s defeat in AD9 resonated in the later Roman imaginarium as a moment of unparalleled horror and humiliation. On terrain of their own choosing, the Roman military – professional, numerous, disciplined, well-equipped – had proved unbeatable for centuries. But, like many supposedly superior fighting forces since, from the Americans and their allies in Afghanistan to the Russians trundling south towards Kyiv, they were vulnerable when tricked, ambushed, trapped in a bottleneck and cut off from reinforcements.

The Varian disaster, as the Romans called it, did not mean that the empire ceased expanding. But it did mean that Rome’s borders never extended east of the Rhine.

The Germanic victor’s name was Arminius, or Herman, as he is called nowadays. The article says that, in the 19th century, he began to be seen as the father of German nationhood. Interestingly, that would have been around the time Prince Albert brought Christmas trees into Britain’s royal palaces for the first time.

The article tells us that Arminius and the tribes’ victory became an historic reference point in Germany during the 1930s and again now with the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) Party, which narrowly lost a run-off district election in Thuringia last week.

Treachery: an inside job

There were battles between the Romans and Germanic tribes from the decades before Christ through the third century, but Arminius’s win over his military superiors was by far the greatest.

Arminius had a foot in both camps, which contributed greatly to his victory.

Wikipedia’s entry on the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest has the fascinating story.

Arminius was born in what was then called Germania. The son of a nobleman, the Romans abducted him in 8 BC, when Drusus defeated his tribe. Arminius would have been ten years old at the time. Because of his high status, the Romans gave him an excellent education in Rome and made him a citizen. He then embarked on a military career:

When he came of age, he joined the ordo equester (the Roman cavalry), which would later lead to his appointment as a commander of Roman auxiliaries. By 4 AD he was serving in Pannonia (in the northwestern Balkan states). Soon after, he returned to his homeland in Germania, still nominally loyal to Rome.^[43]

He married a young noblewoman from Germania, Thusnelda, although his father-in-law was opposed to the union, more about which later.

Historians surmise that Arminius would have remembered a few facts about previous Roman incursions into Germania:

Historian McNally suggests that two important events shaped Arminius’s view of the Romans: an ambush in 11 BC led by the Cherusci against Drusus, and Drusus’ victory over the Cherusci in 8 BC. In the ambush in 11 BC, the Cherusci had trapped Drusus’ army in unfavorable terrain, and the Romans escaped only with great difficulty. Drusus’ victory in 8 BC would have been unforgettable to Arminius, who had been made a hostage because of it. From these events, McNally argues that Arminius surmised a key lesson: “the Romans could be defeated, but only in a situation where their tactical flexibility and discipline could not be brought to bear.”^[43]

Unbeknownst to his commanding officer Varus, to whom he became a trusted advisor, Arminius began building an alliance among heretofore mutually hostile Germanic tribes:

These probably included the Cherusci,^[23]Marsi,^[23]Chatti,^[23] and Bructeri.^[23] These were some of the fifty Germanic tribes at the time.^[32]Using the collective outrage over Varus’ tyrannous insolence and wanton cruelty to the conquered,^[33]Arminius was able to unite the disorganized groups who had submitted in sullen hatred to the Roman dominion, and maintain the alliance until the most opportune moment to strike.^[34]

At the time, the Romans had 11 legions in Germania. While Arminius was building up his tribal alliance, Rome decided to send eight of those legions to the Balkans, meaning that only three legions remained in Germania.

At this point, Arminius seized the day, deceiving Varus from the start:

While Varus was on his way from his summer camp west of the River Weser to winter headquarters near the Rhine, he heard reports of a local rebellion, reports which had been fabricated by Arminius.^[24]Edward Shepherd Creasy writes that “This was represented to Varus as an occasion which required his prompt attendance on the spot; but he was kept in studied ignorance of its being part of a concerted national rising; and he still looked on Arminius as his submissive vassal”.^[35]

Varus was no fool. In fact, he was something of a golden boy in Rome, rising to great positions at a young age:

Varus was a promising leader: Emperor Augustus appointed him as quaestor in 22 BC as a young man even though the office usually required one to be at least 30. He went on to command the XIX legion in 15 BC, and was elected junior consul. He was appointed governor of Africa in 8 BC, and of Syria in 7 BC. The Syrian posting was considered prestigious and was a very difficult job due to the political struggles in the Eastern Empire and its border nations. Varus proved himself a capable governor, acting to solve the succession crisis after the death of Herod the Great in 4 BC. His ultimate performance as governor is disputed by contemporary sources. Josephus (writing some decades after the fact) gives a positive view of Varus, whereas Velleius Paterculus implicitly accuses Varus of corruption in office. At any rate, Varus married the Emperor’s great-niece after his term as governor ended, ensuring him a spot in the Emperor’s inner circle. Varus likely remained with the Emperor in Rome until his appointment to the command in Germania in 7 AD.^[36] Historian McNally assesses that Varus was not assigned to Germania for his military abilities, but rather his political acumen; his skill as a politician was likely sought out by the Emperor in order to deal with the factionalism that plagued the Germanic tribes.^[37]

Varus’s name and deeds were well known beyond the empire because of his ruthlessness and crucifixion of insurgents. While he was feared by the people, he was highly respected by the Roman Senate. On the Rhine, he was in command of the XVII, XVIII, and XIX legions. These had previously been led by General Gaius Sentius Saturninus, who had been sent back to Rome after being awarded the ornamenta triumphalia.^[38] The other two legions in the winter-quarters of the army at castrum Moguntiacum^[33] were led by Varus’ nephew, Lucius Nonius Asprenas,^[30] and perhaps Lucius Arruntius.

… it is unclear how many men were truly under his command at the battle of the Teutoburg Forest; estimates generally range from 20,000 to 30,000. Of his five starting legions, only three were under his command at the battle (~15,000 men), supported by nine small auxiliary units (~4,500 men). Winter attrition due to casualties, illness, and other causes would have sapped the legions’ strength … Recent reforms had required that legionaries be unmarried, which meant that families were no longer part of the camp following. McNally puts the likely number of civilians at a few hundred, mostly merchants who would have followed the army knowing that their goods would be of considerable value during the long campaigning season. McNally, assuming 10% winter attrition, and an auxiliary force of about 4,000 after attrition, comes up 17,000 combatants, supported by roughly 3,800 servant non-combatants. Combined with the civilians, the army would have numbered about 21,000 at the start of campaigning. But this number was probably less by the time of the battle, as further attrition combined with the need to detach garrisons along the way would have sapped the army’s strength.^[41]

Historians also dispute how many men Arminius had under his command. A reasonable estimate would be between 20,000 and 30,000.

Equally important were armour and armaments. The men from the Germanic tribes:

were not just mere farmers, they were experienced soldiers in their own right, even if not outfitted by the state as the Romans were. But the Germanic army was generally worse outfitted than the Romans. Most had no armor and would have been limited to a simple shield and a hunting spear or axe. There was a gradation in equipment quality according to the wealth and status of the fighter. Those fighters who would have held command roles, or been part of a chief’s guard would have carried a heavy spear and a number of javelins, along with various other secondary weapons. Those fighters would also have had high quality shields. Still, armor was very rare and would had to have been acquired as spoils of war from defeated Romans, or perhaps from time serving as a Roman auxiliary.^[44]

Weather was another consideration in battle. Fighting commenced in March and ended in October, when armies returned to their winter camps. This battle took place during early September.

By early 9 AD, Varus had his campaign plan for the year:

The disparate elements of the army would meet at Vetera (modern day Xanten, Germany), cross the Rhine, march to Cherusci territory while resupplying garrisons on the way, and then set up a summer camp in nominally pacified Cherusci lands from which to base summer operations.^[45]

However, Arminius was already plotting:

… unbeknownst to Varus, he had already been betrayed. The idea of setting up a summer camp in Cherusci lands was a ploy by Arminius, who was still Varus’s trusted confidant. By being in the homeland of Arminius, the Cherusci could carefully observe the Romans during the summer, and the Romans would have to make a longer trek back to their winter headquarters. Then, while on the long march back, the Romans could be ambushed in terrain favorable to Arminius. It is unknown and probably unknowable as to when Arminius decided to turn against Rome; perhaps it occurred during his time as a hostage, or even as late as his service in Germania under Varus. Regardless, his mind was made up by early 9 AD when he began deceiving Varus and recruiting Germanic chieftains to his cause. It is doubtful that Arminius imagined he would strike a total victory against the Romans, and thus he had to build a coalition of tribes together in order to wage what could have been a protracted war.^[46]

During the summer, the Roman troops engaged in civil engineering projects while Varus attempted to govern the tribes.

Meanwhile:

The summer proved to be crucial for Arminius, who along with his auxiliaries, was attached to the main Roman army. He bided his time during the early part of the summer, but the clock was running out, and he still needed to orchestrate an ambush. Thus in July, he ordered some of his allies to start raiding the Romans. Then, he counseled Varus to split off a detachment of troops to go put down unrest. Varus acceded, thereby splitting his own forces. Arminius further arranged for his own Cherusci auxiliaries to find Roman work parties, approach them as if nothing was unusual, and then betray the Romans while in their midst. Historian McNally chastises Varus for not improving security or otherwise realizing that a larger plan was afoot.^[51]

At this point, Arminius’s father-in-law nearly ruined his son-in-law’s grand plan:

… Segestes, informed Varus of Arminius’s treachery. But Varus disbelieved this report, perhaps because Segestes had not approved of the marriage of his daughter and thus bore a grudge against Arminius.^[52]

Unrest escalated during the summer as Roman thoughts focussed on making it back to winter camp. Arminius, the trusted adviser, had devised a devious plot:

Other counselors to Varus advised that there was not enough time left in the season to put down unrest and also make it back to winter camp. That would have foiled Arminius’s plans, as the Romans would not only leave before the Germanic troops could be marshalled, but the Romans would also retreat along the same well guarded path they had come in on. In a desperate gamble, Arminius suggested that instead of retracing the army’s path, they could achieve both goals if they went on campaign against the Angrivarii. By going through Angrivarii territory, the route back would be shorter, and the Romans would also be able to put down the revolt. The otherwise boring summer may have increased Varus’s willingness to engage in action, and he chose to follow Arminius’s plan.^[53]

It was all coming together for Arminius, and he soon encountered Varus for the final time:

On the morning of September 7, 9 AD, the Roman army mustered to move out. The muster was combined with the third payday of the year, which resulted in large numbers of coins being distributed to the army. The high density of coins would, some two thousand years later, serve as an archeological marker of the battle site. The morale of the troops was boosted by word that high command authorized looting on the Angrivarii campaign, given that the army would be operating beyond supply lines.^[54]

That evening, Arminius told Varus that he would be breaking off to finish the muster of the Cheruscii auxiliaries, and would be back with the main army in two or three days. It was the men’s final meeting. Arminius left behind a small number of Cheruscii, nominally to act as guides, but their true purpose was to act as spies. The loss of Arminius cut the size of the Roman army by a quarter and deeply curtailed its scouting abilities. Arminius himself hurriedly rode northward to gather the troops of the Angrivarii and Bructeri.^[54]

September 8 spelled the beginning of the end for the Romans, who were negotiating their way through the thick Teutoburg Forest near Kalkriese:

Arminius now only had to ensure that the Romans worked their way towards Kalkriese, where the Angrivarii lay in ambush. To that end, his Bructerii allies attacked the Roman army along its length in the late morning.^[55]

The line of march was now stretched out perilously long—between 15 and 20 kilometres (9.3 and 12.4 mi).^[31] It was in this state when it came under attack by Germanic warriors armed with swords, large lances and narrow-bladed short spears called fremae. The attackers surrounded the entire Roman army and rained down javelins on the intruders.^[56] It was a brief skirmish, aimed at tiring out the Roman troops and causing maximum damage to their supplies. The Bructerii withdrew quickly, likely taking the Cheruscii spies embedded in the Roman army with them.^[55]

The Romans’ luck went from bad to worse as a torrential downpour began. Unable to advance, Varus ordered the army to make camp. A sturdy camp was erected, and Varus called a war council. Casualty reports indicated only light losses, but the baggage trains and scout cavalry were shown to be particularly vulnerable.^[57]

The Romans undertook a night march to escape, but marched into another trap that Arminius had set at the foot of Kalkriese Hill.

There, the Romans were trapped by natural and manmade obstacles, enabling the Germanic men to attack them from cover. There was no escape:

The Germanic warriors then stormed the field and slaughtered the disintegrating Roman forces. Varus committed suicide,^[31] and Velleius reports that one commander, Praefectus Ceionius, surrendered, then later took his own life,^[58] while his colleague Praefectus Eggius died leading his doomed troops.

Roman casualties have been estimated at 15,000–20,000 dead, and many of the officers were said to have taken their own lives by falling on their swords in the approved manner.^[31]Tacitus wrote that many officers were sacrificed by the Germanic forces as part of their indigenous religious ceremonies, cooked in pots and their bones used for rituals.^[59]Others were ransomed and some common soldiers appear to have been enslaved.

All Roman accounts stress the completeness of the Roman defeat …

The victory was followed by a clean sweep of all Roman forts, garrisons and cities (of which there were at least two) east of the Rhine; the two Roman legions remaining in Germania, commanded by Varus’ nephew Lucius Nonius Asprenas, simply tried to hold the Rhine. One fort, Aliso, most likely located in today’s Haltern am See,^[60] fended off the Germanic alliance for many weeks, perhaps even a few months. After the situation became untenable, the garrison under Lucius Caedicius, accompanied by survivors of Teutoburg Forest, broke through the siege and reached the Rhine. They had resisted long enough for Nonius Asprenas to have organized the Roman defence on the Rhine with two legions and Tiberius to have arrived with a new army, together preventing Arminius from crossing the Rhine and invading Gaul.^[61][62]

What happened next

The Emperor Augustus was said to have banged his head against a wall upon hearing of the defeat:

the Emperor Augustus, according to the Roman historian Suetonius in The Twelve Caesars, was so shaken that he stood butting his head against the walls of his palace, repeatedly shouting:

Quintili Vare, legiones redde! (Quintilius Varus, give me back my legions!)

The legion numbers XVII, XVIII and XIX were not used again by the Romans.^[63] This was in contrast to other legions that were reestablished after suffering defeat.

The battle abruptly ended the period of triumphant Roman expansion that followed the end of the Civil Wars forty years earlier. Augustus’ stepson Tiberius took effective control, and prepared for the continuation of the war. Legio II Augusta, XX Valeria Victrix and XIII Gemina were sent to the Rhine to replace the lost legions.

Meanwhile, back in Germania:

Arminius sent Varus’s severed head to Maroboduus, king of the Marcomanni, the other most powerful Germanic ruler, with the offer of an anti-Roman alliance. Maroboduus declined, sending the head to Rome for burial, and remained neutral throughout the ensuing war. Only thereafter did a brief, inconclusive war break out between the two Germanic leaders.^[64]

The battles continued, headed by Germanicus, the commander so named for his forays into the area:

After initial successful skirmishes in summer 15 AD, including the capture of Arminius’ wife Thusnelda,^[69]the army visited the site of the first battle. According to Tacitus, they found heaps of bleached bones and severed skulls nailed to trees, which they buried, “…looking on all as kinsfolk and of their own blood…”. At a location Tacitus calls the pontes longi (“long causeways”), in boggy lowlands somewhere near the Ems, Arminius’ troops attacked the Romans. Arminius initially caught Germanicus’ cavalry in a trap, inflicting minor casualties, but the Roman infantry reinforced the rout and checked them. The fighting lasted for two days, with neither side achieving a decisive victory. Germanicus’ forces withdrew and returned to the Rhine.^[70][71][b]

That year:

Tiberius ordered the Roman forces to halt and withdraw across the Rhine. Germanicus was recalled to Rome and informed by Tiberius that he would be given a triumph and reassigned to a new command.^[79][80][81]

… Arminius, who had been considered a very real threat to stability by Rome, was now defeated. Once his Germanic coalition had been broken and honour avenged, the huge cost and risk of keeping the Roman army operating beyond the Rhine was not worth any likely benefit to be gained.^[31]Tacitus, with some bitterness, claims that Tiberius’ decision to recall Germanicus was driven by his jealousy of the glory Germanicus had acquired, and that an additional campaign the next summer would have concluded the war and facilitated a Roman occupation of territories between the Rhine and the Elbe.^[82][83]

Eventually, the Germanic tribes turned on Arminius:

Arminius would continue to fight against the Romans, but the conflict remained a stalemate. He was poisoned by his fellow Germans in 21 AD, possibly by his own family, who feared his increasing autocracy.^[43]

Dear, oh dear.

The museum

Incredibly, for nearly 2,000 years — roughly the life of Christianity thus far — the site of the battle went undetected.

Equally incredibly, a Briton found the battle site, Kalkriese:

Late 20th-century research and excavations were sparked by finds by a British amateur archaeologist, Major Tony Clunn, who was casually prospecting at Kalkriese Hill (52°26′29″N 8°08′26″E) with a metal detector in the hope of finding “the odd Roman coin”. He discovered coins from the reign of Augustus (and none later), and some ovoid leaden Roman sling bolts. Kalkriese is a village administratively part of the city of Bramsche, on the north slope fringes of the Wiehen, a ridge-like range of hills in Lower Saxony north of Osnabrück. This site, some 100 kilometres (62 mi) north west of Osning, was first suggested by the 19th-century historian Theodor Mommsen, renowned for his fundamental work on Roman history.^{[2][105][106]}

The Guardian article describes the museum and park which now commemorate the battle, although no one in Kalkriese advocates war:

The site of the battle was almost certainly at Kalkriese in today’s Lower Saxony where, in 2002, a museum and battlefield park were opened. There is little to see in this wide field ringed by traces of what was once dense forest – but it is nevertheless a sobering spot. “It was killing fields as far as the eye can see,” says Stefan Burmeister, the museum’s director, describing the aftermath of the ambush. Bones and bodies may have decayed, but the soil is full of phosphates, the chemical traces of the dead, and if you strike the ground with a shovel, he says, there is “a fountain of finds”.

Rising above the museum is a viewing tower, from which the terrain becomes easier to read: the Romans were probably hemmed into a narrow strip of land between swamps to the north and ravines that cut through the chalk hills to the south. The place is deliberately free of any attempted reconstruction; the museum itself is a plain, minimalist building clad in oxidised metal, recalling the rusting iron of weaponry that would have been strewn across a battlefield. A pathway of metal slabs, some inscribed with fragments of Latin, runs across the site.

“It’s a difficult question, how to deal with such a dark historical place,” says Burmeister. “There was so much violence, so much brutality here, thousands of people killed. We don’t want to make it too positive.” By contrast, 100km to the south-east, stands the Hermannsdenkmal – a towering statue of Arminius/Hermann completed in 1875, in a spot once thought to be the battle site. Rising to a height of 53m, the monument radiates “shrill aggression”, to borrow a phrase from Neil MacGregor’s book Germany: Memories of a Nation.

You can read more about the exhibits here, here and here.

I’m not much for battles, but this historically significant one about the Roman Empire and deceit from a Germanic frenemy really captures the imagination. It’s strange that this never found its way into more history books outside of Germany and ancient Rome.