If I Had a Dime for Every Universe
December 17th, 2017
I'd probably only have a dime, despite the strong claims of some that there are many Universes; and this they often claim as a way to avoid the theist-friendly implications of the fine-tuning argument.[1] The fine-tuning argument makes much of the minuscule odds that the the universe would have constants that it does if it were not designed. 'It sure seems designed!' says they. But the multiverse response, one of several made by atheists, argues that there could be a multiverse - countless, perhaps ever-increasing number of universes, hence sooner or later you'd expect a winner to be found, a universe where life could form and exist. We just happen to be in the right one. And in this way they surmise that the design implication of fine-tuning can be successfully routed.
All is not lost for the theist, however; here are two slightly sardonic summations of two responses they can give: (1) Oh, sure there's a multiverse! If you have to take such an outlandish claim to escape the fine-tuning argument, you've conceded its power. (2) Given the vicissitudes of the quantum realm and all the stuff, you'd expect brains to form every once in a while in some of these universes, even if they last only for a moment or two before dissolving. These would outnumber actual observers, and hence, you'd have to embrace the strange conclusion that you're probably a brain that came into being thinking it had a past, and suffering the illusion that the external world is as it appears to you. Also, you'll probably pass out of existence in about a second, so that's too bad.
| Parachutes are for chumps |
Both responses are interesting and worth pursuing, but neither interest me here. Instead, there is a third option available. It grants for the sake of argument that the multiverse hypothesis is able to account for the existence of life-hospitable universe. If you get enough universes that vary in the values of the constants, you'll get one whose constants all fall within the narrow life-hospitable range. The third response begins by noting that, even then odds of any given universe being life-hospitable is bound to be astonishingly small. Then it notes that, if the Christian God exists, we'd be more likely to find universes with life. Thus, this hypothesis better accounts for the fact that we, living beings, exist in a universe that is hospitable for life.
I first found this argument in Taking Pascal's Wager: Faith, Evidence and the Abundant Life (2016) by Michael Rota (from which I will quote, using Kindle pagination). I'll likely write review of this book after I reread it (or most of it) again. But for now, I'll just summarize this argument. Rota makes his fine-tuning case in chapters 6 - 8 of his book, the last of which will be of most interest to us today.
His argument is in the form of a constructive dilemma - (1) A or B; (2) If A, then C. (3) If B, then C. (4) So C. (Loc. 2137-2144). It can be summed up thus:
(1) Either our universe is the only universe, or there are multiple universes.
(2) If ours is the only universe, it is more probable that our universe was designed than that it was not.
(3) If there are multiple universes, it is more probable that our universe was designed than that it was not.
(4) Therefore, it is more probable that our universe was designed than that it was not.
He argues for (2) in the first two chapters, so we will take it for granted here. Indeed, if it is disputed, the atheist need not appeal to the multiverse hypothesis. So we will assume that the atheist who appeals to the multiverse concedes (2). Now, it is rather uncontroversial to say that "either theism or atheism may be true" if the multiverse hypothesis is true, or "God and the multiverse aren’t incompatible". (Loc. 2148-2149, 2169) However, this is more modest than what (3) claims. Why think that it is true? After all, as Rota notes:
If you were at a physics or astronomy conference discussing fine-tuning with the scholars there, you wouldn’t hear much about God or design, but you would hear the term “multiverse". (Loc. 2098-2100)
Rota gets to the heart of matters by noting that by saying that 'eventually you'd find a life-permitting universe' concedes that these universes make up an insignificant portion (of an insignificant portion . . .) of all universes. There is nothing favoring life-permitting universes over non-life-permitting universes, and the kinds of non-life-permitting universes vastly outnumber life-permitting universes, so we should expect only very few universe (like 1 to 10^40 small) to be life permitting. Now, the Christian God would have reason to favor life-permitting universes, and hence we should expect that the percentage of life-permitting universes to be much, much higher. Michael writes:
If we exist in an atheistic multiverse, then the proportion of life-permitting universes will be very small. But if we exist in a multiverse created by God, we should expect the proportion of life-permitting universes to be not nearly so small. (Since life is a good, any intelligent being has a reason to value it, and thus God would have some reason to create more of it.) So the proportion of life-permitting universes will be much higher in a theistic multiverse than in an atheistic multiverse. This in turn implies that the epistemic probability that our universe would be life permitting is much higher on a theistic version of the multiverse hypothesis than on an atheistic version. So if there are many universes, the evidence of fine-tuning favors theism over atheism. Either way, considerations of fine-tuning strongly favor the existence of a universe designer. (Loc. 2149-2155)
What supports the contention that the theistic multiverse hypothesis makes life-permitting universes (generally and our own in particular) more probable?
First, God might very well want to create many universes. Second, the reasons to create many universes that God would have are also reasons to think that a significant proportion of universes created by God would be life-permitting universes. Third, this fact about proportions implies that it is much more likely that the universe we are in fact in would have a life-permitting cosmological constant given a theistic multiverse hypothesis than given an atheistic multiverse hypothesis. (Loc. 2157-2160)
And:
So But would God have any reason to create many universes? The existence of more individual living beings would be a good thing for those individuals, and hence there is always some reason for God to make more individuals. Furthermore, the existence of different kinds of creatures adds value to creation, and the number of possible kinds of creatures is so large that the existence of many universes would be a suitable way to allow for their realization. Finally, consider this argument: for any single universe God creates, there’s probably a better single universe God could’ve created. So if God creates only a single universe, he must necessarily forgo creating a vast, possibly infinite number of better universes he could have created. A theistic multiverse would allow him fuller scope to share the goodness of existence. (Loc. 2169-2176)
And:
For each given physical universe that God creates, that universe would exhibit more value if it contained living beings (especially living rational beings) than if it contained no life at all. So God would have some reason to make an appreciable proportion of the universes life permitting. On the other side, there doesn’t seem to be any very strong reason God would have to create many lifeless universes. So the expected proportion of life-permitting universes should not be very low. (Loc. 2181-2184)
Michael Rota gives this good illustration.
Compare: suppose one learned of the existence of a thousand oil “paintings” all produced by the same cause, and suppose one was told that that cause was either a blind, chance process or an artist believed to value paintings of flowers. One should surely expect many, many more paintings of flowers on the artist hypothesis than on the chance hypothesis. (Loc. 2191-2194)
He also gives an illustration of how to understand the probabilities that his argument deals in, under the subheading "The Deadly Blue Widget". (Loc. 2202) I'll summarize. There are two companies: Redy's and Bluey's. The former makes one blue widget for every ninety-nine red ones. The latter makes ninety-nine blue widgets for every one red widget. You orders a widget from one of these companies, forgetting which one. In any event, each select one widget at random and ship to their customers. As it happens, you gets a red widget. Which one should you think sent you the widget?
Our evidence (E) is that you received a red widget. Our background information (K) is that no attention was paid to color by whichever company sent it, and we have two hypothesis. The R-Hypothesis (HR): it was sent by Redy's; and B-Hypothesis (BH): it was sent by Bluey's. In probability theory this can be expressed in the following notation: P(E | HR& K) [the probability of the evidence on the R-Hypothesis given our background information] & P(E | HB& K) [the probability of the evidence on the B-Hypothesis given our background information]. We know the odds of receiving a red widget from each, and hence know that:
P(E | HR& K) = 0.99
P(E | HB& K) = 0.01
Thus, we should believe that you ordered from Redy's.
Now, we can modfiy this illustration to more closely attend to the multiverse hypothesis. Since we would not be here if, say, the cosmological constant was even slightly different, we can say that, if we received a blue widget (most likely from Bluey's), flawless assassins would have killed you before you could have opened the package containing the widget. Now, you've opened his package, and have read a note note explaining this. Does this change anything? Who should we think sent you the widget?
Things have not changed. Your having the red widget and not having died before you were able to open the package are both equally evidence of R-Hypothesis. It is still, given the evidence you have available to you, 99 percent likely that you ordered and received the widget from Redy's.
Now, bringing things back to the multiverse. B-Hypothesis is the atheist-multiverse hypothesis, since we are more likely to not exist (which is parallel to being killed) on it, and R-Hypothesis is the theist-multiverse hypothesis, since we are more likely to find a universe that supports life (which is parallel with getting a red widget and not being killed), such as the one we exist in. Given this, we should accept (3).
Not so fast! As Rota himself notes:
These considerations aren’t by any stretch decisive; God could very well have other, stronger reasons not to create many universes. (Loc. 2176-2177)
And, to the overall question of God's existence we still have more evidence to consider. There is still further positive considerations.
On the one hand, there’s counterevidence— maybe some things we know count strongly against the idea of an intelligent creator. (Loc. 2265-2266)
So, what should we say about the Rota Response? I think it should give the atheist considerable pause. If it fails, it only means that we can't tell one way or the other whether the fine-tuning of the universe favors theism or no. At worst, it is a draw. I don't think the atheist can give an argument that the fine-tuning of the universe favor atheism. That is, I'm not aware of any fact about the fine-tuning of the universe that would argue against God's existence; if anything it supports theism. But if a draw, as I said, we should not fret. There are better, more fundamental arguments for God's existence, which I briefly touch upon in my review of Five Proofs of the Existence of God and to which I hope to have occasion to touch upon in the future.
[1] "Fine-tuning" should be understood in a neutral way, not as something that presupposes a fine-tuner. Basically by tuning what is meant is that the constants or quantities of the universe are such that life could exist, and by fine what is indicated is that the life-supporting range of values is minuscule. The question is, how do we account for this: change, physical necessity or design?
