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On the political economy of contemporary imperialism: The concept of the “imperialist pyramid” and its critics

By Thanasis Spanidis

Summary in short theses: 

1. In the Programmatic Theses of Kommunistische Organisation (KO) we find (in broad outline) a clear orientation for the analysis of imperialism. The theoretical conception developed therein has now been rejected in a number of contributions to the discussion (Klara Bina, Alexander Kiknadze, to a lesser extent Paul Oswald). 

2. The assertion that the Imperialist world system is characterized by a “unipolar world order” led by the USA cannot be confirmed by the available data. Both the economic and military balance of power at the top of the imperialist world order refute the picture of singular U.S. domination. 

3. Nor is it possible to confirm the idea that the imperialist world system is still characterized by the unrestricted domination of the “triad” of North America, Western Europe and Japan. A new constellation has emerged, mainly through the rise of China to the top of the imperialist hierarchy, but also through the rise of other powers to leading or elevated intermediate positions in the hierarchy.  

4. The view that only the highest countries in the imperialist hierarchy (the “handful of robbers”) can be considered “imperialist” covers up the imperialist roles of countries in higher intermediate positions in the world system. As examples, Russia and Mexico are examined here in terms of their position in the imperialist world system. Particularly problematic are views from the tradition of dependency theory, which tend to absolutize dependency relations in the imperialist world system, to see them as one-sided and unchanging.  

5. This view also represents a break with Lenin’s understanding of imperialism as monopolistic capitalism and thus as a new quality of capitalist relations of production and distribution. According to this false understanding, imperialism is no longer primarily understood as a relationship of domination rooted in monopolistic property relations – the tendency to export Capital – but is unilaterally derived from the (supposed) balance of power between the leading imperialist countries.

The correct analysis of imperialism, in contrast to these false conceptions, is one that understands the imperialist world system as a hierarchical order of mutual but asymmetrical dependencies, as an imperialist pyramid in which not only the top, but also the intermediate positions, to a decreasing degree towards the bottom, exhibit the characteristics of the imperialist epoch of capitalism and share in the division of the spoils. The conception of the “imperialist pyramid” is thus – contrary to the views of its critics – by no means a deviation from Lenin’s conception of imperialism, but rather its application to today’s world situation.

The struggle for the correct analysis of imperialism is not an academic question, but a highly political one. The analysis of imperialism is the analysis of the structure of domination of the capitalist system in which we live; it is the analysis of the interests and strategies of the exploiters we fight. There is no more important question.

The KO has already discussed and decided on an analysis of imperialism. This can be found in its Programmatic Theses. In it, the KO explicitly rejects the idea that “imperialism is the domination of a few, “Western” or “Northern” states such as the USA, Western Europe and Japan. (…) It is wrong to ascribe to certain, relatively inferior imperialist poles within this system a principled capacity for peace or a progressive role. The fatal consequence of such misconceptions is that the working class rallies under the banner of alien interests, namely of one or another imperialist pole. Imperialism is a global system of social relations that encompasses all capitalist countries, not just the U.S., Japan and Western Europe. Even other states where (monopoly) capitalist relations exist, such as China, cannot assume an anti-imperialist character.” These words seem to have prophetic character from today’s point of view: They are written as if they had foreseen certain positions now held by parts of our organization and tried to assure distance from them. This, of course, was not to be. Nevertheless, the formulations we chose at that time were very consciously chosen – they are the result of a discussion that had already taken place in the DKP and SDAJ, which was ultimately a decisive reason as to why part of today’s KO decided to leave these organizations at that time. It may well be that the implications of this position were not clear to everyone involved at the time. However, it is a fact that KO has a clear position on this issue.

The KO did not develop this position in a vacuum, but was able to profit from the formulations and debates in the international communist movement. The confrontation with certain problematic views of imperialism is therefore not new and not limited to Germany; it was taken up first and foremost by the Communist Party of Greece (KKE).

The imperialist war in Ukraine has now brought existing dissensions in the communist movement in Germany to the surface and simultaneously to their breaking point. That this is so may be the “natural” consequence of a world-historical turning point that the war in Ukraine represents – but it is not pleasant. Instead of positioning ourselves on the social conflicts on the basis of a correct analysis, we now have to deal with ourselves and with fundamental debates. That we do so, however, is now unavoidable and therefore the right thing to do.

One shortcoming of many of the contributions so far, and I am referring in particular to those by
Klara Binai , Paul Oswaldii and Alexander Kiknadzeiii, is that they base their dissociation from the KKE’s analysis of imperialism mainly on assertions that they hardly substantiate. There is (still) very little examination of the factual material; for example, the theses of the “unipolar world order” and “dependency” that are central to Klara Bina are not substantiated in concrete terms. In itself, this is understandable, since the discussion is being conducted under time constraints. However, it becomes problematic when the argumentation develops in a direction that, as will be shown here, no longer has much to do with real conditions.

For an analysis of today’s imperialist world system it is of only very limited help to evaluate Lenin’s texts in detail, as e.g. Paul Oswald does. It is correct to use the conceptual-theoretical tools developed by Lenin to analyze the situation of today’s world. However, it is something else entirely (and something else entirely wrong) if, for lack of up-to-date analysis, the answers are sought solely within writings that are more than 100 years old. Lenin’s work is of inestimable importance for us, but it is not a collection of beliefs. There is no getting around the analysis of objective reality. The fact that Klara and Paul in principle also formulate this claim is to be laudable, even if they do not actually follow it in their contributions. Therefore, this contribution shall dare a step in this direction and give some basic assessments of the constellation of today’s imperialism.

From here on, the contributions of comrades Paul, Klara and Alexander will simply be quoted without footnotes for the sake of simplicity.

1. Overview of the debate

In the current discussion, three different analyses of contemporary imperialism seem to compete with each other.

This is, firstly, what Klara calls the “world system approach,” which assumes a graded international hierarchy of asymmetric, yet interdependent, dependencies (“imperialist pyramid”).

Second, an analysis that continues to be widespread, which could be called the “triad theory,” and which still sees only Western Europe, the United States, and Japan (the “triad”) as imperialist powers dividing the world among themselves. Inter-imperialist contradictions developed only between the members of the triad; the contradictions between the triad and the rest of the world, in turn, are seen as those between oppressive and oppressed states.

Third, a “superimperialism” thesis that denies even the Western European powers, Canada, and Japan their autonomy as imperialist actors and regards only the United States as a truly imperialist power.

The first position is, as I said, advocated by the KO in its Programmatic Theses. However, this position is now being questioned by a part of the organization, which tends toward the second (tending toward Klara) or third position (tending toward Alexander). The second and third positions are recognizably based in their assumptions on dependency theory, which characterizes the relations between “North” and “South” as relations of one-sided dependency. The first position, while acknowledging the strong asymmetry of dependencies in the imperialist world system, is critical of dependency theory in its various variants. Why this is so will hopefully become clear over the course of the article.

In what ways does the position contain arguments that fundamentally question the understanding of imperialism in the Programmatic Theses as well as that of the KKE? This position will be briefly described here. It is elaborated most extensively by Klara.

Klara has posed some “questions” on the analysis of imperialism, but in reality they are actually theses. Klara makes it very clear that she considers the position of the KKE and in general of the parties of the Leninist pole in the IKB to be fundamentally wrong – even more, in several places the “world-system approach” is even implicitly attributed to opportunism (e.g. “… because the world-system approach appears as a reaction to other (!) opportunist ideas on the imperialism question“).

She herself believes that today’s world is dominated by a “handful of robbers,” by which she means not only a small number of monopolistic corporations but also a group of a few leading imperialist states. Here she refers to corresponding formulations from Lenin’s writing “Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism”. Lenin says “unequivocally, and this runs like a red thread through the treatise on imperialism, that, first, there are great powers which are qualitatively different from the rest of the world; second, that these great powers dominate the world; third, that the contradiction between them lies in the way they divide the spoils among themselves.“

According to this, we live in a world “where on one side there are the “handful of robbers” and on the other “the robbed”, on one side “the oppressing”, on the other “the oppressed”. If this picture is no longer to be true, then, strictly speaking, it is no longer imperialism.” – because for Klara, the very essence of imperialism is that the world is sharply divided into oppressive and oppressed countries and nations.

For Klara, the fact that the KKE speaks of mutual rather than unilateral dependencies not only fundamentally contradicts “very Lenin’s ideas“, it also borders on “emptying the meaning of the term dependency.” She argues, on the other hand, that at a certain point, quantitative differences between countries must turn into a new quality, “namely into unilateral dependence, which can go as far as total subjugation or even destruction of any remnants of independence.” In contrast, the imperialist states are able “through the presence of immense sums of capital to cover and control the whole world with their capital.“

Dependency theories also assumed unilateral dependency. The contribution of Paul Oswald argues similarly: “In my understanding, colonial oppression thus forms the core of imperialism“; “In my view, it is therefore not possible to speak of imperialism without having these two camps (of oppressing and oppressed nations, Th.S.) in the world in mind“. Today, after decolonization, the role of “semi-colonies” is especially important. Alexander also goes very far here, asking the question: “Is the USA only the top of the (…) imperialist pyramid or ARE they the pyramid, with their absolute worldwide military superiority and currency?

Alexander also writes that it becomes clear “how weak our collective state of discussion is in the form of the Programmatic Theses. Diametrically different positions are derived in the assessment of the concrete situation.” Since in the Programmatic Theses imperialism is characterized as a world system encompassing all countries, it is difficult to understand how anyone can take the view that a view absolutely contrary to this is also a “derivation” from the Programmatic Theses. It is not at all, but rather, and this should be made quite clear, the analysis of imperialism represented in the contributions of Klara Bina, Paul Oswald and Alexander is explicitly a counter-position to the position of the Programmatic Theses.

Now, this statement does not say anything about it being correct or incorrect. Of course, it is conceivable that we could have been mistaken. If this should be the case, we should correct our analysis.

In order to answer whether the Programmatic Theses are fundamentally wrong in their analysis of imperialism, it will now be necessary to better elaborate the understanding of imperialism represented in the Programmatic Theses and to check it against reality. Here, a self-criticism of the entire organization would also be appropriate: The fact that we have not specifically addressed this question so far is a major shortcoming, which has now become our undoing. In order to recognize this problem earlier, however, it would have been necessary for those who hold our understanding of imperialism to formulate this clearer and earlier.

The question of whether or not the KO’s and the KKE’s understanding of imperialism actually deviates from Lenin’s is left out of the first chapters and only taken up again at the end. Thus, the empirical analysis of the imperialist world system will first be carried out with the help of the categories developed by Lenin, in order to then answer to what extent Lenin’s theory is still suitable for analyzing imperialism today and whether the standpoint of the Programmatic Theses can be reconciled with that of Lenin (the answer to both questions is: Yes!).

Is it really the case that the Programmatic Theses are on the wrong track? I anticipate my answer already in the title – No! The imperialism understanding of the Programmatische Thesen is completely correct. It needs no “correction” or revision, but a more exact elaboration. We must undertake this and perhaps this article can already make a contribution to it.

2. Who dominates the world economy? On the hierarchy in today’s imperialist world system

In order to show the imperialist character of a country, Lenin chooses above all the degree of concentration and centralization, i.e. the emergence of monopoly capital, as a fundamental criterion. Building on this and as a consequence of the emergence of monopoly capital, he also analyzes the emergence of finance capital and the tendency to export capital. This is still plausible today; for monopoly capital marks the transition to a new quality at the level of production relations. It ends the “free” competition of smaller capitals in large parts of the economy and replaces it with the competition of monopolies, which is fought out primarily not as price competition, but with other methods (e.g. advertising, high technological barriers and specialization, etc.). The accumulation of huge sums of capital as well as the simultaneous increased need for financing lead to the merging of banks and industry, the establishment of their own banks by industry, the tendency to displace the ownership of capital from functional capital to the shareholding system, etc. The over-accumulation of capital and constant hunt for new investment opportunities leads capital beyond national borders, it makes the export of capital necessary by law.

These phenomena – monopolization, finance capital and capital export – are therefore the main criteria for analyzing the imperialist character of the economy.

Klara’s view of the present imperialist world system can be observed in various places within her text. For example: “The idea that there would be an absolute autocracy of an empire is to be distinguished in this extreme form from the general and, in my opinion, also not incorrect representation of the present imperialism as unipolar rule”.

Alexander is more explicit in this direction. The USA is “still the nation that can dictate its policy to the whole world“. The question is even raised: “Is USA only the top of the imperialist pyramid founded by Aleka Papariga or ARE they the pyramid?”. In the last two statements, the author should be aware that he is indulging in extreme exaggerations here – it is probably reasonably obvious that the U.S. cannot exactly “dictate its policies to the entire world” when, for example, it has failed for 63 years to overthrow the government of a Caribbean island in its immediate neighborhood. But let us take the thesis of the “unipolar world order”, which is used to argue against the imperialism analysis of the Programmatic Theses and the KKE, seriously for once and confront it with the facts.

A first, very superficial approach can compare countries on the basis of their GDP. It makes sense to use GDP measured in purchasing power parity rather than nominal GDP (which is based on official exchange rates). This factors out the effect of inflation and is better suited to comparing countries with different living standards and very different purchasing power (such as the U.S., Russia and China) – GDP is calculated as if all countries’ goods were sold in U.S. prices. Accordingly, the 10 strongest capitalist economies in the world:

TABLE 1: Economic output by purchasing power parity in US$ billion, 2020


Measured in terms of its absolute weight in the world economy, i.e. in terms of the goods and services produced in each case, China is now by some distance the largest economy on earth. The “old” economic superpowers, the USA, Japan, Germany, Great Britain and France, are no longer alone at the top of the world economy. Russia, whose imperialist character is doubted by some, is still in 6th place. To be thorough, we can also look at the list measured in terms of official exchange rates, the other usual way of measuring:

Table 2: Economic output at current prices in US$ billion, 2020


Here, the picture is somewhat different, but the essentials remain: Here, too, the old superpowers are no longer the undisputed leaders. China, India and South Korea are challenging them for the top spots. Russia and Brazil follow in 11th and 12th place.

For a first look at the position of an economy within the capitalist world system, the comparison of the gross domestic product is helpful. However, this view allows only limited conclusions about whether a country plays a dominant or rather intermediate position in the hierarchy. For example, the sheer mass of India’s population involved in economic activities of one kind or another makes its GDP greater than its relative position in the imperialist world system.

2.1 Mastering the international trade in goods

Another indicator of a country’s economic weight is its exports. The following table shows the exports of the world’s largest exporters.

Figure 1: World trade in 2020


Of course, the composition of these exports is also relevant. It makes a difference whether a country exports primarily high-value industrial goods or only unprocessed agricultural products. However, this distinction is already reflected in the fact that the former are sold at much higher prices and it is therefore hardly possible to join the ranks of the largest exporting countries without developed industry. Therefore, this data series also tells us something about the economic hierarchies: again, China is at the top, followed by some of the old imperialist powers, but South Korea, Singapore, Ireland, India and Mexico also occupy notable parts of the world market. But next, let’s look at which countries lead in exports of manufactured goods, using the important sectors of motor vehicles, electronics, chemicals and machine tools as examples. Shaded in gray are countries that do not belong to the old imperialist “triad” (North America, Western Europe, Japan) (Ireland as a former quasi-colony should therefore not be counted as part of the “triad” either).

Table 3: The largest exporters of the industrial sectors automotive, electronics, chemicals, machine tools, in US$ billion, 2020.


The countries of the old “triad” are still most likely to maintain their dominance in the automotive industry. In electronics, the largest of the industries listed here, dominance lies entirely in East and Southeast Asia. In the chemical industry and the comparatively small machine tools sector, the picture is mixed, but there is no undisputed Western dominance here either.

Certainly, one could object here that the matter depends on who controls this production. This objection is partly justified; of course it makes a difference whether certain countries only appear high up in the statistics because they have been chosen as the production location of a foreign industry which then repatriates its profits to the mother country, where it also pays most of its taxes. This certainly partly explains, for example, the high rate of car exports from Mexico, as well as those from Spain and the Czech Republic (Seat and Škoda as the largest car manufacturers are both owned by VW). We will therefore also take a look at which countries dominate the world economy with their corporations. However, the export statistics are nonetheless anything but meaningless. After all, the bourgeoisie of a production location that is dependent on foreign industrial capital also benefits indirectly from this constellation in the form of tax revenues, regional infrastructure projects, knowledge and technology transfer, and so on. As China, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and other countries show, this can certainly contribute to the independent development of a domestic monopoly capital that can even assume an international leadership role in the medium and long term. Therefore, it is justified to evaluate industrial exports as an indicator of position within the imperialist pyramid.

2.2 The export of capital

To determine the position within the imperialist hierarchy, the capital export of a country is also important, for its scale determines the extent to which the bourgeoisie – i.e. mainly (but not only) the monopoly capital of a country – is active with investments in other countries. Lenin writes: “For modern capitalism, with the rule of the monopolies, the export of capital has become characteristic.“iv

Capital exports can take the form of direct investment (FDI) or portfolio investment (PFI), depending on the size of the equity stake acquired in a company. Since data for FDI are far more readily available, we will now look at capital flows from a few selected countries. These are not stock figures, but capital flows within one year:

Figure 2: Foreign Direct Investment (Flows) in US$ billion, 2020 v .


As table:

Table 4: Foreign direct investment (flows) in US$ billion, 2020.

The informative value of direct investment with respect to real capital exports is limited, as is almost always the case with bourgeois statistics. The Marxist category of capital export, of course, does not exist in these statistics. Part of what appears in the statistics as FDI is not real investment, but operations that serve tax avoidance or similar purposes and are often accompanied by the same sum being transferred back and forth at least oncevi. However, since this phenomenon is not unique to the Russian economy, we can still use the data on FDI as a rough indicator of capital export.

Direct investment shows that the USA, Western Europe and Japan still occupy a relatively dominant position in outward capital flows. The only massive exception that has changed the picture significantly in recent years is China, which took third place in 2020, a short distance behind Japan. If China, Japan and the U.S. are in the “front row,” then a second row of France, Germany and other countries that have been omitted for clarity (South Korea, Sweden, etc.) come in the second row. In the third row are Russia and India (also Belgium, Italy, Israel, Denmark, Australia, etc.). Most countries in the world, on the other hand, export only small amounts of capital below the billion range. These can be placed in a fourth, fifth, and sixth row, and so on.

Another indicator of a country’s capital export position is its net international investment position. This is the difference between the claims that a country’s owners have on the rest of the world and the claims that the rest of the world has on that country. If this position is positive, it means that the country has extended more loans and holds more assets abroad than vice versa. This indicator also has limited explanatory power: for even if a country has a negative balance here, it cannot of course be deduced that it is not imperialist. It then only means that other imperialist countries invest more in this country than vice versa.

Figure 5: Net International Investment Position of Selected Countries in US$ Trillions, 2020

What do the data in table 5 show us? That China holds a leading creditor position in the imperialist hierarchy and that the U.S. faces the world primarily as a debtor. But also that in addition to China, other countries outside the traditional “triad” such as Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Russia and South Korea also hold significant positive foreign asset positions. The international expansion of capital is far from being limited to the “handful of robbers” from which it started at the beginning of the 20th century.

2.3 The large monopoly groups

Another important indicator of a country’s position within the imperialist world system is the number of corporations, based in that country, which are among the world’s largest corporations. The internationally operating corporations are the main carriers of the export of capital, international expansion and projection of economic power; their cross-border expansion is the crucible within which the profit interests of capital come into confrontation with each other globally and generate interstate conflicts.

Let’s take a closer look at this indicator. As you know, Fortune magazine publishes an annual list of the 500 largest corporations in the world. It goes without saying that the 500 largest corporations in the world are all economic giants. The 500th corporation ranked still has a turnover of US$24 billion. The mere affiliation of a company to this list proves a global monopoly position (monopoly in the Marxist sense, i.e. there may be other monopolies active in the same industry). The affiliation of a country to this list also serves to prove an elevated status in the imperialist hierarchy, although – as we will see – there are still very large differences to be considered here. Among these groups, industrial, commercial, and also purely financial groups are represented (not banks, however). According to Marxist understanding, however, in all cases it is a matter of monopolistic finance capital.

In 2021, these 500 megacorporations were spread across 31 countries. The number of 31 alone should be reason enough to question the assessment that imperialism is dominated by only a “handful of robbers”. In any case, the expression “a handful” rather suggests a limited number of perhaps 5-7 countries.

But let’s take a closer look at the data. Of the 500 largest corporations, 135 are headquartered in China, which ranks first on the world list. In second place, unsurprisingly, is the USA with 122 companies. Then Japan with 53, Germany with 27, France with 26, Great Britain with 22, and so on.

To see the concentration at the top of the Global 500, let’s take a look at the largest 20 corporations on the list: Of these in 2021, eight were from the U.S., six from China, and one each from the U.K., Germany, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Japan, and the Netherlands.

Who is now number 1? China or the USA? China has now placed more corporations in the Top500, but still slightly fewer in the Top20. As another indicator, you can add up the sales of the largest corporations in both countries and compare them. The largest 10 Chinese corporations then have combined sales of 2.2 trillion. US dollars. The largest 10 U.S. corporations have a slightly higher figure: 2.8 trillion U.S. dollars. US dollars

To illustrate the shifts, it is worth comparing with an earlier historical point in time. The year 1995 is the earliest found in Fortune’s online database and was therefore used here as a point of comparison. In 1995, the U.S. and Japan were tied with 148 corporations each. However, a look at the 20 largest corporations shows a clear dominance of Japan at the top of the mountain: 12 of the largest 20 corporations at that time came from Japan, and only half (i.e. six) from the USA.

Other major players in 1995 were the FRG with 42, the UK and France with 35 groups each, the Netherlands with 12 (plus one listed in the Netherlands Antilles) and Italy with 11. A more detailed list can be found in Table 6.

The following facts are striking:

Firstly, the entire Fortune Global 500 as well as its upper ranks continue to be dominated by three world regions, namely Western Europe, North America and East Asia.

But, and this is a very big “but”: Secondly, unlike in the past, East Asia is no longer essentially represented by Japan in this respect. For one thing, Taiwan and South Korea also play an important role. Lastly, and this probably represents the decisive shift in the imperialist world system, the most important economic actor in East Asia is now no longer Japan, but China.

A third aspect becomes clear above all through comparison with earlier times: Distribution is tending more and more toward a “multipolar” constellation in the sense that no single country or imperialist pole holds clear economic dominance through its world-dominating corporations any longer. Taiwan and South Korea have already been mentioned, with 8 and 10 corporations on the list, respectively. Today, however, some Southeast Asian (Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand) and South Asian corporations (India) are also represented on the list. India accounts for seven of the listed groups, or eight if ArcelorMittal (more than 40% of which is owned by the Indian billionaire Mittal family, but which is listed in Luxembourg) is included. In Latin America, Brazil is the strongest player with six groups, followed by Mexico with two. Russia, like the other countries mentioned, plays an important economic role in the second tier and has four groups on the global list.

Meanwhile, most countries of the former “imperialist triad” (Western Europe, North America, Japan) have suffered significant losses. The USA fell from 148 to 122 corporations. Germany from 42 to 27, France and Great Britain from 35 to 26 and 22 respectively. Japan has fallen furthest down the imperialist rankings as a result of its decades-long stagnation crisis: From 148 corporations in the Top500 and 12 of the world’s largest 20 corporations in 1995 to currently 53 in the Top500 list and only one in the Top20.

Table 6: Selected countries in the “Fortune Global 500” lists 1995 and 2021 (according to 2021 ranking, particularly drastic developments are highlighted in gray)

Let’s take a complementary look at the ranking of the largest banks not included in the Fortune Global500.

Table 7: World’s largest banks by assets, 2021


A look at the banks shows even more clearly that there is no longer any semblance of U.S. dominance. The four largest banks in the world are now Chinese state-owned banks. In the second row are mainly banks from the USA, Japan and France. Germany, on the other hand, with its only major bank, Deutsche Bank, is no longer at the top.

2.4 The Special Role of the USA: The Dollar and Wall Street

Is the USA still by far the world’s leading economic power? Based on the data cited, the answer to this question is clearly negative. Nevertheless, the USA still has a number of advantages over its biggest rival China. In the economic sphere, these are above all its continued central role in the world financial system and the role of the U.S. dollar as the world’s reserve currency.

The role of the USA in the financial system has already been put into perspective by the fact that Chinese banks are now at the top. The situation is different when one looks at where the majority of financial transactions are conducted. The following list shows that the vast majority of stock market transactions still take place on exchanges in the USA.

Table 8: The world’s ten largest stock exchanges, 2021

However, these figures only show that the bulk of the infrastructure of the global capitalist financial system is located in the USA. They do not mean that U.S. imperialism can simply dispose of the sums mentioned. For example, the No. 1 stock on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE, the largest stock exchange in the world) is currently the Chinese corporation Alibaba.

The leading role of the USA in the financial system is a consequence of the fact that the monopoly capital of the USA was the global leader for a long time. To play in big business, big capitalists from other countries also went to New York, where most of the companies were listed and therefore where the most extensive opportunities for financial transactions were available. China, the EU and Japan continue to lag far behind in this area, although it is also evident that Chinese capitalism is catching up fast. This is due to the fact that, as the center of surplus value production shifts toward East Asia, or China in particular, the financial system will also gradually shift, albeit with some delay.

More concrete are the advantages that the U.S. derives from the role of the U.S. dollar as the international reserve currency. The dominance of the dollar as a reserve currency and in transactions (e.g., commodity trade) is undoubtedly an important advantage of U.S. imperialism in global imperialist rivalry. Specifically, dollar dominance means:

  • That the income accruing to the Federal Reserve Board from money creation (seigniorage gains) is higher because more money can be created. 
  • That the U.S. Treasury can borrow in its own currency to a much greater extent because the central bank can create money to a much greater extent without causing demonetization in the U.S. 
  • That the U.S. gets additional opportunities for political influence because it can freeze the dollar reserves of other countries. 
  • That the U.S. dollar, as a much sought-after currency, is more stable than most other currencies. This minimizes exchange rate fluctuations, which is a great advantage for both trade in goods and the reliability of financial transactions. 
  • That the high demand for the US dollar tends to drive up its value. On the one hand, this has the advantage that the purchasing power of US capital increases internationally and imports of intermediate products for industry become cheaper. The disadvantage is that the cheapening of imports, like the higher prices for export goods due to the rising exchange rate, also undermine the international competitiveness of industry in the USA vii .

All in all, these are major advantages that play an important role in shoring up the U.S. position at the top of the imperialist pyramid. That is why, for decades, the U.S. has tried everything to maintain dollar hegemony, for example by militarily attacking and overthrowing governments that sought to conduct oil trade in other currencies.

However, the dominance of the U.S. dollar is far from being a “magic bullet.” It does not establish absolute and unchallengeable economic dominance. In the mid-1990s, it did not prevent Japanese monopoly capital from being ahead of the U.S. in many areas for a time. And it does not prevent Chinese monopoly capital todayviii from overtaking the U.S. bourgeoisie on more and more levels. Nor does it give the U.S. the miraculous power to dictate oil and gas prices to Russia and other producers, as Alexander falsely claims. Dollar hegemony takes place on the basis of the laws of the capitalist mode of production, not outside it. Therefore, commodity prices are also ultimately formed through the market, even if there is considerable political intervention in the process – though not only by the U.S.: the producing countries themselves also intervene to a great extent. After all, the oil-producing countries of OPEC have twice contributed to serious crises in the world economy by deliberately restricting production volumes.

The dominance of the US dollar is still very clear, but by no means unchallenged: The share of the U.S. dollar in global trade fluctuated roughly between 25% and 45% in 1999-2021, but is currently at roughly the same level as in 1999, i.e., about 35%. The U.S. dollar’s share of global reserves in foreign currency has fallen from about 70% to about 60% over the same period. This was initially due to the creation of the euro, whose share mostly fluctuated between 20% and 30%, but seems to have fallen permanently to around 20% as a result of the crisis from 2009. The fact that the dollar hardly benefited from the euro crisis is mainly due to the rise of other, so-called “non-traditional” currencies (i.e. other than the dollar, euro, Japanese yen and British pound sterling). Here, of course, we should especially mention the Chinese renminbi, but above all a multitude of other currencies constitute this swing of balance, namely the Australian and Canadian dollars, the Swiss franc, the Korean won, the Swedish krona, the Singapore dollar, and so on. Balances held in “non-traditional” reserve currencies now amount to the equivalent of $1.2 trillion. Regionally, other currencies often play a role, e.g. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan also hold high ruble reserves due to their close relations with Russiaix .

Nor is the leading role of the U.S. dollar independent of the U.S. position in the imperialist world system, i.e., the material basis of that position in production and the ability of the U.S. to secure its position politically and militarily. With the economic and military dominance of U.S. imperialism in question, it is only a matter of time before the dominance of its reserve currency also erodes. The development of the renminbi into the leading reserve currency of the world economy is the declared goal of the Chinese government. As China is currently working at full speed to relegate the USA to second place in the imperialist pyramid, it is also creating the appropriate conditions for the rise of its currency.

3. Intermediate Positions and Ascension Processes in the Imperialist World System

As has already been shown, an analysis of imperialism cannot consist solely of looking at the top of the pyramid (all the less so if this top is equated with the USA in ignorance of the facts). There are also countries below the leading peak of the imperialist world system that play an important role in the structure of the world system. We will now explore the question of whether it is correct to call these countries imperialist. The criteria mentioned at the beginning, in particular the formation of monopoly capital, must also be used for this purpose.

The Communist Party of Turkey (TKP) warns that “the tendency to establish such relations is not the same as the ability to establish such relations concretely. It is always the second criterion that applies to the definition of an imperialist country.” (Thesis 7).

It is not only about the tendency to monopolize, to export capital, etc., which of course always exists in a capitalist society, but it is above all about the extent to which these tendencies also materialize – this is precisely what needs to be examined, which will be done here using two countries as examples.

The



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On the political economy of contemporary imperialism: The concept of the “imperialist pyramid” and its critics

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