2: [in response to someone else] You clicked that link and saw all that and you are criticizing me instead of the dogmatic ignorance, pain, and human suffering engendered by human superstition? You are a dangerous fucking psychopath if you place meager and morally bankrupt personal beliefs over the anguish of actual human beings.

1: You're addressing an extremely small minority of theists who are very aggressive and vocal. Human superstition does not cause ignorance, it's the result of ignorant people. I find it offensive that you'd call someone else dangerous for having the sense to understand that there are both dangerous and non-dangerous theists. There's no inherent moral quality to religion itself. It's the people who follow such morally questionable edicts (like Sharia law) that should be questioned, and institutions such as Sharia law to be critically examined in light of this. People with attitudes like yourself are the reason people of different beliefs refuse to get along: they see only the negative.

2: Religion is a net loss for humanity, arguing otherwise is the domain of a naive apologist. Religion is anachronistic, unhelpful, unnecessary, and detracts greatly from the human condition in the 21st century.

All religion (with maybe the exception of Jainism) is intellectual fascism.

1: Those arguments seemed tailored towards institutionalized religion as opposed to personal faith, in which case I would agree. And I disagree with your characterization of my arguments as thinly veiled apologetics -- in the first place, I don't condone religious terrorism, so it's inaccurate to imply otherwise.

2: Personal faith is delusion masquerading as virtue. Read it as many times as it takes to sink in. Superstition as faith is supremely arrogant in it's ignorance.

1: [I quote him]. Implying virtue is a universal set of ethics. The two are not so opposed to each other as to be rendered as mutually exclusive concepts. Are you saying a religious person cannot act ethically in accordance with the tenets of his faith? I would agree that unrelenting insistence on a deity's existence would qualify as arrogance, but denigrating seemingly everyone who aligns themselves with theism does not excuse yourself from acting arrogant -- which you appear to be doing here in your vicious attacks on theism.

2: [He quotes me]. Not sure how you got that from what I said. I didn't imply anything.

[He quotes me]. What two [concepts]? What are you talking about?

[He quotes me]. Let's say I am practicing alchemy (I'm trying to turn lead into gold, for example) and I accidentally create a chemical reaction by mixing 2 substances. I take this as a sign that I am nearing my goal of turning lead into gold. Does this make alchemy a science? Does this make me a scientist? No. The reaction was an accident, and the wrong lesson was taken away from it. The objective lesson is ignored. The subjective lesson is flawed as it is based on a false premise. Any decent 21st century moralist should be acting ethically for the sake of acting ethically. Not for fear of religious punishments or promise of religious rewards. Any religious compulsion or motivation does detract something ethically speaking, absolutely. It could be oversimplified to say religious people are essentially ethical "on accident". This is illustrated by the fact that countless religious people believe they are acting ethically when they are clearly inflicting harm. Many of these people thought of these actions as ethical or virtuous. This is the warp of delusion. [WARNING: Large (30,000 x 660) and graphic compilation of images]. 

1: [I quote him]. By framing faith as 'masquerading' (insincerely imitating) virtue, you necessarily disqualify religious faith as being capable to practice acts which can be deemed truly virtuous or possessing a set of ethics deemed virtuous in itself. In order to forward the claim that faith insincerely imitates virtue, you must have an idea of what constitutes true virtue already in mind. I deduct from this that either you're deferring to a supposed consistent set of ethics which you call virtue in order to forward this claim, or your own idea of what virtue is -- if so, you didn't elaborate in your last post.

[I quote him]. The two concepts that you were contrasting: personal faith and virtue. You said that personal faith, more or less, acts as a facsimile placeholder for real ethics -- I've asked you to define what constitutes a real set of ethics.

[I quote him]. In other words, securing divine favor is unethical because it treats 'moral' action as a means rather than an end in itself. I would argue that any incentive system that selects for these behaviors is unethical to the extent that it produces net negative results, for reasons I will clarify below.

How would you illustrate acting ethically for its own sake, then? It seems convenient that you invoke ethics several times but refrain from elaborating on what you think this consists of, although I think I detect traces of it in your argument. 

Why should individuals be compelled to act for the end's own sake? What defines this end? By saying we should act ethically for the sake of acting ethically, you're placing a moral imperative which exists independent of this act. What is this imperative?

 Not that I disagree on this point, but you're arguing, from what I can surmise, from a black-and-white perspective.

[I quote him]. If a person acts in a way that produces a net positive result, but this was not the end-in-itself, is it still an ethical action? If not, how much does acting morally as a means to an end detract from proper ethical practice, considering that net negative/positive results can presumably be measured in terms of an effect's scope?

If acting morally as a means to an end necessarily devalues an action, it must be metaphysical in its significance, since there are outward effects which can be reliably measured that would negate such objections, even if based on principles seeking to regulate these behaviors. 

In fact, if these principles were institutionalized, I argue that their utility is limited as they fail to account for means-as-ends actions that produce a visibly greater net positive effect compared to some actions as ends-in-themselves. 

They may be partially effective at addressing religious violence, but they also inhibit other behaviors which are not religiously motivated that culminate in net positive effects. You see, you don't have to be religious to treat an action as a means to an end -- where's the line drawn where we can say, "Okay, it's unnecessary to condemn this guy because the end justifies the means (greater net positive effect)". 

If people clearly inflict harm (a measurable value) when they think they're acting ethically, you must agree that the moral value of that act is deduced from the effect it has, not from how it's treated as a means to an end. This is how you have framed your argument so far. That they think they act ethically is another matter. There are theists which you'd agree act ethically because their actions have positive effects. To say they don't, or that its significance is devalued because it's a means to an end is to hold a double standard. 

One group -- the violent ones -- you are judging based on the effects they have, hence your illustration of religious terrorism. The 'good theists' are, you argue, selfish because their net positive actions are religiously motivated, but you agree they must be ethical because of those effects. This isn't a consistent position. 

I will demonstrate: Is an action (valued as an end in itself) which produces a net negative effect ethical? I think you're placing too much emphasis on a particular brand of ethics which you have either poorly elaborated upon or not at all.

2: I don't find the semantics and "philosophical" acrobatics you seem to enjoy necessary.

[He quotes me]. It is you that are thinking black and white. Ethics can be measured on a gradient. One ethical action can be more ethical than another ethical action. Two of the same action can carry different ethical values based on intent. Giving a homeless person $5 because you want them to have money for food is more ethical than giving them $5 because you want to curry favor with the divine.

Let's keep this simple: a 21st century moralist should strive to increase the happiness and decrease the suffering of other human beings because you are also a human being.

1: [I quote him]. No, the semantics of this case are important to the discussion at hand. Instead of addressing those arguments directly, you choose to dismiss them out of hand as 'acrobatics'. If you think it's not necessary, fine. I won't argue its necessity any longer.

Case in point: [I quote his example]. 

Now we get to the root of my objection. Namely, intent and its effects. We judge actions based on consequences as well as intent. Would you say this is a fair statement? Where Islamic terrorists might see the intents of their actions as ethical, the consequences of their actions visibly aren't, in terms of damage caused. In the terrorists' mind, the end justifies the means, so this point isn't arguable on a metaphysical level if we assume the Muslim conception of God exists and has been faithfully represented. To them, the intent overrides any visible harm caused; that's secondary to pleasing God. I'm not engaged in apologetics here, I'm just stating how they see things. 

If you believe intent is the weighting factor of an ethical action, then means-as-ends are irrelevant to the case. What you mean to attack are actions based on negative intents, not means-as-ends. Showing compassion to a homeless person is indeed a means to an end. The action of giving them five dollars is a means to fulfill your desire (the end) for them to eat.

[I quote him]. I never denied this. It was quite clear when I asserted that means-as-ends acts can yield greater net positive effects compared to ends-in-themselves acts. In my opinion, net positive effect and intent are what weigh the ethics of an action. If intent is positive, but the effect is negative, than any benefits yielded are negligible. I would never condone people intent on committing violent acts, since those are negative intentions likely to carry negative consequences.

Where we differ is how we value intent. You see means-as-end intent as negative because it's self-interested. But in the theist's mind, that intent is ethical since pleasing God supersedes placing other's needs ahead of your own. In addition, self-preservation (through pleasing God to avoid punishment) shown outwardly as selfishness is justified when you espouse faith in a vindictive deity who'll eternally banish you to the endless depths of a fiery Hell if you reject Him. The same acts, performed by two different people with two different motives, have the same net effect, and in their own minds, have the same ethical level of intent.

[I quote him]. Agreed, but I don't think that attitude is confined to any period of time. As Jesus said, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." He may have existed, but not in a divine capacity, so don't take this to mean that I'm a theist or something.

I'll note, finally, that 'selfishness' is a term I actually despise. It's demonized to the point where it weighs seriously down upon moral decisions. People should question what constitutes selfishness, in what contexts it can manifest, and the utility it serves that justifies and necessitates its perpetuation, for starters. You could never advance your own interests if you weren't allowed to be selfish. Where it needs to be addressed is when it advances the self to the detriment of others. If it advances the self on a metaphysical level as well as satisfying someone's needs, is it as morally repugnant to you?