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The Cure that Causes: Official Action Required

In “Conspiracy Theories,” Profs. Adrian Vermeule and Cass Sunstein concede that parapolitical hypotheses need not be unfounded.  Yet, the context in which they find innocuous and justified Conspiracy research is quite narrow:
This is not, and is not be intended to be, a general claim that conspiracy theories are unjustified or unwarranted. Much depends on the background state of knowledge-producing institutions. If those institutions are generally trustworthy, in part because they are embedded in an open society with a well-functioning marketplace of ideas and free flow of information, then conspiracy theories will generally (which is not to say always) be unjustified.
The underlying assumption here is that most press within the West (especially in the US) is “trustworthy.”  Does that mean unbiased?  One can certainly argue that Fox News has a clear and profound ideological bent, and that other major news outlets have corporate ties, and consequently voice a corporate viewpoint.  Does it mean that the news is necessarily accurate?  I know first hand that people working to produce news often try their best to make sure that what goes on the air is factually accurate.  Yet, I’ve personally witnessed a number of events where large, and important parts of the story were simply ignored.  This redacted material, in turn, could negate the validity of the story that aired.* 

The logical extension of this assumption is the conclusion that while the press might be untrustworthy in other parts of the world, that doesn’t occur here.  Thus, any Western belief in a conspiracy explanation is unjustified.

Vermeule and Sunstein also state that many conspiracy hypotheses are “inconsequential,” meaning their dissemination does not call for any public actions, especially those that would have deleterious effects on society .** With some exceptions, the authors see these as innocuous, requiring no reaction from government.             

The authors nevertheless see potential danger in conspiracy thinking:
Overseas, 'a 2002 Gallup Poll conducted in nine Islamic countries found that 61 percent of those surveyed thought that Muslims had nothing to do with the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001...According to an anonymous State Department official in charge of anti-disinformation, ‘a great deal of harm can result ‘when people believe these lies and then act on the basis of their mistaken beliefs.’‘ For example, 'Al-Qaeda members ‘were encouraged to join the jihad at least in part because of disinformation...’

The widespread belief that U.S. officials knowingly allowed 9/11 to happen or even brought it about may have hampered the government’s efforts to mobilize social resources and political support for measures against future terrorist attacks.'***
The question therefore arises as to whether or not the government should react to conspiracy stories.  The authors argue that rebutting a conspiracy story might legitimize it.  Even if government can compellingly show no conspiracy in a particular case, it can raise credibility in others that Uncle Sam (or John Bull, or insert national symbol here) doesn’t comment on.  But silence, they argue, entails an even greater risk.  If a story can disseminate unchallenged, it can gain believers and foster plurality, thus resulting in wider acceptance.  This leads the authors to believe that a more pro-active approach, one that attacks many conspiracies, can diminish the effect of any specific conspiracy hypothesis:
In a typical pattern, government plays a wait-and-see strategy: ignore the conspiracy theory until it reaches some ill-defined threshold level of widespread popularity, and then rebut....

However, this logic overlooks an important synergistic gain: rebutting many conspiracy theories can reduce the legitimating effect of rebutting any one of them.
Consequently, the authors see a need for government to address conspiracy speech in one of three ways.  The first would be to ban conspiracy hypotheses altogether.  The second would be to impose fines or additional taxes on those who write about conspiracy.  The third method they propose is “counterspeach.” 

As far as we can tell, there is no law that would allow for the banning of conspiracy viewpoints, although serious consideration of them can certainly be banished from the mainstream press through policy.  We don’t exact taxes or fines against conspiracy proponents, but their employers could fire them, or reduce their workload/pay to the point of economic hardship.****

Vermeule and Sunstein don’t seem to take the notion of banning and/or taxing conspiracy speech as a viable option.  Most Westerners would probably find these ideas repugnant, counter as they are to free speech traditions.  Not surprisingly, the authors advocate the last option on their list: counterspeach, which they later describe as “cognitive infiltration.”

The choice of cognitive infiltration itself presents several decisions: whether or not to (1) utilize government employees to infiltrate conspiracy venues; (2) hire “private” parties unaffiliated with government to infiltrate conspiracy venues; or (3) make informal arrangements with “private” parties to infiltrate conspiracy venues.  Profs. Vermeule and Sunstein are quite aware of the historical specter of COINTELPRO, MERRIMAC, CHAOS and other efforts by the government to infiltrate citizens groups.  They carefully wish to point out the difference between their proposal and these past actions:
One promising tactic is cognitive infiltration of extremist groups. By this we do not mean 1960s-style infiltration with a view to surveillance and collecting information, possibly for use in future prosecutions. Rather, we mean that government efforts might succeed in weakening or even breaking up the ideological and epistemological complexes that constitute these networks and groups.   
On second blush, one would have to realize that the only real difference between “1960s-style infiltration” and their proposal is that the former happens in meatspace, the latter in cyberspace.  The Church Committee documented a real concern to disrupt not only these groups, but the influence that they had upon each other and the public at large.  So these two goals would be nearly identical.  Also, since Vermeule and Sunstein justify these actions in order to thwart actual terrorist attacks, then any such infiltration would have to include the collection of information for a later prosecution (unless you plan on a summary execution).

Profs. Sunstein and Vermeule might counter-argue that the main difference between the historical program and their proposed one is that the former wanted to collect information.  The latter wanted to give information.  Firmly believing that conspiracy milieus suffer from a “crippled epistemology,” (i.e., they don’t have enough facts to understand the truth), the idea would be to infiltrate the groups, give them adequate facts to support a non-conspiracy point of view. 

Government actors would have, as an advantage, a presumed authority to speak on matters that pertain to their particular jobs.  But the authors feel that if an official announces or confirms her identity in an online conspiracy forum, than other members might suspect that she’s doing little more than giving out the party line.  If the government agent disavows his official capacity, or a third-party contractor is used, then this might give their dissenting opinions more weight.  But the authors caution that this is a high-risk proposition, should the cognitive infiltrator blow his cover.
In the former case, where government officials participate openly as such, hard-core members of the relevant networks, communities and conspiracy-minded organizations may entirely discount what the officials say, right from the beginning. The risk with tactics of anonymous participation, conversely, is that if the tactic becomes known, any true member of the relevant groups who raises doubts may be suspected of government connections.
The snickering irony here is that Profs. Vermeule and Sunstein are suggesting a government conspiracy to discount the notion of government conspiracies.  The not-so-funny side of this, however, is the potential consequences such a policy would have.  If one thinks about it for any length of time, it’s difficult to believe that anyone, government actor or no, undercover or no, could log into a chat room, forum, or Twitter feed and say something to the effect of, “Oh, your data are either incomplete or wrong.  Here are the true, complete facts.”

And the resident netizen of that cybervenue will respond by saying, “I’m so wrong, you’re so right.  I now see the light, Hallelujah!”

Again, judging from their other work, I can confidently assert that Profs. Vermeule and Sunstein are brilliant men.  The latter has a record of outstanding public service.  So I’d have to think that they could see the flaw in this logic.*****    The authors state in their conclusions that conspiracy stories are sometimes a threat to National Security and the public safety, and many more should be rebutted by cognitive infiltration.  But if cognitive infiltration has no proven efficacy in stemming conspiracy stories, why advocate for it? 
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*For example, I watched my students peacefully protesting school tuition policy.  They had the savvy to invite the local ABC, NBC, CBS and FOX affiliates, who all came down, and interviewed then.

A phalanx of police stood by with nightsticks out, and in hand.  The students had legally obtained a permit for the demonstration. But the permit constrained them to the sidewalk.  One protester, not looking where he was going, accidentally stepped one foot off the curb.  He immediately pulled himself completely onto the sidewalk, but too late.  The police descended, pulled him out into the street, and beat him repeatedly with the billy clubs, as the cameras filmed the entire thing. 

Despite the fact that the reporters at the scene were appalled by the police action, and had witnessed (even shot) the whole thing, the lead line for all four major affiliates was “Violence erupted during a demonstration....”

True, violence had occurred.  But without any information about what led up to it, the viewer could very well believe (a) there was mutual aggression on the part of students and police, or (b) the students (note plural) were the aggressors.  The footage of all four stations was almost identical, each showing the police beating this one helpless kid in the street, but without showing the police pulling this one person off the sidewalk for an extremely mild transgression.  

I’ve also had the privilege to know a number of reporters for major news outlets, and many of them have complained to me about the degree to which their work has been “edited” by superiors before airing.  They’ve also told me that supervisors sometimes excised pertinent factual information because it made certain political or corporate parties look bad.

**The authors give the examples of the Easter Bunny and Roswell to demonstrate this characteristic. 

***I don’t plan on going into any depth on the validity of this statement, but one can immediately note a couple of things.  First, there’s much we (i.e., the general public) do not know about 9/11 because we have seen little factual evidence to support the official conclusion.  In its stead, we’ve seen numerous and vehement statements of disclaimer by officials. Second, since HUMINT on Al Queda has been so limited, I’m not sure there could be any definitive account as to how much conspiracism has played a role in that organization’s growth as opposed to the actual US-imposed sanctions against Iraq (which killed over 500,000 according to the UN), or the historic military intrusions into both Iraq and Iran (which in itself resorted in the re-establishment of a brutal monarch that tortured and murdered thousands more).

****Examples covered in The X-Spot would include Dr. John Mack (Professor, Harvard Medical School) who almost lost his tenure for considering the possibility of alien abduction, or John King, a CIA analyst who temporarily lost his clearances (and therefore couldn’t work) after criticizing the Agency on a humor website.  Another example would be Prof. Ward Churchill (Communications, University of Colorado at Boulder), who lost both his tenure and his job for suggesting that the 9/11 attacks were a logical consequence of illegal US actions in the Middle East.

*****In fact the authors do make note that the disclosure of information does not necessarily heal epistemological cripples.  In an anecdote about the release of 9/11 video that would show whether a jet or a missile slammed into the Pentagon, they wrote:
An example involves the disclosure of the Department of Defense video involving Flight 77’s crash into the Pentagon on 9/11. A pro-transparency group, Judicial Watch, filed a FOIA request to obtain the video, but the Defense Department declined, saying that the video was to be used in the trial of Zacharias Moussaoui. Judicial Watch filed suit to force disclosure, with the avowed objective of using the video to rebut the conspiracy theories surrounding Flight 77....

As we have detailed above, the video’s release did little to squelch the Flight 77 conspiracy theorists, who promptly folded the video into their theories.
So there’s never any guarantee that “accurate information” will persuade someone to your opinion,  even if you both agree that the information is indeed accurate.




This post first appeared on The X Spot, please read the originial post: here

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The Cure that Causes: Official Action Required

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