During the second half of this year, Iraq will hold provincial elections for the first time in more than a decade. Following the mass opposition protests in 2019, local councils were disbanded, leaving a void left by the Dec. 18 vote. Although the upcoming elections may well be postponed, Kirkuk is a multi-ethnic and oil-rich city.

In the event that Kurds and Turkmen lose power and influence to Arabs in the elections, tensions in the strategic city could increase. There have been violent clashes in the past few days over a dispute over control of a building between the Kurdish party and the Iraqi security forces. Iran and Turkey, among other external actors, seek to enhance Kirkuk's allies, adding to the complexities.

Iraq's Kurdish political landscape is fragmented ahead of the forthcoming elections in Kirkuk. The Erbil-based Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) has formed a coalition including the Kurdistan Islamic Movement, Turkmen People's Party, and Iraqi Islamic Party. Meanwhile, another alliance has been made between the Kurdistan Islamic Union and the Kurdistan Justice Group. The Sulaimaniyah-based Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Communist Party have decided to contest jointly, while the opposition New Generation Movement will stand alone.

Kurdish parties fielded a single list in the 2005 local elections, winning 26 of the 41 seats.

Kirkuk has seen major changes since the 2017 Kurdish independence referendum. After the plebiscite, Baghdad and Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) launched a military offensive. Peshmerga forces had to withdraw, and the KDP and PUK closed their offices in the city. This event only drove a deeper wedge between the two parties across Kirkuk and wider Kurdish politics.

Baghdad put its own economic and political pressure on Kurds in Kirkuk. This came in the wake of the independence plebiscite when then-Iraqi prime minister Haidar Al-Abadi (2014-18) removed Najmaldin Karim, an ethnic Kurd, from his position as provincial governor and replaced him with Rakan Saeed Al-Jubouri as acting Kirkuk governor. Moreover, the Kurdish-majority provincial council was abolished. Additionally, Kurds allege that Arabs from other areas of Iraq - working with the PMU and Iraqi security forces - took land from Kurdish farmers in villages surrounding Kirkuk city.

This is why the return of a Kurdish governor would serve as a litmus test for Kurds' influence in Kirkuk and wider Iraqi politics, helping them regain influence lost since 2017. If, however, the PUK keeps close ties to Iranian-backed groups in the city, as it has in Baghdad, and Turkmen choose to work with Arabs to oppose the Kurds, the community's position will be weakened.

It appears that Turkmen discontent with Arab control has been escalating, argues an anonymous Turkmen researcher. According to this source, all 3,000 employees chosen for the Kirkuk Airport project were from the Jubouri tribe, and no Turkmen were included. This information could not be verified. Moreover, the researcher further alleges that Acting Governor Jubouri overturned the previous Kurdish leadership's decision to devote certain directorates—including the police department—to members of the Turkmen group.

Nine Turkmen political groups have collaborated in the buildup to the election, hoping to bridge their leadership disagreement and religious disputes. The former head of ITF, Arshad Salihi, and his successor, Hasan Turan, have been at odds for some time, while Shiite Turkmen's ties to Iran-backed organizations might cause a division when casting ballots. Turan recently called out those who harassed the community by calling for a boycott of the election, whereas Salihi had issues with ITF's refusal to accept certain people affiliated with him into its shared list.

In the Kirkuk provincial council prior to the 2017 referendum, there were 26 Kurds, nine Turkmen, and six Arabs. With the assistance of the Baghdad government, Arabs who have settled in Kirkuk have consolidated administrative, political, and social influence in the city. Despite their desire to maintain power and dominance over the city, Arabs are also divided.

For the upcoming elections, Arab players will be divided into five prominent coalitions: Jubouri's Arab Coalition of Kirkuk; the Leadership Coalition; the Alliance of Kirkuk Arabism; the National Coalition; and a coalition supported by Iran's Shiite Coordination Framework, called the National Framework Coalition. Sunni Arabs in Kirkuk may benefit from cooperation with groups sympathetic to Iran.

The lack of a governor chosen by Kirkuk's provincial council is at the crux of current ethnic tensions. The reinstatement of the provincial council and a new governor after the upcoming elections may reduce these tensions. Kurds and Turkmen might have a stronger hand in seeking the governorship if they achieve electoral success. However, there is a strong chance that the next governor will be an Arab.

Despite the difficulties, Turkmen and Kurds should act pragmatically. Ultimately, Turkey can encourage Turkmen to join the KDP and the Kurds as a whole. Yet the fact that the PUK and Shiite Turkmen may enjoy the support of Iran-backed groups adds another dynamic to the upcoming elections, highlighting the complexity of local politics.