Shia armed political factions form the foundation of the Coordination Framework – a coalition of Arab Shia groups formed by Nuri al-Maliki in late 2022, which led to the appointment of Mohammad Shiaa al-Sudani as Prime Minister. 

Sudani has tried to de-align Iraq from Iran's influence, and he backed up U.S. forces (approximately 2,500 personnel), who are combing and instructing Iraqi forces against elements of the Islamic State organization. 

Nevertheless, due to mounting pressure from Tehran, Maliki, and pro-Iranian Shia militia leaders - on August 15, Sudani met with Iraqi army leaders announcing that Iraq does not need foreign combat troops anymore, plus Maliki’s accusation against U.S. forces - concern raised among American officials had grown even more after Lloyd J. Austin III and Thabit Muhammad Al-Abassi joined together for the inaugurate U.S.-Iraq Joint Security Cooperation Dialogue (JSCD). 

This collaboration was supposed to represent a long-term security relationship between both countries beyond their joint attempt for ISIS elimination, but that perspective seemed uncertain, taking into account Iranian unrest over anti-Assad hostilities in Syria and its potential threat towards Assad's regime.

Iran's increased attention on Iranian Kurdish opposition groups based in Iraq’s northern provinces, assigned by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), has led to tension between Iraq’s Arab and Kurdish populations. On August 28, Nasser Kanani of the Iranian Foreign Ministry noted that Baghdad had accepted a proposal to have these factions disarm and move away by September 19. Iraqi Kurds have argued that this agreement is an attempt to subdue Kurdish autonomy and provide an opportunity for Baghdad and Shia militias to occupy Iraqi Kurdistan.

The Iraq-Iran agreement contributes to Baghdad's efforts to limit the KRG's autonomy by restraining its funding sources. Back in 2023, the Iraqi national oil company won a nine-year-old case against Türkiye that prevented them from aiding the KRG in exporting oil from northern Iraq. 

This caused Türkiye to close down the pipeline, sending oil to Ceyhan, and the results of this total about $4 billion lost in ERG crude along with 75,000 barrels per day of Baghdad-controlled crude. The missing oil revenue combined with Baghdad’s decrease in allocations to the ERK has caused financial hardship for Erbil, leading to tensions between the two main Kurdish parties - the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Consequently, as KDP strengthens its power over both KRG and central government money, PUK fighters (peshmerga) have minimized their participation with KDP peshmerga and KRG Ministry of Peshmerga affairs. 

On August 20, Major General Matthew McFarlane pointed out that if there isn't any advancement on the U.S.-KRG Memorandum of Understanding, they must consider appropriate actions regarding security assistance sent to the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs.

Iraqi politics, governance, and society are heavily influenced by a maze of crosscurrents that will be echoed in the upcoming provincial elections, slated for December 18. Created by 2005’s post-Saddam constitution, provincial councils are influential entities that dictate budgets for numerous sectors such as education, health, and transportation. 

When these councils were dissolved in 2019 due to widespread protests against corruption and nepotism from major Iraqi factions, their reestablishment was temporarily stalled. Provincial council elections will not take place in Kurdistan Region provinces; however, Kirkuk’s council elections are still scheduled despite the Kurds losing power in 2017 after a controversial referendum. 

To regain control over Kirkuk, a coalition between KDP and PUK failed, leading to major demonstrations against central government forces on September 2. While the forthcoming elections may offer insight into Iraq’s politics and governance issues, they alone cannot provide a viable solution to the conflicts currently gripping the country.