So far in this series I have analyzed, with the help of data, what has happened in the war, to try and understand what happened and why, by discussing the strategic and operational issues that each side has to deal with.  In this post, I will talk about what I expect to happen in the next few months. It is said that amateurs discuss strategy and professionals, logistics. Since I haven’t covered logistics, except in passing, so far in this series, I will do so now. There are 2 news items that prompted me to do this:

I will discuss the implications of both later, but first, a reminder of the basic factors that shape this, or any war: 
- Objectives 
- Manpower. 
- Arms, ammunition & logistics.
- Political considerations

Objectives: I think the most misunderstood part about the Ukraine war, is Russia’s objectives. Invading and occupying Ukraine was never an objective. It was, as President Putin informed the nation at the start of the conflict, the demilitarization of Ukraine. This can be done either by advancing into Ukraine and forcing Ukraine to defend their territory, or negotiate for peace (as was almost achieved in the first month of the war), or, as has been the case since June, letting the Ukrainians attack prepared Russian defenses. Ukraine’s objective has been to liberate all Ukrainian territory occupied by Russia (incl. Crimea) which plays into Russia’s preferred option of letting Ukraine attack. Where the Russians have attacked, it has been local attacks to improve their position, or attack an objective Ukraine will be forced to defend commit resources and suffer an adverse casualty ratio – as it happened in Bakhmut, which was an exchange of Russian ex-convicts of the Wagner group, for a larger number of Ukraine’s frontline troops.  

Manpower.  In part 1 of this series: https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2023/07/ukraine-war-understanding-numbers-part.html 
I had calculated, based on June’23 figures, that both Russia and Ukraine both had around 250,000 men in combat formations, in Ukraine. Since then, Russia has got more volunteers and Ukraine has taken more casualties during its counter offensive, which has altered this ratio. More important is the quality of manpower. I’d like to explain that starting with the Ukrainian army, which I have not covered in detail so far, as it has bene more difficult to get what I think it credible data, from open sources, on their structure and casualties.

Ukrainian manpower:

The deployable manpower of Ukraine, comprises, in decreasing order of ability:
1. The pre war standing armed forces of approx. 250,000 men (and women).
2. The national guard, territorial army, armed police and right wing militia groups – 250,000 men
3. Those who were conscripted in the past (approx. 58,000 p.a) and served in the fighting in the
    Donbass (2014-21) and not part of groups 1 & 2.  Approx 75,000 men
4. Those conscripted in the last 30 years (19-50) and not part of the previous 3 groups.
     This is approx. 50,000 men (excl specialist Air force and Navy conscripts) * 30 years or 1.5 million.
     From this, exclude the 575000 already serving. Assume that of the 1 million military age men who
     went abroad in 2022 to avoid being mobilized, half were former conscripts. This leaves 425000 men.

EU refugee data suggests 1 million Ukrainian men of military age went abroad to avoid conscription– in Germany for e.g. 203640 men of military age are listed as refugees. The trend of men fleeing abroad has been exacerbated in the last 2 months, once news of a new mobilization and losses in the counter offensive have become known. 

It gives a total of 1 million men with military experience, which is consistent with Ukrainian  
announcements of having deployed `up to a million’ men, or having mobilized an additional
600-700,000 men. In addition to the standing armed forces of 250,00 men, Ukraine listed its pre-war reserves as 700,000 men and military and national guard as 400,000  My estimate of a possible 1.5 million men is therefore generous.  

There is now several western and Ukrainian sources that suggest that mobilization is no longer voluntary and that the pool of experienced reservists has been exhausted. The Ukrainian govt has also officially announced the need to mobilize those previous excluded.

At the start of 2023, Ukraine’s order of battle (in decreasing order of ability) was:

4 Tank brigades.
9 artillery brigades.
20 Mechanized Brigades.
8 Assault or motorized brigades.
6 Airborne or Marine brigades.  (2 more under training in NATO Countries)
20 National guard brigades.
7 Territorial army brigades.   

The order of battle of Ukraine on 30^th Sept 23 is:

4 Tank Brigades
8 Artillery brigades
18 Mechanized brigades (some being converted to assault brigades)
8 Air assault or Marine brigades.
10 Assault / Motorized brigades
25 Territorial army brigades.
7 National guard brigades

There is reasonably credible and consistent data that suggests the following:

All the Tank and Mechanized brigades have lost most of their armored vehicles and more than half their
original manpower. Tanks (or even Infantry fighting vehicles) are no longer being used in anything more than troops of 3-4 vehicles. The elite brigades in the Rabotino salient for e.g. (see part 4 of the Ukraine series) have had their manpower replaced within a month of being committed to the fighting.

9 of these frontline Brigades, after replacements of manpower, have again sustained very high losses and are ineffective for all practical purposes. 2 Mechanized brigades have been converted to assault brigades (fewer armored vehicles).  

The original National guard brigades have been decimated and are mostly the equivalent of lightly armed territorial defense brigades.

The Ukrainian leadership has admitted that they cannot carry out more than platoon level actions,
indicating a lack of experienced officers or NCOs.

There are few reports of Soviet made artillery guns (which comprised the bulk of Ukraine’s artillery) being destroyed by the Russians. The most likely explanation is that there is insufficient 152mm or 122mm ammunition, making Ukraine dependent on NATO supplies of 155 and 105mm ammunition, stocks of which have mostly been exhausted during the 4 month long counter offensive.

My estimate of the total manpower of these formations is just over 200,000 men. More importantly, only a small percentage of the original army, combat experienced men, or national guard remain. Assuming 200,000 men are in support function (since combat formation exclude engineering, sappers,
drone operators or air defense) and another 100,000 in the police or border guard, the reserve of
manpower with previous military experience would be 500,000 less the casualties already sustained.

I have argued In my earlier post, that Ukraine’s irreplaceable casualties (dead and seriously wounded)
were 360,000. To this should be added the casualties from the ongoing counter-offensive and the number of prisoner – credible estimates put this at 20,000. If for e.g. the total casualties are 450,000, it would mean Ukraine has almost exhausted its reserve of trained manpower (experienced manpower of 1 million, less 450,000 casualties, less 500,000 men in service) and will have to rely on people with no experience, who are conscripted against their will. Data from obituaries, prisoner interrogations, as well as a statement made by the former UK Defense minister Ben Wallace, that the average age of Ukrainian soldiers is over 40, reinforce this point.

My point is not estimating casualties (there will always be disagreement there) but make the point that the quality of Ukraine’s manpower is going to rapidly decline – with experienced volunteers being replaced by unwilling and inexperienced people. This is central to what I think is going to be Russia’s strategy, going forward.

Russian manpower:
As explained in part 1 of this series, the total strength of the Russian ground forces in combat formations, pre-invasion, was 280,000 men, inclusive of conscripts. Not 1 million as is often reported.
This can be cross checked by looking at the T&OE (the authorized manpower and equipment) of all combat formations in the Russian army.
If one excludes men that could not move out of other theatres (e.g. Syria, Kaliningrad, Tajikistan etc.), and some conscripts (assuming that a portion of them participated in the SMO), we would exclude 60,000 men.
Add back: militia of the Donbass (40,000) and formations belonging to the Air force and Navy 40,000 (Paratroopers and Naval infantry) we have a deployable manpower of 300,000 men.

As analyzed in part 5 of this series: 
https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2023/09/ukraine-war-part-5-how-russia-fights.html

an estimated 125000 were irreplaceable Russian casualties (or 135000 by end Sept) and 45,000 would need to be rotated out at any time. This leaves 120,000 men in combat formations. To this must be added 300,000 men who were mobilized in Sept 22 and will remain mobilized for the duration of the war. It can be assumed that since these men were recruited to plug gaps in the combat strength of the Russian army, about 2/3^rd would be in combat formations. This would give 320,000 men, which does not significantly change the strength of the Russian army in Ukraine (up to 300,000 earlier).

There are an estimated 360,000 men who have volunteered to join the Special military operation (SMO) and have signed contracts with the Russian army. This is a moving total, since an estimated 1000 are signing up each day. However, this number is deceptive. It includes:
- Conscripts who sign up after their 1 year of conscript service is over.
- Soldiers who renew their contracts.
- Former members of the Wagner organization who sign contracts

When cross referencing statements of the Russian ministry of defense (I read them in Russian so I don’t need to rely on 3^rd party reporting) it appears that the incremental number of men on contract would be
between 110,000 and 150,000. This is consistent with statements on how they would be deployed.
The Russian Mod announced the creation of 26 new brigades and a new corps level formation (which will be outside of the SMO area) and the strengthening of armored formations with  additional infantry. This would require an additional 100-150000 men.

The Russian armed forces also announced an increase in overall strength by 500,000 people, of which
150,000 would be recruited in 2023. This is an additional validation of the 150,000 number. The MOD correctly makes the point that it cannot equip and train a larger number than this in 2023.

A total of 420-47000 men would mean a 2:1 superiority over Ukraine in manpower (even if assumptions around both Ukraine’s and Russia’s manpower are tweaked). Ukraine’s MoD estimated the size of Russian forces in Ukraine to be 420,000.
As long as Ukraine is attacking into prepared Russian defenses, their manpower ratio vs. Russia will worsen. More importantly, so will the decline in the quality of manpower. Russia would therefore have no immediate need for an offensive of its own.
The details and location of various Russian units suggest that newly formed reserves are slowly being induced to the battlefield (after refresher training and, in some cases, specialist training) under controlled conditions. The 26 new brigades would probably be ready and equipped by the end of 2023.   

Arms, Ammunition and supplies: There are shortfalls in the supply of weapons, supplies and in logistics for both sides.

Ukraine had stockpiled supplies for the counter offensive, on the assumption that operations would last a month. It has been 4 months. It is highly likely that Ukraine is able to fire only the bare minimum of
artillery shells (probably 1000/ day). No significant use of precision missiles – HIMARS or Storm shadow/scalp cruise missiles have been reported for the last 2 weeks. There is also no significant supply of weapons in the pipeline, barring small quantities of the much hyped F-16s and M1 Abrams tanks.

Since NATO has exhausted stocks of Soviet era weapons and stock of western weapons it could supply to Ukraine – barring limited quantities that need refurbishment, any further supply would have to come from new sources (e.g. South Korea) or increasing production capacity. The latter has only begun on a small scale most notably US increasing production of 155mm shells from 25,000 to 100,000 per month
- which is half Russia’s capacity, will be shared by the US military and will be reached only in 2025. Any increase in production from new facilities by NATO will take at least a year.   

Ukraine will also not be able to train new manpower to bring its existing formations to strength (particularly since new conscripts have no prior experience) for the next 6 months. Thus Russia will have a window of opportunity till the first half of 2024, where its manpower and armaments strength, relative to Ukraine will be at its highest. Russia however has its own problems.

Ukraine’s Air force, Air defense systems & artillery guns are also being destroyed faster than they can be replaced. In another 3 months, Russia will expect to have far more dominance of the air than they have hitherto had, due to Ukrainian air defenses.

Russia: Although media attention has been focused on several western weapon systems, all touted as
`game changers’ (e.g. Javelin Anti-tank missiles, Bayraktar drones, HIMARS, Storm shadow etc.) the reality is that all these new weapons, after the initial surprise, have been defeated by Russian counter measures and they no longer influence the war. The real game changers in my view will be simple weapons produced in bulk. These, in my opinion are:

1.Modifications to FAB 250/500/1500 kg bombs to make them guided bombs launched out of the range of Ukrainian anti-aircraft missiles. First seen in May 23 (the 1500 kg bomb only appeared in Sept), if Russia ramps up production of kits from 20 a day to 100+  AND modifies enough aircraft to carry them, it will (as Ukrainian sources also admit) make a big difference, as Russia can launch precision strikes on targets well behind the front.   

2. Production of drones - both shorter range Lancet and longer range Geran drones, are ramping up and their use is already 10 times more than a year ago. For e.g. while there were 10 recorded strikes from
Lancet drones per month between Jun-Aug 22, they crossed 100 in June ‘23 and 250 in Sept.

3. In part 2 of this series: https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2023/07/ukraine-war-understanding-numbers-part_18.html
I have suggested that the most important weapon of this war for Russia is the 152mm artillery shell. I assumed Russia would get about 1 million shells from North Korea in 2023 and did not assume that Russia would need to have a reserve in case there is a war against NATO. My assumption of Russia producing 1.5 million 152mm shells a year, is also the view of western intelligence sources – which have put the number, based on current production, at 2 million per year.  

Since any offensive by Russia would probably require 20,000 shells a day and current production is about 6000/ day (reducing its estimated 5 million shell stock by 420,000 shells each month), Russia would probably need 1-2 million shells from North Korea (with gun barrels to replace worn out Russian barrels ) to maintain a comfortable artillery buffer.

In all these cases, it will take Russia 2-3 months to stockpile a quantity big enough to conduct an offensive.  

There are also other weapon platforms which are currently in short supply and affecting Russia’s ability to conduct an offensive. These are:

-         A-50U upgraded AWAC aircraft. Russia has insufficient AWA&C aircraft (probably 7 operational A-50U (upgraded version of the obsolete A-50) of which 2 would be flying at any time. A new A-50U has just been handed of to the Russian air force, while its first A-100 (which is expected to more than match the NATO’s E-3) is expected in the beginning of 2024.

-         Penicillin gun detection systems (detecting enemy artillery based on sound and not radar) have been successfully deployed, but it will take time before each artillery regiment gets one, along with dedicated drones.

-         Attack helicopters. A batch of the new variant of the KA-52 (Ka-52M) would be fully inducted by the end of the year, along with the new variant of the Mi-28 (Mi-28 NM). 

Logistics: The Russian army has historically been dependent on supply by rail – which is understandable given the size of the country. Truck based supply is designed to operate no further than 100 km from a rail head. Russia has about 450 trucks in each logistics brigade that supports each of its 9 corps sized Armies. In sustained combat, or when stockpiling supplies for an offensive, the Russian army’s existing truck fleet (8000 trucks for basic goods transport) will not suffice and it has to take trucks from the civilian fleet (as the Indian army with a much larger truck fleet would also do). Russia has not done so, as it cannot hurt the domestic economy by supply bottlenecks – which are already happening due to sanctions and the diversion of rail cargo capacity for military purposes.

In the Kharkov sector of the front, the loss of the Izyum and Kupiansk rail heads last Sept, has complicated logistics, by increasing the distance from the rail head to storage depots and then to combat units. Similarly, to supply the Zaporozhe front (where the Ukrainian counter offensive has been going on for 4 months, placing a heavy logistics requirement on the Russian army), the Russian army has to use a single rail line which is close to the front and vulnerable to shelling or drone strikes.

The situation is exacerbated by the loss of about 20% of all the trucks in Russian logistics units and combat formations, since the conflict began and the need to disperse supply depots and keep them further away from the front (out of the range of HIMARS rockets). 

A lot of rail and truck capacity had been taken up by the construction of defenses in the Zaporozhe and later Bakhmut sector (e.g. concrete, earth moving equipment etc.). This is now complete and that capacity can be used for moving supplies from factories and storage sites to combat units. 

The Russian army, which has dedicated railway units, is constructing an additional line to Mariupol (to supply the Zaporozhe sector), while also strengthening the rail line from Crimea and ferry capacity to Crimea. There is similarly rail construction to enable Slavyansk to be used as a rail head.   

There has been a recent ban by Russia on the export of diesel. It seems surprising, given that oil exports are an important source of hard currency earnings. The only plausible explanation is the need to stock diesel for a planned offensive. Along with stocking fuel, the Russian army will have to lay more pipelines (there are dedicated pipeline units for this) from fuel depots to forward storage locations – again the need to keep fuel dumps dispersed and move the `parent’ dumps away form the front, requires longer lengths of pipeline – and protection from sabotage teams and drones.      

My sense is these rail and pipeline projects would be completed by the end of the year, by which time sufficient fuel and ammunition would be stocked.

Politics: Support for Ukraine among NATO countries has been reducing in the last 3 months. President Zelenski got a cool reception at the NATO summit. The G-20 did not endorse his, or the West’s position on Ukraine. His subsequent trips to the US and UN were not successful and there is a significant reduction in financial aid (also military aid, but there isn’t any to give). The reduction in aid does not consider the budget related crisis in the US, which has shut all aid to Ukraine for the time being.

More significantly, there is a shift in voter opinion in Europe, on open ended support to Ukraine.
The reelection of Erdogan in Turkey (against the expectations of the West) means Turkish neutrality toward Russia, rather than an anti -Russia policy that the Turkish opposition was expected to pursue.
Hungary is supportive of Russia’s position.
If elections in Slovakia held on 30^th Sept, bring a govt led by former PM Fico, Slovakia can be expected to stop aid to Ukraine. While the amount involved is insignificant, the country borders Ukraine and it will mean that Hungary is not isolated in NATO, on Ukraine policy.

German local elections to Hesse and Bavaria on 8^th Oct and Polish elections on 15^th Oct, may all result in coalitions that may weaken the hitherto pro Ukraine and Anti Russia stance of the ruling party. Coupled with a budget related paralysis in governance in the US, its possible that Russia wait for Ukrainian morale to weaken (and arms supplies in the pipeline to dry up) before launching any offensive.    

What happens next: The rains in Oct lead to the `mud seasons’ which makes the movement of mechanized forces difficult. Any Russian activity till the ground hardens during winter will be 
small pushes at the battalion level, to improve a tactical position. 
Ukraine has almost stopped its counter offensive in the Zaporozhe front – Russian MOD reports a far lower (and falling) level of casualties. Ukrainian attacks in the Bakhmut sector have been stronger but are also ending, due to negligible gains and high casualties. The rains will provide a good reason for Ukraine to stop offensive activity (rather than admit the counter offensive has failed).

As we have seen, it is not in Russia’s interest to launch an immediate offensive of their own. I believe they would do so when the ground freezes in winter. Apart from the hardened ground, forests do not have foliage, making it easier to spot enemy positions (heat signatures are also enhanced).

I believe Russia will look at a limited offensive in multiple sectors (rather than a `big arrow’ armored fist). Russia would not try to gain a large amount of territory, or an all-out war, which would involve serious damage to Ukraine’s cities and infrastructure. That runs the risk of NATO intervention and solidifying support for Ukraine that is wavering. Russia will not also respond strongly to single drone attacks (like the hit on the HQ building of the Black sea fleet).
On that subject, it is highly unlikely that ANY armed forces would put their HQ staff in a known and highly visible location, with no defense against air attack. So, it was a propaganda victory for Ukraine, but does not change the overall direction of the war.

NATO’s escalation strategy has been explained in this article:
https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/army-war-college-report-predicts

 
The following sectors are in my view the most likely to be the objective of a limited Russian offensive:

1. The North. An limited offensive across the Russia border, advancing towards Sumy and Kharkov.
This would require the Russians to advance no more than 20km. It would protect the Russian side    from Ukrainian cross border shelling (which will also justify to Russians and the world community
the reason to advance outside of the disputed Donbass region). A Russian advance here will put both Kharkov and Sumy in artillery range, which will be a deterrent to Ukrainian shelling of Russian cities.

G   Given the importance of Kharkov (Ukraine’s 2^nd largest city) and Sumy, the Ukrainians will be forced to reinforce both areas, drawing away forces from other sectors. Russia only needs to threaten both cities (as they did in the first month of the war), not capture them. This is the least defended part of the front and gives the Russians the least logistics problems.

2. 2. Another Bakhmut. The city of Avdiivka (the source of Ukrainian shelling of the city of Donetsk) has been semi encircled. If, as it happened in Bakhmut, Russia attempts to capture the city, Ukraine will most likely be forced to defend it, with a heavy loss of life, since Russia will have significant artillery and drone superiority and have a large number of assault squads experienced in urban fighting, who will will be attacking conscripted Ukrainians. Not defending the city, will result in the Ukrainian defensive line (built over 8 years) breaking and unhinging the whole defense.

A similar logic applies to Marinka (which is about 80% occupied). Taking it, allows the Russians to
move south, attacking the city of Ugledar from the North, unhinging the whole Ukrainian line
from Zaporozhe to Ugledar and protecting the H20 highway, a major road supply route for Russia.  Similarly, the capture of Pervomaiske (50% under Russan control) will enable Russia to cut Ukraine’s Donbass defensive line in two. (see map).

3. Regaining the Oskol river and Severodonetsk river lines: A push from the East, towards Kharkov regaining the territory Russia lost in Ukraine’s Sept 22 offensive. It will regain the important logistics hubs of Kupiansk and Izyum, give Russia an easily defended river line, threaten Kharkov from the East (as well as the North, if Russia implements option 1) and the last remaining Ukrainian controlled cities in the Donbass – Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, from the North.

444. Crossing the Dnieper: This, I believe will be the most ambitious operation (crossing a large defended river always is). However, it can be done with limited objectives, which would be (re)occupying the city of Kherson and the west bank of the river upto the town of Beryslav. This Russia would attempt to have a bridgehead about 10 km wide and 20km from north to South. The west bank of the Dnieper is higher than the east bank and easier to defend. Occupying it will achieve the following:

- Regain the city of Kherson (capital of the province) lost in the Ukrainian offensive a year ago. 
  Force Ukraine into costly urban warfare (with inadequate artillery and no air support) if they want to recapture it.
- Force Ukraine to concentrate forces in the open and conduct costly frontal assaults, if they want to regain the west bank of the Dnieper. A small Russian force manning the West bank can  easily be supplied through the islands between the west and east Bank (which Ukraine is now using to conduct their own river crossings). If this Russian force is overwhelmed, it can retreat across the river. The operation can be called in `reconnaissance in force’ so that any Russian retreat can be explained away. 
- Push Ukrainian HIMARS systems further away from Crimea 

Ukraine’s defensive options would be similar to what the Germans faced on the Eastern front from the latter part of 1943. They would have to shorten their front, to increase the density of the defenders and
not insist on defending every town.  
Ukraine’s options include:
- Retreat behind the Oskil river, giving up control of Kupiansk.
- Withdraw from the Sversk salient, which is being attacked from three sides. It reduces the front by
  almost 100km.
- Withdraw from the salient between Ugledar and Marinka, which will shorten the line to be defended.

To sum up, winter will see a limited Russian offensive in multiple sectors.

Previous articles in this series. 

https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2023/07/ukraine-war-understanding-numbers-part.html

https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2023/07/ukraine-war-understanding-numbers-part_18.html

https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2023/07/ukraine-war-part-3-missed-opportunities.html 

https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2023/08/ukraine-war-part-4-ukraines-counter.html

https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2023/09/ukraine-war-part-5-how-russia-fights.html

Map: Russian options in the Avdiivka, Pervomaiskie and Marinka sectors.