I am a former FDA COO and Harvard faculty member, and a decades-long infectious disease spread risk management expert. (It’s the rate, depth, and breadth of “spread” that most counts.) At the FDA, I co-led its last major internal reform. At Harvard, I taught policy, law, and management, including risk management.
In my prior jobs, I stayed on top of how best to manage the risks facing our nation and its businesses.
As a patriot, successful family man, and accomplished businessperson, I feel it remains my job to warn the public and our leaders at all levels of significant risks that we—at the national (national security and defense) and enterprise levels are woefully unprepared to risk manage (prevent, mitigate, and control).
There is one risk right now of which I am most worried, both because it is severe and because, despite the deaths of 1.2 million Americans and 7 million people worldwide, we learned nothing from the COVID-19 Pandemic. We are acting as if it
never happened. I am most worried right now about bio-suicide Sneak attacks and if they will be in the future. I fear they will be. Why?
Because of its surprise (sneak) terrorist attack nature—and overwhelmingly successful result—we neither professionally characterize nor publicly call the October 7. 2023, vicious and brutal attack by Hamas on the Israeli people a “suicide sneak attack.” But that is what it was.
A suicide sneak attack is one likely to have a disastrously damaging effect on oneself physically or mentally. What kind of people do this—and why?
Many of the attackers on that brutal day had to know that because of Israel’s superior intelligence mechanisms (eventually) and national security and national defense firepower (applied at the end of the attack and for months to come), they would likely be killed during or shortly after the October 7 attack. But they carried out the mission anyway. Why?
It is said that most organized terrorists do this because, like the WWII Kamikaze pilots, they responded to their commonly held duty to support their religion and their religious leaders. And because they believe they will receive just returns in the afterlife based on their heroism.
We probably will never know what a single attacker had in mind. But for sure, all the attacking Humas warriors on October 7 were surprised and delighted that only a small number of their nearly 2,000 teammates were killed. Things could have been so much worse.
What lessons should we, Israel, and our other allies draw from this awful experience? Why weren’t more of the warriors deterred? How did Hamas convince some 2,000 men to cross the border into Israel, thinking they most likely would be killed if they did? Few people are willing to make such a sacrifice of themselves and to their families. What was different here?
Was it desperation? Was it a commitment to a cause? Was it in the protection of their families? Was it fear that they would be killed or severely punished physically or humiliated by their leaders if they refused? Were they drugged? Was it that they feared that Israel was planning an attack on them in which they would be killed, so they had nothing to lose? Or was it something else?
Put yourself in their shoes. Why would you ever perform a suicide sneak attack?
The first shocking experience I had with such commitment to the point of almost certain death (complete heroism or insanity) was when the US President asked me to help a team had assembled to immediately and forcefully respond to and minimize the damaging effects on the US and our allies of the largely misunderstood Chornobyl Crisis.
When the Crisis was first discovered, many in our intelligence apparatus thought it might have been a deliberate nuclear explosion attack and quickly spreading mass-destruction level disaster—perhaps the first of many.
The heroism I observed was not among our team. It was among the Russian responders—the nuclear technicians and chemical blast firefighters who gave their lives to control the spread of the fire.
By willfully giving their lives, they prevented the disaster’s increased breadth and depth. They saved the lives of thousands, if not millions, in Russia and the rest of the world—notably those residing in the parts of Russia and other countries located downwind of the disaster.
What heroes they indeed were. We brought the world’s top bone marrow surgeon to the scene, but all of them died, as they knew they would. But they ran into the clear and present danger anyway. What kind of people do this? Is there a lesson to be learned from here as well?
I raise these questions because I believe they are highly relevant when I ask myself: “Could bio-suicide sneak attacks be in our future?” Of course, not all sneak attacks are bio, and not all of them are suicidal. So why am I so concerned regarding this method and means of killing millions of American residents and people residing within our allied countries?
This is because handling the widespread use of bioweapons is extremely dangerous for the spreader, especially if they are a warrior and not a bio expert. It is challenging to spread extremely dangerous (very deadly and highly contagious) pathogens beyond a few floors within a building without catching the disease.
Even if the spreader gives up their identity by wearing a highly protective mask—and thereby reduces the size of the spread they can accomplish before being caught—there remains a high risk of dying.
Of course, there is the lesson that Hamas and their allies and agents will be willing to conduct chemical weapon terrorist attacks, even suicidal chemical weapon terrorist attacks—including suicidal Sneak Attacks, like the one they just performed on October 7 in attacking Israel.
These warriors performed this attack on our and our allies’ soil, no matter how hard and dangerous the effort was. So, why bio-suicide sneak attacks? Wouldn’t a significant nuclear or chemical attack be more potent? The answer is “No.”
Nuclear weapons are too immediately traceable (so an immediate response of the same or greater magnitude is almost certain) and too messy.
Chemical weapon attacks are also too dirty—and they do not, in a single wave of attacks, spread city-wide, county-wide, state-wide, nation-wide, or continent-wide. Bioweapons spread by 2,000 embedded agents do.
Is there a far more significant lesson we should learn from what has already occurred, historically or recently? “Yes.”
Why do terrorist groups or nation-states make suicide sneak attacks? And why would they add a bio component to the equation?
Even the most hardened facilities have a high risk of a sneak attack doing great harm. For example, guards can quickly be overwhelmed by warriors or drones. Or entry codes can be stolen.
And, if necessary or preferred, a suicide sneak attack might be even more potent still. But why would they take it to the extreme and use bioweapons instead of chemical weapons and knowingly give their lives to impose the most significant harm to their targets?
A bio-suicide sneak attack, if correctly performed, would be far more effective than a chemical sneak attack, whether suicidal or not. A bio-suicide sneak attack would be highly effective and kill perhaps millions more people than a chemical attack if the estimated 2,000 Hamas/Iran agents residing in the US went full force into doing
it, even though it were to turn out that some didn’t keep their commitment because they were too scared.
What are the two forms of bio-suicide sneak attacks we might experience if Hamas, a puppet of Iran and increasingly “on its last leg and desperate,” or Iran itself performed such an attack?
The most obvious is the case where the agent infects themselves and then spreads the significant pathogen within, for example, a series of manufacturing plants (of which there are some 600,000 just in the US) or drug stores (of which there are almost 44,000 just in the US) or food-processing plants (of which there are 42,000 just in the US) either as a worker, visitor, customer, raider, trespasser, or night-time-shift intruder.
The other case is where the warrior places canisters or biologics within structures set to go off after the warrior leaves the premises. This second case is less deadly but still significantly deadly.
Because dangerous pathogens are challenging to handle, they are less lethal but still deadly in most instances. Just like Russian roulette does not kill every player in every try, it is suicidal to play.
But in most situations, suicidal attacks are the most effective and cost- effective. For groups or nations that are in desperate situations, sacrificing 2,000 warriors who are willing to give their lives to the cause of victory for their religion is nothing.
The bottom line: the third and best rail of terrorist or hostile nation weapons of mass destruction is bioweapons. There is no weapon more potent, given less risk of immediate retaliation.
No other weapon continues for days, weeks, months, or even years to kill so efficiently, effectively, surreptitiously, highly untraceably, and broadly, readily across a nation “in a single bound.”
And there is no other weapon of mass destruction for which the US and our allies are less prepared. In truth, not just less. But poorly prepared. Not just at the nation- state level. But at the enterprise. Why?
The risk is exceptionally high. And our enemies know this.
CONTACT:
John Norris – 617-680-3127
[email protected] https://www.safely2prosperity.com
© 2024 Safely2Prosperity LLC and Dr. John Norris. All Rights Reserved. Text: 617-680-3127.
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