Prospect the Reckless in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy
Pakistan’s Foreign Policy can be understood with respect to three impulses: the normative, statist, and structural. First, the normative impulse is a constitutive element of the Pakistani nation-state project, including ideological and self-definitional tropes such as culture, values, religion, and history based on its Islamic identity. The key question is to what extent Pakistan’s Islamic identity provides explanations for its Foreign policy when international relations literature considers the national interest a more reliable predictor of foreign policy than identity or ideology. Second, the statist strand in Pakistan’s foreign policy demonstrates a path-dependent fixation on a traditional paradigm of security as a defense against external threats. These regional threat perceptions emanate from two of its immediate neighbors: from Afghanistan, via the Durand Line conflict; from India, over Kashmir, its core security problem antique. Third, the structural impulse is indicative of policy inputs from the international system, and, specifically, great powers over which Pakistan exercises little control. The growing strategic rivalry between the United States and China, for instance, directly impacts Pakistan’s foreign policy as Pakistan attempts to navigate between the two powers without jeopardizing its relations with either of them. These three imperatives provide insight into Pakistan’s two key foreign policy goals: achieving economic redemption and regulating traditional security.Normative dimensions in Pakistan foreign policyDoes Islam as a normative ideal provide a solid explanation for Pakistan’s foreign policy since independence or does foreign policy have to do more with the attainment of national interest objectives? The Islamic identity is often invoked as a key element in the first Prime Minister of Pakistan Liaquat Ali Khan’s side-stepping of an official invitation from the Soviet Union in 1949 and, instead, visiting the United States in May 1950 because the “godless” communist ideology of the Soviet Union tampered with Pakistan’s religious sensitivities. This ideological dimension was conveniently set aside when it came to China, the countervailing communist power. Pakistan recognized Communist China as early as 1950 and initiated bilateral relations with the Chinese state despite engagement in military defense alliances with the United States.The interplay of Islamic identity and national interests is also apparent in Pakistan’s outreach to the Muslim world. This outreach was patchy in the initial years as Pakistan’s national interest dictated a pro-Western foreign policy and a less enthusiastic response to Arab nationalism. In 1956, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Husain Shaheed Suhrawardy, lamenting on the state of the Muslim world, reiterated: “zero plus zero plus zero plus zero is after all equal to that, zero.”National interest dictating foreign policy choices is a theme both for Pakistan and also for the Muslim states Pakistan has invoked as its allies after India revoked Article 370 granting Jammu and Kashmir semi-autonomous status in August 2019. The Pakistani Foreign Minister recently blamed Saudi Arabia for its lack of support for convening a special session of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation on Kashmir, which came after it reduced its aid for Pakistan. This is a small example of how normative idealism—solidarity, as a Muslim-majority country, with Pakistan in its stance on Muslim-majority Kashmir—matters increasingly less in foreign policymaking. This, combined with the Muslim countries’ pursuit of peace with Israel, indicates changing strategic realities that Pakistan’s foreign policy must contend with in the future.
Pakistan’s Foreign Policy can be understood with respect to three impulses: the normative, statist, and structural. First, the normative impulse is a constitutive element of the Pakistani nation-state project, including ideological and self-definitional tropes such as culture, values, religion, and history based on its Islamic identity. The key question is to what extent Pakistan’s Islamic identity provides explanations for its Foreign policy when international relations literature considers the national interest a more reliable predictor of foreign policy than identity or ideology. Second, the statist strand in Pakistan’s foreign policy demonstrates a path-dependent fixation on a traditional paradigm of security as a defense against external threats. These regional threat perceptions emanate from two of its immediate neighbors: from Afghanistan, via the Durand Line conflict; from India, over Kashmir, its core security problem antique. Third, the structural impulse is indicative of policy inputs from the international system, and, specifically, great powers over which Pakistan exercises little control. The growing strategic rivalry between the United States and China, for instance, directly impacts Pakistan’s foreign policy as Pakistan attempts to navigate between the two powers without jeopardizing its relations with either of them. These three imperatives provide insight into Pakistan’s two key foreign policy goals: achieving economic redemption and regulating traditional security.
Normative dimensions in Pakistan foreign policy
Does Islam as a normative ideal provide a solid explanation for Pakistan’s foreign policy since independence or does foreign policy have to do more with the attainment of national interest objectives? The Islamic identity is often invoked as a key element in the first Prime Minister of Pakistan Liaquat Ali Khan’s side-stepping of an official invitation from the Soviet Union in 1949 and, instead, visiting the United States in May 1950 because the “godless” communist ideology of the Soviet Union tampered with Pakistan’s religious sensitivities. This ideological dimension was conveniently set aside when it came to China, the countervailing communist power. Pakistan recognized Communist China as early as 1950 and initiated bilateral relations with the Chinese state despite engagement in military defense alliances with the United States.
The interplay of Islamic identity and national interests is also apparent in Pakistan’s outreach to the Muslim world. This outreach was patchy in the initial years as Pakistan’s national interest dictated a pro-Western foreign policy and a less enthusiastic response to Arab nationalism. In 1956, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Husain Shaheed Suhrawardy, lamenting on the state of the Muslim world, reiterated: “zero plus zero plus zero plus zero is after all equal to that, zero.”
National interest dictating foreign policy choices is a theme both for Pakistan and also for the Muslim states Pakistan has invoked as its allies after India revoked Article 370 granting Jammu and Kashmir semi-autonomous status in August 2019. The Pakistani Foreign Minister recently blamed Saudi Arabia for its lack of support for convening a special session of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation on Kashmir, which came after it reduced its aid for Pakistan. This is a small example of how normative idealism—solidarity, as a Muslim-majority country, with Pakistan in its stance on Muslim-majority Kashmir—matters increasingly less in foreign policymaking. This, combined with the Muslim countries’ pursuit of peace with Israel, indicates changing strategic realities that Pakistan’s foreign policy must contend with in the future.
