OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES ART LOOTING INVESTIGATION UNIT APO 413 U.S. ARMY CONSOLIDATED INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1 15

August 1945 ACTIVITY OF THE EINSTATZSTAB ROSENBERG IN FRANCE 

J. S. PLAUT Lieutenant, USNR Director 

Distribution US Chief of Counsel (War Crimes) Doc. Div. 6 J.A. Sect. (War Crimes) 3rd US Army 5 US Group CC (Germany), MFA & A 4 USFET, MFA & A 2 USFAustria (USACA), MFA & A 2 G-5 Civil Affairs War Dept. 2 Roberts Commission 2 EWD State Dept. 2 Brit. El. CC. Germany, MFA & A 4 A.C.A. (British), MFA & A 2 M.E.W. 2 M.I.5. 2 D.G.E.R. 4 Commiss. Gen. Netherlands (Ec. Recup.) 2 [p. i] 

CONFIDENTIAL 

CONTENTS i. Introductory Note: Sources I.ORGANIZATION AND AUTHORITY II.DEVELOPMENT OF Einsatzstab ACTIVITY IN FRANCE (a)The GOERING Relationship (b) “Revision” of the Mission ; the M-Action (c)Internal and External Conflict III. CONFISCATION IN PRACTICE AND IN THEORY (a) Methods Employed by the Einsatzstab (b) Official French Protests and German Justification (c) Analysis of Confiscation IV.DISPOSITION OF CONFISCATED MATERIAL (a) Objects Brought to Germany - General i.Difficulty of Transportation and Storage (b) Objects Acquired by GOERING (c) Objects Acquired for HITLER (d) Exchanges i. Summary ii. Policy and Method V.DETAILS OF EXCHANGES VI.E.R.R. PERSONNEL ACTIVE IN FRANCE (a)Executive (b)Professional Specialists (c)Confidential Assistants (d)Photographic Staff (e)Secretarial (f)General VII.ATTACHMENTS (Note : ATTATCHMENTS 5, 6, 9A, 10 and 11 are submitted in translation. All other attachments are submitted in the original German text and in translation.) 1. Letter from General KEITEL to German Military Commander, France, dated 17 September 1940 2. GOERING Order dated 5 November 1940 CONFIDENTIAL [p. ii] CONFIDENTIAL 3. Hitler Order (“Vorbehalt”), signed by LAMMERS, dated 18 November 1940 4. Letter from SCHOLZ to HANSSEN, dated 11 December 1940 5. ROSENBERG memorandum for HITLER, dated 18 December 1941 6. Letter from LAMMERS to ROSENBERG, dated 31 December 1941 7. UTIKAL order (internal E.R.R.) dated 6 July 1943 8. ROSENBERG letter to GOERING dated 18 June 1942 9. BUNJES report on E.R.R., dated 18 August 1942 9a. Hague Convention of 18 October 1907, “Rules of Land Warfare” – Article 46 (extract) 10. List of collections confiscated by the E.R.R. 11. List of confiscated works of art selected for HITLER, February 1941 12. POSSE letter to SCHOLZ dated 16 July 1941 13. SCHOLZ letter to POSSE dated 19 July 1941 14. UTIKAL letter to ROSENBERG dated 18 February 1941 15. UTIKAL letter to SCHOLZ dated 18 February 1941 16. E.R.R. exchange contract of 9 July 1941 17. Appraisal list, signed Jacques BELTRAND, dated 11 March 1942 18. E.R.R. file memorandum (re. exchange) dated 3 December 1941 19. BOEDECKER letter to LOHSE dated 27 March 1943 CONFIDENTIAL 

CONFIDENTIAL i. Introductory Note : Sources This report is intended as comparatively definite study of the most elaborate and extensive art looting operation undertaken by the Germans in World War II – namely, the confiscation by the Einsatzstab Rosenberg of Jewish-owned collections in France. As such, it includes no account of the seizure and exploitation by the Einsatzstab of libraries and archives, or of other political or cultural material. The information contained herein has been derived from the detailed interrogation of key German personnel and the analysis of official German documents. The following individuals, listed as sources, were detained and interrogated at a special investigation centre in Austria during the period 10 June – 15 August 1945 : 1. Dr. Robert SCHOLZ, chief adviser to Reichsleiter ROSENBERG in art matters; Bereichsleiter (Divisional Director) of the Rosenberg Amt Bildende Kunst (Office for Pictorial Arts), Berlin. 2. Dr. Bruno LOHSE, special art representative of GOERING in France and Deputy Director of the ROSENBERG art staff in Paris. 3. Dr.Günther SCHIEDLAUSKY, member of the E.R.R. and keeper of the E.R.R. deposits in Germany (Interrogated at Neuschwanstein/Füssen, Bavaria, on 10 - 11 July 1945). 4. Karl KRESS, photographer attached to the E.R.R. staff. 5. Gustav ROCHLITZ, German art dealer active in Paris, who conducted important transactions with the E.R.R. 6. Walter Andreas HOFER, art dealer; principle buyer for GOERING, and Director of his gallery at Carinhall. 7. Fräulein Gisela LIMBERGER, GOERING’s personal librarian and secretary, and keeper of the records of the GOERING Collection. The files of the EINSATZSTAB ROSENBERG, still largely intact, were examined at Neuschwanstein/Füssen, Bavaria and constitute a primary source of information. J.S.P. -2- CONFIDENTIAL 

CONFIDENTIAL I.ORGANIZATION AND AUTHORITY The Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg für die Besetzen Gebiete was a special unit formed under Hauptabteilung III: (Sonderaufgaben) (Division # 3: Special Projects) of the Aussenpolitischesamt (Foreign Political Office) of Reichsleiter Alfred ROSENBERG. Originally, its primary and theoretical function was the collection of political material in the occupied countries, for exploitation in the “struggle against Jewry and Freemasonry.” Amt Westen (The Office for the occupied Countries of the West) became operational in July 1940, with headquarters in Paris. On 17 September 1940, General KEITEL, Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht, ordered the Commander in Chief of the German Army in France to render all assistance to the Rosenberg organization for the implementation of its mission (ATTACHMENT 1). On 5 November 1940, a GOERING order issued in Paris extended formally the authority of the Einsatzstab to include the confiscation of “ownerless” Jewish art collections, and, indeed, altered the emphasis of the Einsatzstab mission so as to make such activity its primary function (ATTACHMENT 2). Prior to the GOERING order, such activity had been the nominal responsibility of the German military commander for France and the German Embassy in Paris (see Consolidated Interrogation Report No. 3, “German Methods of Acquisition”). On 18 November 1940, HITLER ordered through Reichsminister LAMMERS that all confiscated works of art were to be brought to Germany and placed at his personal disposal, and that all matters relating there to were to be the responsibility of the Director of the Dresden Gallery, Dr. POSSE (ATTACHMENT 3). Amt Westen was directed at the outset of Stabsfuehrer Dr. EBERT, assisted by the German Red Cross Oberfuehrer, Kurt Von Behr. This office was located in Paris, with headquarters in the Hotel Commodore. In addition to a staff of photographers, the Paris Dienststelle, commanded a small group of professional art historians who worked as a -3- CONFIDENTIAL

 CONFIDENTIAL unit designated as the Arbeitsgruppe Louvre. The function of this unit was the methodical preparation for transport to Germany of all works of art received through confiscation, and a comprehensive inventory thereof. 

At the outset, this group comprised Doctors SCHIEDLAUSKY, WIRTH, ESSER, JERCHEL, KUNTZE, and several research assistants. Early in 1941, EBERT was forced to retire because of an injury suffered in an automobile accident. He was succeeded by Stabsfuehrer Gerhard UTIKAL, who, however, was given complete responsibility for the activities of the Einsatzstab in all countries, with offices in Berlin and the title of Hauptstellenleiter des Aussenpolitisches Amt und Leiter des E.R.R. Simultaneously, von BEHR was made responsible for all Einsatzstab operations in France. Administrative confusion was caused from the outset by the fact that the Berlin Amt Bildende Kunst (Office for Pictorial Arts) was a subdivision of the Amt für Weltanschauliche Schulung und Erziehung (Office for World-political Education and Indoctrination), an independent division of the Amt Rosenberg with authority equal to, but separate from, the Aussenpolitisches Amt. 

As ROSENBERG’S personal advisor in art matters and Director of the Amt Bildende Kunst, Bereichsleiter Dr. Robert SCHOLZ was charged with the professional guidance of the art historians active in Paris. Inasmuch as von BEHR’s authority as Director, both of the Einsatzstab in France and of the subsidiary art staff, stemmed from a different branch of the Rosenberg organization, he was able at all times to resist SCHOLZ’s attempts to control the activity of the Paris staff. Formally, the Amt Bildende Kunst was a department of the Hauptamt Kunstpflege (Central Office for Art Administration), under the direction of Hauptamtsleiter Dr. Walter STANG, who was described by SCHOLZ as an administrative figurehead, entirely unversed in art matters. -4- CONFIDENTIAL 

CONFIDENTAL II.DEVELOPMENT OF EINSATZSTAB ACTIVITY IN FRANCE (a)The GOERING Relationship It is of the utmost significance that, whereas the confiscations of the Einsatzstab in France were conducted under authority vested in the Rosenberg office by the Reichschancellery (HITLER), the important operations were dominated by GOERING. The function of the Einsatzstab in GOERING’s behalf was in formal contradiction to the HITLER order of 18 November 1940; but GOERING, through personal sponsorship of the project, contrived to exploit its activity in his own interest from 1940 through 1942. First, ROSENBERG, while he felt constrained to carry out the HITLER order literally, was not strong enough politically to oppose GOERING on even terms. Second, GOERING’s command of the Luftwaffe enabled him to supply the Einsatzstab with much-needed motor transpot, military escort personnel and such operational perquisites as the organization was unable to obtain from other sources. Early in December 1940, following a conference in Berlin with ROSENBERG and Dr. HEIL, business manager of the Aussenpolitischesamt, SCHOLZ was sent to Paris in order to determine the extent of GOERING’s interest in the Einsatzstab and the effect of such interest on the activity of the Paris staff. On arrival, SCHOLZ was told by EBERT and von BEHR that GOERING had received HITLER’s permission to examine the collections already confiscated, and to decide what should be done with them. SCHOLZ received the impression that EBERT and von BEHR were working entirely in GOERING’s interest, and that GOERING, who had already visited Paris, had begun to select confiscated works of art for his own collection. SCHOLZ returned to Berlin and reported to ROSENBERG that, in his estimation, the confiscation proceedings were not consistent idealogically with the political function of the Rosenberg office, and that GOERING planned a wholesale movement to Berlin by train of confiscated objects. ROSENBERG thereupon ordered -5- CONFIDENTIAL

 CONFIDENTIAL him to obtain official clarification from HITLER’s headquarters as to the desired disposition of confiscated objects. Accordingly, SCHOLZ wrote on 11 December 1940 to Dr. HANSSEN, assistant to Reichsleiter BORMANN (ATTACHMENT 4), and received in return a letter from BORMANN which referred in essence to the HITLER order of 18 November 1940. BORMANN requested SCHOLZ to communicate with POSSE, but no reference was made to GOERING and the matter therefore remained unsettled. GOERING’s domination of the Einsatzstab is most clearly indicated by the fact that, on numerous occasions, von BEHR received word that GOERING would be in Paris within forty-eight hours, and wished to have shown to him the most recently confiscated material. At such times, von BEHR would put his entire staff to work to arrange a special exhibition in the Musee du Jeu de Paume of newly acquired collections, always with emphasis on those objects which it was believed GOERING would wish to take for himself. GOERING is known to have visited the Jeu de Paume on the following dates: 3 and 5 November 1940 13 and 15 August 1941 5 February 1941 2, 3 and 4 December 1941 3, 11 and 14 March 1941 25 February 1942 7 April 1941 14 March 1942 1 and 3 May 1941 14 May 1942 9 July 1941 24 and 27 November 1942 The extent of his interest is manifest in these figures. GOERING was seldom opposed in his choice of Einsatzstab material for his own collection. It has been learned from several sources that POSSE was reluctant to implement HITLER’s order giving him full authority over the disposal of the confiscated collections. As POSSE had unlimited funds for purchase, he did not wish to be burdened with the responsibility for such material. In addition, he was a sick man and came infrequently to Paris. At the outset, GOERING had no personal representative in the Einsatzstab. All sources are agreed that von BEHR acted wholeheartedly in GOERING’s interest, so as to ingratiate -6- CONFIDENTIAL 

CONFIDENTIAL himself with the Reichsmarschall and to secure his own position. Also, it has been established that Dr. BUNJES, never a member of the Einsatzstab, but present in Paris as Director of the German Art Historical Institute, acted initially as an advisor to GOERING. In March 1941, BUNJES came to Berlin, bringing with him a large portfolio containing photographs of Einsatzstab material which he wished to present for GOERING’s approval. BUNJES met with ROSENBERG and UTIKAL to discuss the availability of such items for GOERING. Immediately after BUNJES’ visit, ROSENBERG dispatched SCHOLZ to Paris, in an attempt to block another large transfer of Einsatzstab material by GOERING to Germany. SCHOLZ arrived in Paris, and was informed by von BEHR that the works in question were being placed in two freight cars attached to GOERING’s special train. When SCHOLZ remonstrated with UTIKAL and von BEHR over the irregularity of this procedure, he was told bluntly that nothing could be done to stop the GOERING transfer as it was in fact already taking place. Early in 1941, GOERING selected Dr. Bruno LOHSE, one of the art historians attached to the Paris Dienststelle of the Einsatzstab, as his personal representative. The arrangement was made with von BEHR’s approval, and LOHSE continued to work with the Arbeitsgruppe Louvre, but was accorded independent status for the Sonderauftrag Goering (Special GOERING Mission). LOHSE was given credentials signed by GOERING which ordered all German military and civil units to facilitate his mission. Within the Einsatzstab, he was given the responsibility, with SCHIEDLAUKSY, of arranging exhibitions of confiscated works of art which he though GOERING might wish to acquire for himself. In addition, he was ordered to make periodic surveys of the open Paris art market in GOERING’s behalf. SCHIEDLAUSKY stated that from November 1940 through December 1941 he had been obliged to arrange ten exhibitions for GOERING, and that these exhibitions took place on the following dates: -7- CONFIDENTIAL 

CONFIDENTIAL 3 November 1940 1 May 1941 5 “ 1940 3 May 1941 5 February 1941 13 August 1941 11 March 1941 15 “ 1941 14 “ 1941 4 December 1941 The procedure whereby GOERING “legitimatized” his acquisition of Einsatzstab material was as follows: In the summer of 1940, with the reported concurrence of the Louvre authorities and on the BUNJES’ recommendation, GOERING appointed M. Jacques BELTRAND, a French artist, as “official appraiser” for the French Government. Once GOERING, through von BEHR, LOHSE, and Walter Andreas HOFER his chief buyer who inevitably accompanied him on the trips to Paris – had decided what material he wished to acquire from the current Einsatzstab lot, BELTRAND would appraise the objects in question. The appraisal lists were held by the Einsatzstab, and were ultimately forwarded to GOERING’S headquarters in Berlin for filing against future payment. It has been determined conclusively that: (a)GOERING did not pay the Einsatzstab – or any other organization or individual – for the works of art acquired in this manner, and (b)no method of payment was ever established. (See Consolidated Interrogation Reports No. 2, “The GOERING Collection,” and No. 3, “German Methods of Acquisition.”) (b)“Revision” of the Mission; the M-Action On 25 March 1942, von BEHR was appointed Leiter der Deinststelle Westen des Ostministeriums (Direct of the Western Branch of the Ministry for the Occupied Countries of the East). General dissatisfaction with von BEHR’s conduct of the Paris art staff had existed from the beginning, and there was an open breach in his relations with SCHOLZ and the professional art historians. Von BEHR’s high-handed methods and utter disregard for the intrinsic value of the confiscated material, coupled with his excessive vanity and selfish ambition, had produced a -8- CONFIDENTIAL 

CONFIDENTIAL chaotic condition within the Einsatzstab. On 18 December 1941, ROSENBERG recommended to HITLER the seizure of furnishings in “ownerless” Jewish residences in the Western Occupied Territories, for the use of Party officials in the bombed-out areas of the East (ATTACHMENT 5). HITLER accepted the recommendation and replied in a note of 31 December 1941, signed by LAMMERS (ATTACHMENT 6). On 14 January 1942, ROSENBERG requested of HITLER’s headquarters that the mission be placed under the jurisdiction of the Reichsminister for the Occupied Territories of the East, as he felt unable to cope with the problems attendant to such confiscation and transfer through extant Einsatzstab channels. Accordingly, on 25 March 1942, the Reichsminister ordered the establishment in Paris of Dienststelle West, wish subsidiary branches throughout France, Belgium and the Netherlands, and with von BEHR in full control. This newly inaugurated confiscation activity was known as the M-Action, and von BEHR in his new capacity was ordered to relinquish control of the Paris art staff of the Einsatzstab, inasmuch as the M-Action was to be entirely divorced from the Einsatzstab mission as of 1 May 1942. Von BEHR was stated to have considered that the M-Action would enable him to discover and manipulate personally a large number of valuable objects, which as “furniture” would not be subjected to the careful scrutiny and inventory which had been prescribed for valuable art collections seized by the Einsatzstab. All sources are agreed that von BEHR proposed the M-Action to ROSENBERG as a means of achieving a freer hand and a greater prestige. In theory, von BEHR’s activity as Director of the Einsatzstab art staff ceased with his appointment as Director of Dienststelle West. SCHOLZ was given full professional responsibility for the art staff, and Lieutenant Hermann von INGRAM was made its administrator and business manager. A Dr. BRETMAUER took over von BEHR’s administrative duties with the Einsatzstab. -9- CONFIDENTIAL 

CONFIDENTIAL SCHOLZ and von INGRAM, assisted by SCHIEDLAUSKY, prepared a “Revision” report for ROSENBERG in which it was stressed that the activities of the art staff to date had been highly detrimental to the reputation of the Nazi Party, in view of the fact that the wholesale confiscation of French Jewish collections had been conducted in great disorder, and that if, as was to be expected, the ultimate disposition of the confiscated works were referred to an international commission after the war, German prestige would suffer accordingly. SCHOLZ and von INGRAM proposed that the future activity of the art staff of the Einsatzstab be confined to: (a)the methodical conservation and cataloguing of the collections already in hand, and (b)the rigid control of all material confiscated under the new M- Action, with power to withdraw and “freeze” any art objects from shipments of furnishings to the East, so as to avert any further misuse of valuable cultural material. Von BEHR was, in fact, not deposed as head of the art staff until January 1943. It was stated that he had managed to prolong his activity with the art staff by asking GOERING, on the occasion of the latter’s periodic visits to Paris, to legitimatize his activity temporarily; and that this went on for some months. It was also stated that during this interim period of reorganization the art staff of the Einsatzstab continued to function as heretofore, and that GOERING remained unopposed in his efforts to exploit confiscated material. The most tangible evidence of the separation of the M- Action from the art staff of the Einsatzstab was that von BEHR took over for the Dienststelle West the quarters at 54 Avenue d’Iena which the Einsatzstab had occupied since it had moved from the Hotel Commodore in 1941. The Einsatzstab moved into new quarters at 12 Rue Dumont d’Urville. Von INGRAM was appointed in due course to the position of Oberstabseinsatzfuehrer, and headed Hauptabteilung III in Berlin. (On 6 July 1943, UTIKAL sent to the Einsatzstab units an administrative order delineating the authority of -10- CONFIDENTIAL 

CONFIDENTIAL the Leiter (Director) of Hauptabteilung III (ATTACHMENT 7).) SCHOLZ stated that whereas, following von BEHR’s removal, the recommendations made in his and von INGRAM’s report to ROSENBERG were followed literally, the activity of the art staff was nevertheless complicated by constant wrangling with the military authorities over jurisdictional questions. One of the primary functions of the staff in this period was to make inventories of art objects found in the various residences which had been requisitioned by the military command as German officers’ billets. This proved to be an endless and highly complicated undertaking. ON 18 June 1942, ROSENBERG wrote GOERING to the effect that it would no longer be possible for the Einsatzstab to make available works of art for GOERING’s personal selection. ROSENBERG emphasised that he was grateful both for the personal support which GOERING had given the undertaking, and for his material assistance in having supplied transport and personnel. He stated that the professional art historians employed by the Einsatzstab would remain at GOERING’s disposal for all questions of consultation and advice, and that it would be entirely in order for GOERING to retain LOHSE and his assistants for “special duties” (ATTATCHMENT 8). In spite of ROSENBERG’s letter, von BEHR continued to provide GOERING with confiscated works of art, and the terms of the letter did not take effect until von BEHR’s final removal six months later . On 21 April 1943, BORMANN wrote ROSENBERG to inform him of HITLER’s order that Prof. VOSS, Dr. Friedrich WOLFFHARDT and Dr. von HÜMMEL were henceforth to be regarded as the official experts for the Fuehrer’s collections, and were empowered to make decisions relative to the disposition of material confiscated by the E.R.R. In general, the work of the Einsatzstab assumed a more passive character following von BEHR’s departure. Several thousand M-Action -11- CONFIDENTIAL 

CONFIDENTIAL items were held, inventoried and catalogued; in addition, the preparation of objects seized prior to the “revision” for transport to Germany, and the major task of compiling a comprehensive inventory of such complex and hastily seized collections as those of the ROTHSCHILDS, David WEILL and LEVY-BENZION, occupied the staff until the fall of PARIS became imminent. LOHSE stated that in April or May 1944, following involved legalistic discussions with the Devisenschultz Kommando (Foreign Currency Control), the NEUMANN collection (ex-Vienna) of Dutch paintings of the 17th century was confiscated in Paris by the E.R.R. Early in August 1944, when the Germans armies were being routed in France, the Paris defense [sic] command ordered the Einsatzstab to make its male employees available on forty-eight hours’ notice for defense [sic] of the city. At the time, most of the able-bodied male members of the staff had already been called to front-line military service. Headquarters of the Einsatzstab were abandoned well before the American entry into the city, the staff having affected a somewhat disorderly and hysterical evacuation of the premises. (c)Internal and External Conflict The efficiency of the Einsatzstab undertaking was jeopardized consistently through lack of authoritative direction and by internal friction. Most important, the GOERING monopoly undermined morale, in that the staff was precluded from carrying out its basic (HITLER) directive. ROSENBERG’s political weakness in the Party hierarachy [sic] , moreover, made itself felt even in the lower echelons of his organisation. SCHOLZ stated, for instance, that ROSENBERG, though Minister for the Occupied Territories of the East, as well as Reichsleiter, was unable to obtain an audience with HITLER for a period of nine months; and that this fact was common gossip among his subordinates. Both LOHSE and SCHOLZ have referred repeatedly to the feuds which existed -12- CONFIDENTIAL 

CONFIDENTIAL between ROSENBERG and GOEBBELS, ROSENBERG and BORMANN, and BORMANN and GOERING, the repercussions of which were felt strongly in the conduct of Einsatzstab activities,. Von BEHR, characterised by SCHOLZ, LOHSE and others as an unscrupulous egomaniac, antagonized the professional art historians serving under him, both through his gangster-like methods and his highly patronizing attitude. He lived in great luxury in Paris and entertained lavishly, seeking as his guests the highest-ranking military and political figures. Wholly ignorant in art matters, he refused to be guided by the opinions of the specialists or his staff. He was thus constantly at odds with SCHOLZ, who was theoretically responsible for the professional conduct and the well-being of the Einsatzstab art historians. Moreover, SCHOLZ (according to LOHSE) wished to terminate the entire undertaking at the earliest possible moment, whereas von BEHR, for selfish reasons, did everything possible to prolong the life of the Paris Dienststelle. LOHSE provoked the resentment and jealousy of his fellow-workers through the enjoyment of special privileges in the execution of his mission for GOERING. He is known to have clashed with his colleagues on several occasions. Shortly after von INGRAM took over the administration of the art staff, he (von INGRAM) dismissed Fräulein Dr. EGGEMANN and a secretary because these women were disliked by his wife, who was also an art historian attached to the Einsatzstab. LOHSE interceded with von INGRAM, and called upon SCHOLZ to have von INGRAM’s order rescinded. Once reinstated, Fräulein EGGEMANN claimed that she had been offered a part-time position with the German Embassy in Paris, and could therefore not work full time for the Einsatzstab. LOHSE told her that she would be obliged to give full time or resign. Fräulein EGGEMANN remained, but because of this rebuff sided against LOHSE in all future discussions and brought about a rift between LOHSE and Dr. BORCHERS, with whom he shared responsibility for professional -13- CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL guidance of the Arbeitsgruppe Louvre. In January 1944, SCHOLZ was obliged to dismiss LOHSE from any further activity with the Einsatzstab, although he retained his special portfolio for GOERING. It has been learned further that von BEHR, SCHOLZ, SCHIEDLAUSKY, and von INGRAM were all involved in affairs with staff secretaries of the Einsatzstab, the circumstances of which contributed more than any other factor to the lowering of staff morale. The felonious activity of the Einsatzstab was deplored by many German officials, who contested its legitimacy and attempted to obstruct its operations. Count METTERNICH, head of the Kunstschutz, the German military organisation for the protection of works of art, condemned von BEHR publicly whenever possible, and the military organisation as a whole was antipathetic to what it considered a disgraceful political action. ROSENBERG, aware of the low repute in which his organisation was held by the German military, encouraged von BEHR to entertain extensively, in the hope that the prestige of the Einsatzstab would gain accordingly. It is of parenthetical interest that HIMMLER, following HITLER’s restatement of policy (in March 1942) whereby the E.R.R. was to have the sole right of confiscation of archives, libraries and cultural material, wrote to ROSENBERG to determine the rights of the Sicherheitsdienst and the Sicherheitspolizei in the confiscation and exploitation of documentary material bearing on enemies of the Reich. ROSENBERG thereupon agreed to the transmittal to HIMMLER’s organisations of all police documents, and sought to assure HIMMLER that the Einsatzstab was in no sense attempting to usurp the authority of the Sicherheitsdienst and the Sicherheitspolizei. For a considerable period, the confiscatory prerogatives of the Einsatzstab were jeopardized by the firm opposition of HIMMLER and LAMMERS, whose influence in Army circles was sufficiently strong to minimise the cooperation extended the Einsatzstab by military units. -14- CONFIDENTIAL 

CONFIDENTIAL III.CONFISCATION IN PRACTICE AND IN THEORY (a)Methods Employed by the Einsatzstab The manner in which collections of works of art were obtained by the Einsatzstab in its early stages of activity is described by all informants as chaotic. As the initial confiscations were effected by the German military command in France and the German Embassy, the Einsatzstab became operational at a moment when these collective seizures were already widespread. SCHOLZ stated that EBERT, UTIKAL and von BEHR never communicated with Berlin to receive instructions for the disposal of a given collection which had been located. Instead, it was stated that the Einsatzstab employed a number of irresponsible men who would simply collect a truckload of objects and carry them off to the Jeu de Paume. SCHIEDLAUSKY and the other art historians would be working in the Jeu de Paume on inventories, when some stranger would come in with a carload of works of art and simply say, “These are from ROTHSCHILD,” or “These are from the Avenue du Bois,” leave them and disappear. More often than not, SCHIEDLAUSKY would never again see the same man. When, at a later date, a conscientious attempt would be made to reconstruct the process of seizure and to inventory all objects which had been brought in in [sic] a particular lot, it would already have become impossible to ascertain the source of a large quantity of material, which remained classified “unknown.” SCHOLZ, LOHSE and SCHIEDLAUSKY all stated that the art historians protested the irregularity of this procedure, and informed von BEHR that they refused to allow the collections to be sent to Germany until basic inventories had been prepared. On such occasions, however, von BEHR, showing no regard for orderly method, would simply call in his secretary, Fräulein PUETZ, and order the miscellaneous loot to be sent to the chief German depot at Neuschwanstein/Füssen, the cases to bear the stamp “Unknown.” -15- CONFIDENTIAL 

CONFIDENTIAL The early seizures were directed by two-non-professional “technical assistants” to von BEHR, named BRAUMUELLER and BUSSE. These men worked without inventories and, following leads which they received from the collaborationist French police, effected wholesale confiscations and turned over the accumulated material to the Einsatzstab. SCHOLZ states that members of the French police force accompanied BRAUMUELLER and BUSSE on their expeditions to facilitate the confiscations. Information was also received from the Sicherheitsdienst. According to SCHOLZ and SCHIEDLAUSKY, the art historians were further handicapped in their efforts to prepare comprehensive inventories through not having at their disposition an art reference library. The seizure of all books was controlled by a different unit of the Einsatzstab, which was obliged to “freeze” such material pending receipt of instructions from the Berlin Office for World-political Education and Indoctrination. Thus, the art historians, in the earlier phases of confiscation, had virtually no reference material with which to work. SCHIEDLAUSKY, in a report prepared at von INGRAM’s request at the time of the “revision” of the Einsatzstab, dated 22 August 1942, alluded to the many difficulties which confronted him in his efforts to prepare comprehensive inventories. First, he complained that the lack of qualified personnel was such as to preclude the possibility of making inventories of material as it arrived. He stated that, from November 1940 through February 1941, Drs. WIRTH and ESSER were available to him only on a half-time basis, and that Dr. JERCHEL had been available only for one month; that Drs. DANNEHL, EVERS and STRENGER, all of whom had been temporarily assigned to the Einsatzstab as photographers, had to be called upon to participate in the work of cataloguing objects; and that all of the men in question were in fact only “lent” to the Einsatzstab, as their normal duties were with the Kunstschutz; that Drs. KUNTZE and LOHSE had not been made available -16- CONFIDENTIAL 

CONFIDENTIAL until February 1941 and that, of these two, LOHSE, after preparing an inventory of the WASSERMANN Collection, was given responsibility as a special representative of GOERING, which meant that he could no longer be counted upon to do research under SCHIEDLAUSKY’s direction; that, therefore, only KUNTZE and he had been in a position to devote full time to the orderly recording of Einsatzstab material, and that once the shipments to Germany had begun, in April 1941, only one of them could remain in Paris. He deplored the fact that there were not sufficient trained art historians available to permit a specialist to accompany the special groups effecting seizures, so as to be able to decide on the spot what objects were of sufficient value to be taken. Finally, he complains that the preparation of exhibitions for GOERING jeopardized seriously the work of the trained staff, in that it was very time-consuming and involved the services of personnel who might otherwise have been preparing inventories, at times when they were most urgently needed. SCHIEDLAUSKY stated that the greater part of the material from the ROTHSCHILD, KANN, WEIL-PICARD and WILDENSTEIN Collections was confiscated by mid-November 1940, and SCHOLZ stated categorically that the great majority of the works of art seized during the course of the entire Einsatzstab action were already in hand when he arrived in PARIS early in 1941. The flow of confiscated material, toward the end of 1940 and in the beginning of 1941, was characterized as so swift that the art historians, in any event, could not have kept up with the incoming collections. Later, following the change in administration, greater selectivity was shown and examination of potential seizable material was undertaken by one of the art historians prior to confiscation. LOHSE stated, however, that with the exception of the Max WASSERMANN Collection and portions of the David WEILL Collection, no group of important objects was confiscated after the early months. The monthly reports of E.R.R. acquisitions generally listed no more than five or six objects obtained, and these of low quality. There -17- CONFIDENTIAL 

CONFIDENTIAL was a certain resurgence of activity when the M-Action was initiated in 1942, but this was described by LOHSE as irregular and circumstantial. (b)Official French Protests and German Justification The Einsatzstab confiscations not only were conducted under the authority of the HITLER order of 18 November 1940, but were cloaked by the fictitious pretext of adherence to international law. On 16 May 1942, GOERING asked Dr. BUNJES to prepare a paper setting forth in detail the facts attendant to the Einsatzstab confiscations, in the light of numerous French protests which had been lodged with the German authorities. This paper, entitled “French Protests against the Safeguarding of Ownerless Jewish Art Properties in Occupied France,” describes German measures taken, presents a details analysis of the French protests, and offers recommendations for refutation of the French argument. In essence, the BUNJES paper stresses the ingratitude of the French state and the French people for the altruistic efforts of the Einsatzstab, without which the destruction and loss of invaluable cultural material would have been inevitable. The paper is a pinnacle in the literature of political treachery. Briefly stated, BUNJES offers the following transparent legal justification for the German action : The Hague Convention of 1907, signed by Germany and France, and observed in the armistice terms of May 1940 calls in Article 46 for the inviolability, among other things, of private property (ATTACHMENT 9A). BUNJES states, however, that the Compi?gne armistice of 1940 was a pact made by Germany with the French state and the French people, but not with Jews and Freemasons, and that the Reich, accordingly, was not bound to respect the rights of Jewish property owners; further, that the Jews, in company with Communists, had made innumerable attempts since the signing of the armistice on the lives and persons of Wehrmacht personnel and German civilians, so that even sterner measures had to be taken to suppress Jewish lawlessness. -18- CONFIDENTIAL 

CONFIDENTIAL BUNJES contends that the basis for the French protests, and petitions for the return of ownerless Jewish property, is the desire on the part of the French government to deceive Germany and further the prosecution of subversive activity against the Reich. BUNJES states that the French request for access by French government officials to those places in France where German personnel are talking inventory of confiscated material should be disallowed, since, if it were granted, the door would be wide open for French espionage. The French protests, according to BUNJES, are motivated by the desire to conduct eventual anti-German cultural propaganda in France; to formulate resistance to the German claims for the return to the Reich of cultural material destroyed or stolen by French soldiers in Germany; and to discount the nobility and altruism of the German measures for the protection of French cultural material. The paper concludes with BUNJES’ personal recommendation that no answer whatever be made to the French government until such time as HITLER personally determines the disposition of the accumulated confiscated material. (The BUNJES paper is reproduced in its entirety (and in translation) in ATTATCHMENT 9.) Prior to the preparation of the BUNJES paper, UTIKAL, on 3 November 1941, had prepared an internal memorandum by way of reply to the protest over confiscation of Jewish-owned art properties, lodged with the German authorities on 25 July 1941 by the French General Commission for Jewish Questions. UTIKAL dismisses all legal considerations in his paper which is, in essence, a violent anti-Semitic harangue, couched in terroristic language. SCHOLZ stated that a special commission had been formed in Germany, early in the war, to make a comprehensive list of all works of art and cultural items taken from Germany by the French during and after World War I. This list, according to SCHOLZ, was the basic point of departure for the confiscation of French cultural and art -19- CONFIDENTIAL properties, it being held that such confiscation was aimed at the forced reparation of German losses sustained at the hands of the French. (c)Analysis of Confiscation The seizures of the Einsatzstab in France are believed to have totaled [sic] 21,903 objects, from 203 collections. Examination of the Einsatzstab files further disclosed a detailed inventory of 5,009 items from the several ROTHSCHILD collections; 2,687 from the David WEILL Collection; 1,202 from Alphonse KANN; 989 from Levy de BENZION; and 302 from Georges WILDENSTEIN. According to SCHIEDLAUSKY, the total of 558 inventoried items from SELIGMANN and 123 from WEIL-PICARD represents but a fraction of the material confiscated from these collections. A statement of art objects counted and inventoried, prepared by SCHOLZ in July 1944, partially confirms the above figures and furnishes the following supplementary totals: 1. Paintings, water colors, drawings, pastels engravings, miniatures, etc, 10,890 2. Sculpture (bronzes, marbles, wood, terracottas, ivories, reliefs, etc.) 583 3. Furniture 2,477 4. Textiles (tapestries, carpets, embroidery, etc.) 583 5. Objets d’art (including porcelains, glass, jewelry, coins, rare gems, etc.) 5,825 6. Asiatic art (including sculpture, porcelains, paintings, screen, etc.) 1,286 7. Objects of classified antiquity (Greek Roman, Egyptian, Assyrian, sculpture, vases, jewelry, etc.) 259 (The list of confiscated collections is reproduced in its entirety, with accompanying code designations, as ATTACHMENT 10.) -20- IV.DISPOSITION OF CONFISCATED MATERIAL (a)Objects Brought to Germany - General In conformity with the HITLER order of 18 November 1940, the greater part of the material confiscated by the Einsatzstab was sent to Germany for safekeeping and for HITLER’s ultimate disposition. The SCHOLZ report of July 1944 records 29 shipments into the Reich during the period April 1941 to July 1944. The shipments comprised 138 freight carloads, containing 4,174 cases of work destined for 6 separate protected deposits. These deposits were: 1. Schloss Neuschwanstein (Kreis Füssen) 2. Schloss Chiemsee (Herreninsel, Kreis Traunstein) 3. Cloister Buxheim (Kreis Memmingen) 4. Schloss Kogl (St. Georgen/ Kreis Vöcklabruck) 5. Schloss Seisenegg (Kreis Amstetten) 6. Schloss Nickolsburg (Kreis Nickolsburg) The first shipment of Einsatzstab material from France to Germany took place in April 1941. Shipments continued to the above-mentioned deposits through February 1944, at which time the Reichschancellery, because of the increasing danger from air raids, ordered the major deposits evacuated and their contents brought to Alt Aussee, Austria, for storage in the Steinberg salt mine. i.Difficulty of Transportation and Storage SCHEIDLAUSKY stated that the shipments from France were complicated by the lack of available adequate rolling stock. For the first and most important shipment, the Einsatzstab was obliged to requisition special baggage cars from every corner of the Reich. These were cars normally attached to deluxe passenger trains, and could be heated. Thirty such cars were obtained, and the shipment, comprising material from the ROTHSCHILD, SELIGMANN, WILDENSTEIN, David WEILL and WEIL-PICARD Collections, for transfer from Paris to Neuschwanstein/Füssen, -21- CONFIDENTIAL was accorded a special military escort of Luftwaffe personnel. The special train proceeded via Belfort, Stuttgart and Augsburg, and was approximately three days in transit from Paris to Füssen. SCHIEDLAUSKY and KUNTZE rode the train and were in charge. The second major shipment occurred in October 1941, and comprised 23 carloads of objects from the lesser collections. According to SCHIEDLAUSKY, none of the outstanding confiscated material was included in this shipment. The train was routed from Paris to Füssen; it was intended that the contents of eleven cars should be deposited at Chiemsee, but an early snowfall precluded the further transfer and the entire trainload was removed at Füssen. A garage in Füssen was rented for the purpose of storing the Chiemsee material, as it was impossible to bring trucks up the steep road to Neuschwanstein. The material was transferred to Chiemsee during the Spring of 1942. According to SCHIEDLAUSKY, these two shipments constituted the only major transfers to Neuschwanstein. In 1942 the BACRI and KRÄMER Collections were transferred to Kogl, and during the same year Nickolsburg and Buxheim came into use, with material being routed directly there from Paris. Early in February 1944, SCHOLZ received an urgent summons to Munich for a conference with Dr. von HÜMMEL, confidential assistant to Reichsleiter BORMANN, and was informed that HITLER had instructed BORMANN to make every effort to move the more important part of the Einsatzstab material to Alt Aussee at the earliest possible moment. The order was transmitted formally by BORMANN to ROSENBERG from HITLER’s headquarters on 6 February 1944. SCHOLZ and SCHIEDLAUSKY stated that because of the serious lack of packing materials, most of the objects at Füssen and the other deposits had been unpacked and the packing materials returned to Paris and other points for repeated use. The events of February 1944 necessitated complete repacking of the objects and their transfer by road convoy to Alt Aussee. Thirteen convoys were despatched from the several deposits, -22- CONFIDENTIAL 

CONFIDENTIAL beginning in February 1944 and continuing through March 1945. According to SCHIEDLAUSKY, three convoys came from Nickolsburg, three from Chiemsee, and the remainder from Neuschwanstein. (b) Objects Acquired by Goering Approximately 700 objects from the Einsatzstab were selected for the GOERING collection. Shipments of this material from Paris to Berlin took place on 8 February 1941, 15 March 1941, 3 May 1941, 15 August 1941, 2 December 1941, 14 March 1942, 15 May 1942, and 24 November 1942. The standard procedure for the selection of this material was that GOERING would give eleventh hour notice of his intention to visit Paris and would go to the Jeu de Paume personally to make his selection from the material placed on exhibition there by the Einsatzstab staff. According to SCHOLZ, LOHSE and SCHIEDLAUSKY, he was accompanied on all but one or two occasions by HOFER, to whom he deferred invariably in the matter of choice. In most instances, the material selected was packed in the Jeu de Paume and taken out at once to the GOERING special train, as it was stated that the Reichsmarschall wished whenever possible to have his acquisitions accompany him back to Germany. (See Consolidated Interrogation Report No. 2, “The GOERING Collection.”) (c)Objects Acquired for HITLER (For further details see Consolidated Interrogation Report No. 4, “Linz: HITLER’s Museum and Library.”) Inasmuch as all work of art confiscated by the Einsatzstab were theoretically at the disposition of HITLER, relatively few objects were specifically earmarked for him or the Fuehrermuseum, Linz. Examination of the Einsatzstab files revealed that 53 objects had been set aside for HITLER and Linz. With the exception of one or two objects, this material came entirely from the ROTHSCHILD and SELIGMANN Collections, confiscated at the very outset. The selection was made at the Jeu de -23- CONFIDENTIAL 

CONFIDENTIAL Paume on 5 February 1941. Most of the objects were packed in their original ROTHSCHILD cases, and the entire selection was put aboard GOERING’s special train and brought to Munich. ( Two large Bouchers and four tapestries from the ROTHSCHILD Collection could not be accommodated on the train, and were subsequently sent to Füssen.) The material was placed in the Fuehrerbau at Munich for safekeeping, and was transferred to Alt Aussee in 1944. (A list of the selected works is appended as ATTACHMENT 11.) SCHIEDLAUSKY and LOHSE stated that GOERING undertook the selection for HITLER personally in the Jeu de Paume. This is borne out by a letter dated 19 July 1941 from SCHOLZ to POSSE, in which SCHOLZ replies to questions raised in a letter from POSSE with respect to the material selected for HITLER. POSSE had made a tentative selection of objects from photographs submitted to HITLER during the first stages of confiscation proceedings, but GOERING subsequently conferred with HITLER and was authorized to make the selection on the occasion of his visit to Paris in February 1941 (see ATTACHMENTS 12 and 13). It is believed that no further definite selection of Einsatzstab material for HITLER or Linz was made. All sources agreed that POSSE never visited the Jeu de Paume to select pictures, nor did VOSS, his successor. According to SCHIEDLAUSKY, VOSS visited Neuschwanstein on one occasion in the Fall of 1943, accompanied by von HÜMMEL and other dignitaries. Although his personal authority to select Einsatzstab material for Linz had been established by a BORMANN order of 21 April 1943, his visit was an unofficial one. Periodically, as significant new material was acquired by the Einsatzstab, leather- bound volumes of photographs were prepared by the staff and transmitted to the Reichschancellery. SCHOLZ and SCHIEDLAUSKY stated that these volumes were prepared rather for the purpose of acquainting HITLER’s headquarters with the work of the Einsatzstab, and of dramatizing the scope of the undertaking, than of -24- CONFIDENTIAL 

CONFIDENTIAL illustrating what specific objects had become available for potential acquisition by HITLER or the Fuehrermuseum, LINZ. It was stated that nearly one hundred such volumes were put together in the course of the operation. (See Consolidated Interrogation Report No. 4, “LINZ: HITLER’s Museum and Library.”) LOHSE stated that no German museum directors had access to the material confiscated by the E.R.R. and that, with the exception of the objects selected by GOERING and those disposed of through exchange, the accumulation remained intact for HITLER (Note: This statement has been confirmed from other sources). (d) Exchanges i. Summary From February 1941 through November 1943, the Einsatzstab conducted 28 formal exchanges of confiscated paintings with 6 individuals. In most cases, the works exchanged by the Einsatzstab were French paintings of the late 19th and the 20th century, confiscated chiefly from the ROSENBERG-BERNSTEIN Collection. 18 of the 28 exchanges were arranged with the German dealer, Gustav ROCHLITZ. Two exchanges were arranged with Adolf WUESTER, two with the dealer Max STEOCKLIN, two with von BEHR’s confidence man, Arthur PFANNSTIEL, and single exchanges with the Galerie ALMAS-DIETRICH, Munich, the Frankfurt dealer, BOEDECKER, the Amsterdam dealer, Jan DIK Jr., and a Hungarian dealer, Dr. Alexander von FREY. Eighteen of the exchanges were conducted in [sic] behalf of GOERING: six or seven for HITLER and the Reichschancellery; one, possibly two, for RIBBENTROP, and one for BORMANN. Von BEHR is believed to have arranged a single exchange in [sic] his own behalf, and GOERING received the entire art library of the Jewish dealer, Allen LOEBL, in “token” exchange for one E.R.R.- confiscated painting by Utrillo. This exchange was implemented by LOHSE and HOFER and was not conducted through normal Einsatzstab channels. The contract, dated -25- CONFIDENTIAL 

CONFIDENTIAL 23 November 1942, was signed by HOFER. The Utrillo was from the BERNHEIM Collection. ii. Policy and Method The exchanges were inspired chiefly by an organizational edict against the transportation to Germany of confiscated French Impressionist and 20th century paintings, which were regarded formally and in the aggregate as Entartende [sic] Kunst (Degenerate Art). Rather than allow this abundance of highly saleable material to lie fallow, however, the Einsatzstab was prepared to sacrifice certain ideological considerations to the interests of commercial exploitation. It has not been possible to ascertain finally who conceived the idea for the exchanges. HOFER attributes it to von BEHR and LOHSE jointly, with the observation that they initiated the exchanges as a means of “enriching” the GOERING collection. LOHSE, insisting that von BEHR was responsible, stated with SCHOLZ that von BEHR had even gone so far as to propose to UTIKAL and GRITZBACH, GOERING’s civilian Chief of Staff, that Impressionist and contemporary paintings confiscated by the Einsatzstab be smuggled into Portugal and used as barter for uncut diamonds. This idea was to extreme, for obvious reasons, to find favor [sic] with von BEHR’s superiors; but the exchanges of such material for old masters and German 19th century paintings in the trade were sufficiently flagrant. ROCHLITZ stated that he was forced by LOHSE to propose the series of exchanges in which he was involved, and was threatened with “the consequences” should he fail to comply with GOERING’s wishes (see Detailed Interrogation Report No. 4 – Subject: Gustav ROCHLITZ). GOERING was stated by LOHSE to have preferred acquisition by exchange rather than purchase whenever possible. SCHOLZ and LOHSE denied categorically that ROCHLITZ had been forced in any way to participate in the exchanges, and were agreed that he had seen in these transactions a means of (a) making large profits, -26- CONFIDENTIAL 

CONFIDENTIAL (b) gaining a prominent position in German art circles, and (c) winning personal favors from GOERING. There is abundant evidence to support their contention. In almost every exchange, the quid pro quo was balanced heavily in Rochlitz’ favor. For example, he acquired celebrated masterpieces by Cezanne, Corot and Degas, together with eight pictures by Renoir, Sisley, Picasso, Matisse, and Braque, in the first exchange (3 March 1941), in return for a highly questionable Titian portrait and a pede