By Henry Srebrnik, [Moncton, NB] Times & Transcript

China has become increasingly active in Peacekeeping, as evident in United Nations peacekeeping operations. China only engages in peacekeeping through the UN.

In 1989, China sent 20 staff officers to the United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia, marking its first presence in a UN peacekeeping operation. China sent its first cadre of peacekeeping personnel to Cambodia in 1992.

By 2022, China had become the eight-largest provider of UN peacekeeping forces globally. It had contributed 2,158 peacekeepers to 25 UN peacekeeping missions, far outnumbering the combined troop contribution of other permanent members of the UN Security Council.

UN officials have worked with their Chinese counterparts to prepare a wider array of rapid reaction capabilities, including helicopters. China established two training centres, one in Hebei and the other in Beijing, to hone the peacekeeping skills of the Chinese police and military.

Its initial contributions tended to involve specialized units including police, engineers, and field hospitals. China also opened a logistics base in Djibouti, in part to support its peacekeepers in Africa, and set up two standby peacekeeping contingents, enabling the rapid deployment of 330 Chinese police and 8,000 military personnel.

Chinese officers have commanded the UN missions in Cyprus and Western Sahara, both relatively small and militarily low-risk enterprises. It deployed a full infantry battalion with the UN for the first time in 2015, in South Sudan, but has not sent any other large contingent on another mission to date.

 Its financial contribution has also increased tremendously since the first peacekeeping-related payment in 1982. In 2020–2021, China contributed 15.21 per cent of the overall UN peacekeeping budget, making it the second-largest donor following the United States.

Beyond peacekeeping, China has also expanded its participation in conflict mediation and post-conflict reconstruction, especially under President Xi Jinping. The dramatic expansion of China’s economic footprints in sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, Central and Western Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America have made Beijing a stakeholder in these regions’ conflicts and fragility.

Through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation started in 2000, the Belt and Road Initiative launched in 2013, the South-South Cooperation Fund established in 2015, and the China–United Nations Peace and Development Trust Fund in 2016, China has become the largest provider of commercial investment and development loans for many developing countries, include many war-torn ones. China’s bilateral programs in conflict-affected settings are mainly economic; the Chinese consider this peace through development.

While China remains indifferent to democracy, human rights and other liberal norms, it doesn’t undermine these norms. China’s aid and investment does not favour any particular regime type, nor does it hinder democracy promotion efforts by the West in these countries.

China’s peacebuilding programs focus on strengthening the capacity of the post-conflict governments, including training for governmental officials, financial support to national anti-terrorism forces, and joint peacekeeping exercises. When it comes to civil society building, human rights and gender promotion, electoral assistance, legislative reforms and other efforts to install democracy, China has little interest.

China has played a constructive role in many major crises. China promoted the unanimous passing of Resolution 1769 in 2007, during its rotating UN Security Council presidency, that authorised the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation to Darfur, where Sudan was accused of genocide. China also voted in favour of Resolution 1264 in 1999, which authorised the creation of an International Force for East Timor led by Australia.

One of China’s priorities is securing senior political and peacekeeping posts for Chinese nominees. While Beijing has placed its candidates at the head of a number of UN agencies, it has filled fewer peacekeeping-related posts.

Chinese media and officials portray these deployments as proof of the country’s commitment to multilateralism. They also allow People’s Liberation Army (PLA) personnel a chance to gain operational experience abroad. Peacekeeping postings may also give the PLA opportunities to gather intelligence on other UN units and the countries where they are deployed.

China’s measured engagement in peacekeeping has paid dividends, and its contribution looks like a pragmatic attempt to advance its interests through the UN. Beijing has also framed peacekeeping as a rare area for multilateral cooperation with Washington at a time when relations between the two powers have deteriorated.