Author: Bakhytzhan Kurmanov, Nazarbayev University
On 10 June 2018 the Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev attended the annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) — a political, economic and security grouping of Asian and Eurasian states. ‘I am confident that the outcome of this meeting will serve for further development of the Organisation in an eight-sided format with the accession of India and Pakistan. [The] strategic priority of the SCO is to strengthen political dialogue and trust, ensuring security and development in the space of our organisation’, Nazarbayev said at the summit. He also urged member states to boost the trade and investment projects between SCO countries from a bilateral to a multilateral level. But Nazarbayev’s conciliatory speech belies Kazakhstan’s mixed relationship with the SCO.
Kazakhstan, as one of the most prominent and richest countries in Central Asia, is being forced into the orbit of the enlarged political and economic spheres of the SCO: Russia aims to increase the political influence of the Eurasian Economic Union, while China promotes its Belt and Road Initiative.
Russian President Vladimir Putin perceives the SCO as an important political tool that can be used to bolster his anti-Western rhetoric. For instance, Russian media reported the success of the June SCO summit and contrasted it with the alleged failure of the June 2018 G7 meeting in Quebec. Russia seeks to promote the SCO as a symbol of the growing geopolitical importance of non-Western states vis-a-vis the United States and its allies, both to strengthen its own standing within the Eurasian Economic Union and to promote the further formation of the ‘Eurasian world’.
Kazakhstan is one of Russia’s closest allies in Central Asian, and the relationship between Russia and Kazakhstan plays an important role in the functioning of the SCO. But the relationship has recently become rocky: Kazakhstan was criticised by the Russian media over Astana’s decision to allow US ships to use Kazakhstan’s Caspian Sea ports to supply US forces in Afghanistan. On 11 June, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov issued concerns to Kazakhstan regarding its increased cooperation with the United States in a meeting of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. Kazakhstan’s recent move from Cyrillic to Latin script is also being perceived as an attempt to move away from Moscow’s influence. Meanwhile, the latest round of Western sanctions on Russia have caused Astana’s policymakers to worry about the economic future of the Eurasian Economic Union.
Kazakhstan–China relations are ostensibly faring better. According to the official Kazakh narrative, relations between Kazakhstan and China are exemplary and Astana is eager to capture the opportunities provided by China’s Belt and Road Initiative. China has pledged to provide more than US$600 million to support the development of transport infrastructure in Kazakhstan within the next five years, and Chinese companies are building a light rail transit system in Astana with US$1.9 billion that Kazakhstan borrowed from the China Development Bank. More than 127 projects cumulatively worth US$67 billion were signed between Kazakhstan and China in the past six years. New joint projects were also discussed during Nazarbayev’s last visit to China in areas such as energy, oil and gas, new technologies and cultural cooperation.
But there are emerging tensions in the Kazakhstan–China relationship too. Oppression of predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and Kazakhs in western China is catching the attention of Astana’s media and officials. The Kazakh Ministry of Foreign Affairs held tense negotiations with Chinese diplomats regarding the ill treatment and detention of ethnic Kazakhs in the Chinese restive region of Xinjiang at the end of May. Another worry is the increased vulnerability of Central Asian countries to Belt and Road investments. Kazakhstan owes almost US$12.3 billion to Beijing, which makes China Kazakhstan’s fourth biggest creditor. Closer Kazakh cooperation with China could paradoxically lead to increased anti-China resentment among Kazakh people: recent attempts by the Kazakh government to rent land to foreigners, including Chinese investors, resulted in huge protests across the country. Cumulatively, these issues could fuel existing sinophobia in Kazakhstan and Central Asia more broadly.
Further, Nazarbayev turns 78 on 6 July and lacks an imminent successor. Chairman of the Kazakh Senate Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has recently hinted that Nazarbayev might not run in the 2020 election, which has caused rumours about the apparent political transition. The resultant political uncertainty for Astana may begin to surface in how Kazakhstan plays its role in the SCO and in its relationships with both Russia and China.
Bakhytzhan Kurmanov is a PhD student in public policy at the Graduate School of Public Policy at Nazarbayev University, Astana. He is an alumnus of the Australian National University, Canberra.
