Unlike ousted Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Salih, Yemen’s new president-elect Abd-Rabbuh Mansur Hadi has “no Tribal, familial, regional, or partisan base and has no real experience in power,” according to diplomats.
This has been welcomed by some, who have argued that his standing goes beyond such rivalries, giving him greater legitimacy to rule a unified Yemen than his predecessor.
An astute Political player, President Salih used his family and tribal links to build relationships between tribal confederations, such as the powerful Bakil and Hashid groups, and through his patronage network, to “buy” the support of tribal leaders’ in his fight against northern Huthi separatists, the Southern Movement, and Al-Qaeda (AQ) in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
Power and legitimacy
In Yemen political power and political legitimacy are two different things.
While incoming president Hadi clearly has political legitimacy, it remains to be seen whether he can maintain the delicate balance between the different political and tribal factions to retain an effective government.
Other than the separatist movements in the north and south, one of President Salih’s main problems was with AQAP, which seemed to be gaining support particularly in the rural areas, where Salih’s influence has been traditionally weak.
Through his patronage, Salih had managed to isolate tribal leaders from their rural power bases, leaving power vacuums and dissatisfaction amongst communities that felt that the central government could not provide for them adequately.
The recent elections are a testament to the Yemeni peoples’ dissatisfaction with Salih and the dire economic situation, amongst other things, and come after a year of violent anti-government protests in the Arabian Peninsula's poorest country.
Salih’s government’s narratives as the guarantor of national unity have not resonated well with the largely rural, tribal population after North and South Yemen unified in the 1990s.
In the urban centres, pro-republic educated elites have become increasingly disillusioned with Salih’s centralized authority, suppression of the people, and the promise of a Yemeni republic.
Meanwhile, Zaydi Shi’i Islamists (more popularly known as the Houthis) in the north and disaffected separatist southerners (known collectively as the Southern Movement) have continued to wage war against the central government.
Al-Qaeda rising
In the background, AQAP has been noisily lurking. It has been putting itself forward as an alternative to central government, providing services to disenfranchised tribal communities in the south and east (such as drilling for wells), taking control over territories in these areas, encouraging marriages with tribal women and its members, and generally playing a long-term game, albeit with a steady flow of clashes with Yemeni forces and tribes here and there.
This has led some analysts to argue that perhaps AQAP’s objective in Yemen is not to destabilise country, but rather to build a stable environment for itself, pinning its rhetoric as paragons of Islamic virtues on Yemen’s historical perspective of itself as a religious beacon among “uncivilised people” in the region.
For thousands of years, Yemen has seen itself as hub of culture and piety in the region. Yemenis were some of the first to convert to Islam and the country became a place where both Sunnis and Shi'i shared mosques, indicative of the strength of Islam as an identity in the country and the tolerance of difference amongst its people.
During Salih’s presidency, this discourse was used to build support against the extremist version of Islam propagated by groups such as AQAP, whose rhetoric against Shi’i Islam and calls for suicide bombings clashed with mainstream Yemeni perceptions of Islam.
Challenges ahead
Yet AQAP’s rise amongst Yemen’s tribal areas has not gone unnoticed by the international community and will remain a priority issue for incoming president, Hadi.
Without the so-called familial and tribal links to shore up his influence in these areas and to legitimise the state’s authority, it remains to be seen whether Hadi’s narratives of state-led unity alone can draw young Yemeni men away from joining AQAP’s ranks.
Al-Hadi is from the small town of al Wadi (also: Am Wadî`) in the Dathinah plain, District (Mudiriyah) of Lawdar, Governorate (Muhafazah) of Abyan.
Al-Wadi is inhabited by the Ahl Billayl (or BalLayl) sub-tribe of `Ilah (`Ulah); itself a sub-tribe of Madhhij. The clans of Ahl Billayl include Âl Hâdî Mansûr, and also Âl Lahtal, Âl Majhar, Âl at Tumaysh, Âl Milhim, Âl Mahrûq and Âl Mad.has. The new president has the name of the first of these clans and is thought to be affiliated with it.
One member of an Arabic-language forum referred to Hadi as “Hadi al-Marami”, suggesting that his tribal affiliations (whether the tribe's name is right or wrong), at least through his place of birth, are still important to some.
These links, however loose, may still play a role in the style he chooses to use to convey authority and build political alliances.
Regardless, tribal factions in the south have been reported to have been battling AQAP since August 2011; while some Yemen watchers state that the Salih’s military campaign against AQAP - led by his nephew Brigadier Yahia Salih - has largely been a failure.
Meanwhile, Hadi has said in pre-election speeches that things will change in Yemen, and that he will focus on Yemen’s economic recovery.
His speech was designed to assuage most Yemenis’ primary concerns, that and the fact that he is not a member of the Salih family has added to his popularity.
Conclusions
The recent announcement by the Somalia-based militant group Al-Shabab that it has formally aligned itself with Al-Qa’idah, and subsequent reports that “foreign” fighters from Somalia are entering Yemen, will mean that Hadi will have two main challenges in the weeks ahead: Firstly, to assuage the concerns of Yemenis that led to the ousting of Salih; and secondly, be seen to be engaging with local tribes in AQAP-affected areas in order to calm the regional and international communities.
It is likely that the initial consensus surrounding his presidency will enable him push through economic policies more easily and to address immediate concerns regarding political stability rather than medium to long-term issues such as AQAP, the Huthis, and the Southern Movement.
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