Russia's Vladimir Putin, currently prime minister, is widely expected to become president in the elections on 4 March, making it his third term in office.
His first two terms were from 2000 to 2008, but the Russian constitution prohibits more than two consecutive terms.
However, the emerging middle classes and other more marginalised segments of Russian Society have recently risen up to protest against what they view as Russia’s system of authoritarian kleptocracy.
A few of the drivers of the anti-Corruption protests have included a creeping sense of disillusion with a state that has been unable to deliver on promised socio-economic reforms, which claims that its critics are agents of the so-called West, and a narrative landscape that is deeply divided over fundamental questions about what Russian governance and leadership mean in the post-Soviet era.
Questions which Putin, following his legacy, must consider as well.
Russia racketeering
Essentially, corruption describes deviant behaviour that is motivated by private gain at public expense.
Russia has consistently ranked poorly in international comparisons of countries that are corrupt.
For example, Transparency International (TI) placed Russia 143rd place out of 182 countries in its rankings in 2011, with a score of 2.4 on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean).
In 2000, TI had ranked Russia 82nd out of 99 countries, and scored it 2.4.
These rankings show that that Putin’s presidency in 2000 and then again in 2004, and again as prime minister in 2008, has had little impact on the levels of corruption in Russia, as measured by TI.
However, the scale of corruption, type, and its social acceptability are more difficult to measure given the repression of the Media in the country.
According to academics, corruption in Russia has moved from centralized forms (where payment are organized, centralized, and fixed) in the Communist era to a decentralized system (any number of bureaucrats may independently demand payment) in the post-Soviet era.
This form of decentralized corruption can be seen to a lesser degree in post-economic reform China, but more chronically in Sub-Saharan African countries, where instead of maintaining a status quo, corruption can in fact increase poverty.
Repressed media?
The media is often the main vehicle through which a society shows its dissatisfaction.
In Russia, the media has been drawn into the battle between the state and anti-corruption protesters.
Some of the main state-controlled TV channels, such as Rossiya One and Channel One, began showing earlier this year anti-establishment politicians who were previously banned from their studios for several years.
However, other editorially independent media outlets, such as the liberal radio station Ekho Moscovy and opposition newspaper Novaya Gazeta, have recently come under pressure by state authorities for providing coverage of anti-corruption protests.
Even so, it has been the internet which has been the main medium through which Russian citizens have been able to bypass state rhetoric, expose corruption in Russian society, and propagate that message to both domestic and international audiences.
Despite Putin’s comments in February 2012 downplaying the impact of the internet in Russian society, without the same control mechanisms in place as China, Moscow will find it difficult to control opposition or anti-Putin discourses online.
Although around 80 per cent of Russians still watch the news on state-dominated television channels, Russian independent polling organisation Levada Centre found in December 2011 that fewer people believe the news they see and hear.
Meanwhile, some 44 per cent of Russians use the Internet as one of their main news sources, and this trend is likely to rise, particularly among the disenfranchised, internet-savvy Russian youth.
Beyond Putin
Media narratives show that Russian society, much like any other former superpower, is split largely along strong simultaneous desires to maintain control and influence in the international community (strong leadership), and hopes that the country will successfully modernize both economically and politically (strong governance).
Both corruption and anti-corruption movements in Russia are symptoms of the mainstream society that believes that their former superpower nation can again be super.
Up until recently, Putin has been able to use this belief, along with Russians’ sense of nationalism, to show his strength as a leader both domestically and abroad.
However, aspiration-focused opposition media narratives indicate that the spell that has been binding people’s perceptions of Putin as inextricably linked with Russia’s (past and future) greatness is starting to break.
For example, the rhetoric dominating the anti-corruption protest movements has been largely anti-Putin in nature and began with a demonstration on 4 February following allegations that parliamentary polls had been rigged in favour of Putin’s One Russia Party.
Analysts suggest that Putin can proceed after his election on 4 March either by repressing opposition voices, or by going with the calls for change and reform.
However, the narratives indicate that Putin should also be considering how to revive Russia’s regional and international status and influence, instead of propagating an illusion of his own greatness and associating it with that of Russia’s.
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